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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters that invoke axiomatic approaches to study
models of decision making under objective and variable information.
In Chapter 1, we propose a model of choice from choice architectures that refer to
environments where alternatives are presented with objective and observable choice-
relevant information. We identify choice architectures by directed graphs on sets of
alternatives where directed edges represent choice-relevant information about the al-
ternatives. In this domain, a choice function hence singles out a vertex from each given
directed graph, whereas a choice correspondence assigns to every directed graph a set
of vertices. A choice function and choice correspondence are respectively characterized
by a choice procedure that separates the role of information processing from that of
preferences. Notably, both choice procedures suggest the same machinery of informa-
tion processing that is hinged on properties of directed graphs, hence being objective
and predictable. We then explore its implications on the formation mechanism of con-
sideration sets and the sources of the stochasticity of choice. Later in the chapter,
we also study the applications in terms of demand shaping and revealing equilibrium,
respectively.
Chapter 2 considers decision making under uncertainty with objective and variable
information structures. We take as primitive a family of information-dependent pref-
erences over subjective acts indexed by partitions of the state space. Each partition
corresponds to an information structure. We characterize a utility representation that
comprises an affine utility index over simple lotteries, a unique capacity over the state
space, and for each partition, a probability measure on the σ-algebra generated by the
partition. We find that such a representation is equivalent to the Choquet expected
utility representation with specific machinery of non-additive belief formation. We then
connect the utility representation to the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion
to explore the characteristic conditions related to the translatability of uncertainty
attitude among variable information structures.
In Chapter 3, we explicitly incorporate framing of information into decision making
under uncertainty. As in Chapter 2, we also study a family of partition-indexed prefer-
ences over subjective acts, where we interpret each partition as a frame of information.
iii
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Under a modest set of axioms, we characterize a general utility representation, which
we call frame-adaptive expected utility. Having the general utility representation, we
focus on two parameterized forms of frame-adaptive expected utility featuring atti-
tude towards informativeness and degree of salience, respectively. We then apply the
frame-adaptive models to the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion and that
of definitive uncertainty-aversion to study the translatability of uncertainty attitude
among variable frames of information. We also conduct a comparative analysis and
find that the decision maker’s reaction to information frames plays a role in modifying
the degree of uncertainty attitude revealed from choices. Later in the chapter, we relate
frame-adaptivity to ambiguity-aversion and argue that the latter can be viewed as a
manifestation of the decision-maker performing frame-adaptive reasoning.
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Choosing from Graphical Choice Architectures
1.1. Introduction
The standard revealed preference theory considers choice from sets.1 It evinces
a parsimonious stance on what should be observed in the model, yet it has led us
to experience identification problems when we try to understand bounded rationality,
procedural rationality, and attention structures (e.g., Kahneman (2003); Manzini and
Mariotti (2012a); Masatlioglu et al. (2012)). For example, once attention structures are
employed to explain choice data, we often fail to separate preference and the strength
of attention-grabbing. Even when the choice data satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP), we still have at least two explanations: (i) the choice is obtained by
a preference maximization (Richter (1966)), or (ii) an exogenous order on alternatives
describing their strength of attention-grabbing determines the choice while preference
is empty. Such identification problems seem to be inevitable when we insist on choice
from sets and introduce subjective concepts to explain choice data. Moreover, since
choice problems are entirely described by the given sets of alternatives (i.e., menus),
the standard theory suggests only one-dimensional identification of choice problems.
Hence, the standard framework might become uninformative about whether and how
the behavioral properties that we observed in a choice problem translate to the relevant
applications. For instance, in the game-theoretical context, it is often considered that
the rules of a game influence players’ choices solely through determining the way of
strategic interaction among players, while the underlying preference of each player is
fixed. However, when multiple games are under consideration, we are unable to tell if
games with different rules also modify players’ preferences or solely alter the form of
strategic interactions.
In the real world, choices are often made in environments where many objective and
observable features or information can influence them. Thaler et al. (2010) referred to
those environments as choice architectures. For example, a DM might browse items
through hyperlinks on a shopping site. In task scheduling, the designated rules in which
one task necessitates another constrain the arrangements. Choice architectures give us
1For a comprehensive summary, see Chambers and Echenique (2016).
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various choice observations even with a fixed set of alternatives, hence providing rich
choice data that allow us to isolate more accurate descriptions of choice than what we
used to in the domain of sets. That is to say, if we equip choice architectures with
suitable analytical structures and take them as primitives, then in this rich domain, we
might be able to separate the unconditional choices and explicate how others depend on
exogenous information given by choice architectures. Moreover, once we unveil such an
architecture dependency, it becomes possible to lead the choice via shaping the choice
architectures to achieve desirable outcomes. Thus, why not utilize the richness?
We propose a model of choice from a class of choice architectures and study both
choice functions and correspondences. Our model specifies choice architectures as di-
rected graphs (digraphs) on sets of alternatives. This is because, apart from those ar-
chitectures that have the structure of digraphs by nature (hyperlink connections, store
layout, etc.), we might find that some architectures suggest specific orders over the
alternatives (e.g., material conditionals, eligibility in task scheduling, rules of games),
and such orders can be represented by directed graphs. A choice function hence sin-
gles out a vertex from every digraph, whereas a choice correspondence assigns a set of
vertices to every digraph.
In the spirits of the Monotonicity axiom and the Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives (IIA) axiom in the context of choice from sets, we impose two sets of analogous
axioms on our choice function and correspondence. They jointly characterize the choice
function and correspondence as two specific procedures, both of which involve sorting
alternatives. Such sorting obeys the acyclic part of the order induced by each given
digraph and coincides with topological sorting of each digraph with a specific transfor-
mation. Intuitively, the choice function is a position-based selection from the sorted
lists that admits the choice function from lists studied by Rubinstein and Salant (2006)
(RS).2 That is, given a choice architecture, the DM sorts the alternatives following the
order induced by the architecture. She then picks the first or last most preferred
alternative from the sorted list according to her preference. Meanwhile, the choice
correspondence is described by the union of alternatives that survive a position-based
elimination from each possible sorted list. The elimination is specified by a pair of tran-
sitive binary relations (%0,%1) and incorporates the maximization of a partial order
∗ given by %0 ∩ %1. Given a choice architecture, the DM considers all possible sorted
lists that obey the order induced by the digraph. From each sorted list, she eliminates
the alternatives that are weakly dominated either by %0 from the front or by %1 from
behind. The potential choices are then obtained by gathering the remaining alterna-
tives from each sorted list. Notably, since the topological sorting of digraphs represents
the sorting procedure, the sorted lists depend only on each given choice architecture,
2For a related model, see also Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
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hence being objective and independent of the preference. Thus, our model achieves a
physical separation of the preference maximization and the architecture dependency,
and we subsequently explore the significance of such a separation.
In Section 1.5, we discuss the implications of our model. It is proved that the
selection procedure of our choice function is compatible with the elimination proce-
dure of our choice correspondence, which suggests two translation properties that link
our choice function and correspondence. Moreover, our model implies a mechanism
of shortlisting, which is closely related to the one suggested by the iterative search in
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013). We also identify a possible source of the stochastic
description of choice that can unify the approaches of preference maximization and
stochastic choice (Manzini and Mariotti (2014)). We then present two strands of ap-
plications in Section 1.6, in terms of shaping demand and revealing equilibrium. We
show that (i) the interested party can lead individual choice via shaping choice archi-
tectures, and (ii) our model can be introduced as an alternative formalization of games
with discrete payoffs where our choice correspondence reveals the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria as in Chambers et al. (2017).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 includes the formal
notations. In Section 1.3, we present the axioms and the characterization of the choice
function. Section 1.4 provides the full characterization of the choice correspondence
and investigates the rationalization of the induced choice correspondence on sets. The
implications and applications are studied in Section 1.5 and Section 1.6. Section 1.7
discusses related literature. Proofs are concluded in Appendix 1.A.
1.2. Preliminaries
Let X be a finite set of alternatives and 2X denote its power set. For a given
positive integer n ≤ #X, the set of all n-element subsets of X is denoted by [X]n. Let
D = D(V,E, ι, τ), simply D = D(V,E), be the typical digraph on vertices V ∈ 2X \{∅}
with edges E ⊂ V ×V , where E defines an irreflexive relation on V .3 Whenever E 6= ∅,
the mapping ι : E → V maps each e ∈ E to its first coordinate, while τ maps to
the second coordinate. Let D be the set of all digraphs on the nonempty subsets of
X. Given a D, the set of vertices and that of edges are denoted V (D) and E(D),
respectively. Moreover, let C(D) and P(D) denote the sets of all cycles and paths in
D. We write uPv ⊆ D when the path P ∈ P(D) goes through u, v following the
directions of every e ∈ P . Unless otherwise stated, we do not distinguish a set V
from the digraph D(V, ∅), and simply write V . Similarly, given u, v ∈ X, simply write
3That is, D(V,E, ι, τ) does not allow any loops or multiple edges.
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(u, v) to denote D ({u, v}, {(u, v)}). Given a D, its induced subgraph on A ⊆ V (D)
is denoted by D[A].4 Let T : D → D be the transitive closure operator. Denote by
A : D → D the mapping which, from every D ∈ D, deletes all the edges contained in
cycles in D. That is,
A(D) := (V (D), E(D) \ {e | ∃C ∈ C(D), e ∈ E(C)}) .
Unless otherwise stated, the induced subgraph operator always acts last for any com-
bination of operators. For instance, A ◦ TD[V ] = (A ◦ TD)[V ].
A digraph D is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) if C(D) = ∅. A DAG S is a string
if S is connected and satisfies #{e | ι(e) = v} ≤ 1 and #{e | τ(e) = v} ≤ 1 for all
v ∈ V (S). The set of all strings in D is denoted by S. For a DAG D, a string ϕ(D)
on V (D) is called a topological sorting of D if ι(e)Pτ(e) ⊆ ϕ(D) for all e ∈ E(D). We
identify each topological sorting by a mapping ϕ : {D ∈ D | C(D) = ∅} → S, and





ϕ2(·): vuxy ϕ3(·): vxuy
D Φ(D) = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}
Figure 1.1 – Topological Sorting
1.3. Choice Function
In a collection of non-repeated observations, choice behavior is described by the
choice function z : D → X such that z(D) ∈ V (D) for all D ∈ D. We impose the
following two axioms on z.
Axiom 1.1 (Dominance of Acyclic Connectivity, DAC). For any V ∈ 2X \ {∅} and
v ∈ V , if z(D) 6= v for any connected DAG D on V , then z(D̃) 6= v for all D̃ with
V ⊆ V (D̃).
We refer to the connected DAGs as “simple” architectures, since every connected
DAG represents a nonempty partial order on the underlying set of vertices. DAC
states that, given a menu, if an alternative is not chosen from all possible simple
4D[A] contains all the edges of D which connects the vertices in A.
1.3. CHOICE FUNCTION 5
architectures on the menu, it would never be chosen from extensive menus regardless
of the choice architectures. Conversely, if an alternative is chosen from a particular
choice architecture, then for any of its sub-menus, it is possible to design an appropriate
architecture from which this alternative would be chosen. Hence, DAC implies that
the DM’s choice must reveal her preference if it exists.
Given a D, we call a collection of digraphs {Di}i an induced partition of D if (i)
{V (Di)}i partitions V (D), and (ii) Dj = TD[V (Dj)] for every Dj ∈ {Di}i.5 Note that
every member of an induced partition (Dj ∈ {Di}i) preserves all the information given
in D since, for any u, v ∈ V (Dj), if there is a P ∈ P(D) such that uPv ⊂ D, then
(u, v) ∈ E(Dj).
Axiom 1.2 (Independence of Induced Partition, IIP). For any D ∈ D and any of
its induced partitions {Di}i, if v = z(D) 6= z (TD[{z(Di)}i]) = u, then
(i) v ∈ {z(Di)}i =⇒ [(u, v) ∈ E (TD) ⇔ (v, u) ∈ E (TD)];
(ii) v ∈ Dj \ {z(Dj)} =⇒ [(z(Dj), v) ∈ E (TD) ⇔ (v, z(Dj)) ∈ E (TD)].
IIP considers a compound choice that divides a choice architecture into several
sub-architectures then chooses from the alternatives which are chosen from each sub-
architecture and compares such a compound choice with that from the original ar-
chitecture. It states that, without loss of information, the choice reversal is allowed
only among those pairs of alternatives that are not simply intervened ((u, v) ∈ E(TD)
or (v, u) ∈ E(TD) exclusively). Intuitively, for some pairs of alternatives, when a
given choice architecture is restrictive or stimulative to neither of the alternatives
((u, v), (v, u) 6∈ E(TD)), then the choice might depend on how they are related to
the others in the architecture and what is available on the menu. On the other hand,
when the given choice architecture is stimulative (resp., restrictive) to both alternatives
((u, v), (v, u) ∈ E(TD)), then the DM should be free to implement either of those in-
terventions in her choice. In connection with the IIA axiom, IIP requires that omitting
the alternatives that are rejected under simple interventions from a choice architecture
does not alter the choice. The following example gives a simple illustration of IIP.
Example 1.1 (IIP). Consider the digraph D in Figure 1.2, where TD is given by
including the dashed edges and {C1, S1}, {{y}, D1} define two induced partitions of D.
(i) Suppose z(C1) = y and z(S1) = v in {C1, S1}. Then IIP requires that z(D) 6= x
since x is not chosen from {v, x} under a single edge. While it does allow z(D) = u
5Caution should be exercised in the definition of induced partition. In particular, each Dj ∈ {Di}i
is not necessarily the induced subgraph of D, as the induced subgraph operation is taken after the
transitive closure. Hence, Dj becomes the induced subgraph only if TD = D.
















Figure 1.2 – Independence of Induced Partition
because the choice from cycles is not necessarily consistent. (ii) Suppose z(D1) = v,
then it must hold that z(D) = z((y, v)) for the induced partition 2.
Let %⊂ X×X be a connex and transitive binary relation and let δ : X → {0,1} be
an indicator function such that δ(x) = δ(y) whenever x ∼ y. Denote by z%,δ : S → X
the choice function that picks the first or the last %-maximal vertex from every S ∈ S,
when δ = 0 or 1, respectively (Rubinstein and Salant (2006)).
Theorem 1.1. A choice function z : D → X satisfies DAC and IIP if and only if
there exist a unique connex and transitive binary relation %⊂ X×X, a unique function
δ : X → {0,1}, and for each D ∈ D, there is a topological sorting ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD)
such that, for every D ∈ D, z(D) = z%,δ(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD). Moreover, given %⊂ X ×X,
this choice procedure is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.2.
Remark 1.1. In the theorem, the binary relation% and the function δ : X → {0,1}
are given in accordance with RS. That is, %:= ∪ ∼ and ∼:=∼0 ∪ ∼1, where
 := {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = z((v, u)) = u} ;
∼0 := {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = u ∧ z((v, u)) = v} ;
∼1 := {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = v ∧ z((v, u)) = u} .
Accordingly, for any v ∈ X, we assign δ(v) = 1 if a u ∈ X exists such that v ∼1 u, and
δ(v) = 0, otherwise. Then, δ : X → {0,1} is well-defined under IIP.
DAC and IIP characterize the choice function by the procedure that comprises
the maximization of %⊂ X × X and the resolution of indifference. Concretely, the
selection of topological sorting ϕD and the priority indicator δ govern the resolution
of indifference. Given a choice architecture, the DM sorts the alternatives in a linear
order that is compatible with the information given by the architecture. She then
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picks the most preferred alternative, which presents in the first or last in the sorted
list, according to the preference and priority indicator. The following example provides













x y u v
x u y v
Φ(A ◦ TD)
⇒





Figure 1.3 – Choice Function from Architectures
Example 1.2 (Choice Function). Suppose y ∼0 u  v ∼1 x and consider the
choice architecture D in Figure 1.3. Since D induces two partial orders, the DM sorts
{x, y, u, v} into ϕD or −−−→xyuv. Then, from one of the sorted lists, say ϕD, the DM
picks the first %-maximal alternative u as the indifferent class {u, y} is endowed with
δ(·) = 0.
For a given D, Φ(A ◦ TD) is predetermined yet non-singleton in general. As the
choice procedure is not informative about the realization of topological sorting ϕD ∈
Φ(·), it involves a systematic indeterminacy. The implication of such indeterminacy is
discussed in Section 1.5.3.
1.4. Choice Correspondence
In this section, we consider the collective observation in which choice behavior is
described by a choice correspondence Z : D  X such that ∅ 6= Z(D) ⊆ V (D) for any
D ∈ D. We postulate the following axioms on the choice correspondence.
Axiom 1.3 (Dominance of Acyclic Connectivity*, DAC*). For any V ∈ 2X \ {∅}
and any u ∈ V , if u 6∈ Z(D) for all connected DAG D on V , then u 6∈ Z(D̃) for all
D̃ ∈ D such that V ⊆ V (D̃).
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Axiom 1.4 (Difference in Acyclic Difference, DAD). For any V ∈ 2X \{∅} and any
connected DAGs D and D̃ on V , u ∈ Z(D), v ∈ Z(D̃) implies u, v ∈ Z(D ∩ D̃).
The first two axioms regard the variation of choice architectures on a fixed menu,
where DAC* is clearly the natural extension of DAC. Meanwhile, if we suppose that
two different simple choice architectures (D, D̃) on a fixed menu (V ) yield different
choices (u ∈ Z(D), v ∈ Z(D̃) and u 6= v), then it is reasonable to attribute the cause
to the difference between those architectures. DAD hence states that, if we remove such
difference and preserve only the interventions that those architectures have in common,
then the new choice architecture (D∩D̃) must admit all the alternatives that are chosen
separately (u, v ∈ Z(D ∩ D̃)). That is because, a plainer choice architecture must not
contradict the reasons that lead to the choices from finer architectures, meaning that
choices from a plainer architecture should be as flexible as those from finer architectures.
Axiom 1.5 (Independence of Induced Partition*, IIP*). For any D ∈ D, (i)
Z(D) = Z (TD [⋃i Z(Di)]) for all induced partition {Di}i; (ii) if #V (D) > 2, and⋃
i Z(Di) = V (D) for every induced partition {Di}i, then Z(D) = V (D).
IIP* regards the variation of the induced subgraphs of a fixed choice architecture.
Clearly, IIP*-(i) is the natural extension of IIP, while IIP*-(ii) rules out a specific
situation in which some alternatives are eliminated from a choice architecture, with it
being chosen from every possible member of induced partition, only if the architecture
is presented as a whole.
The following theorem and proposition provide two equivalent characterizations of
choice correspondence from architectures with different primitives. In Theorem 1.2,
a unique pair of transitive binary relations (%0,%1) and a unique filtration mapping
γ characterize the choice correspondence. Meanwhile, in Proposition 1.1, the choice
correspondence is characterized by the unique filtration mapping γ and a unique choice
profile ∆ that assigns the chosen alternatives directly to every potential edge.
Given a D, Y(D) ⊆ [V (D)]2 denotes the set of all pairs of vertices contained in the
same cycles in D. That is, Y(D) := {{u, v} | ∃C ∈ C(D), u, v ∈ V (C)}. Let (%0,%1)
be a pair of partial orders on X. Denote by Z%δ : S  X the choice correspondence
that picks, from each string, all the vertices which are not dominated under %0 from
the front, nor under %1 from behind. Formally, for any S ∈ S,
Z%δ(S) :=
v ∈ V (S)
∣∣∣∣∀u ∈ V (S),
 uPv ⊆ S ⇒ ¬(u %0 v) ∧
vPu ⊆ S ⇒ ¬(u %1 v)
 .
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Theorem 1.2. A choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD, and
IIP* if and only if there exist a connex quasi-transitive binary relation R ⊂ X×X with
a unique decomposition R =%0 ∪ %1 ∪ ∼∗ and a unique mapping γ : [X]2 → [X]1∪{∅}










Moreover, %0,%1 are transitive, and given (%0,%1), the expression of Z is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.3.
Remark 1.2. The binary relations %0,%1 and ∼∗ are specified as follows:
%0:= {(u, v) | v 6∈ Z((u, v))} ; %1:= {(u, v) | v 6∈ Z((v, u))} ;
∼∗:= {(u, v) | {u, v} = Z((u, v)) = Z((v, u))} .
Then, ∼∗ is symmetric yet not necessarily transitive, while %0 and %1 are transitive.
When ∗:= (%0 ∩ %1) 6= ∅, it characterizes the unconditional choice in the sense that,
if u ∗ v, then v would never be chosen whenever u is available.
The theorem suggests that “selection” and “elimination” are behaviorally compati-
ble when we consider the cumulative choice data. That is, given a choice architecture,
the potential choice can be described by the collective outcome of a specific elimina-
tion. From every sorted list that obeys the order induced by the given digraph, the
DM rejects an alternative if another alternative is listed in front (resp., listed behind)
that weakly dominates it under %0 (resp., %1), or it is excluded by Γ(D).
Note that the mapping γ : [X]2 → [X]1 ∪ {∅} assigns to each choice architecture
a set of alternatives that would never be chosen from the architecture even if some
of them might survive the elimination. That is, for particular choice architectures, γ
systematically rules out some alternatives, as if the DM ignores them from those choice
architectures. This observation is compatible with the notions of limited attention and
limited consideration (e.g., Manzini and Mariotti (2014); Lleras et al. (2017)).
Let E := (X × X) \ {(x, x) | x ∈ X} be the set of all potential edges on X. Let
∆ : E  {0,1} be a nonempty correspondence. Denote by Z∆ : S  X the choice
correspondence that picks, from every string, the vertices which are neither the initials
of edges with ∆(e) = {1} nor the terminals of edges with ∆(e) = {0} in TS. Formally,
for any S ∈ S,
Z∆(S) :=
v ∈ V (S)
∣∣∣∣ ∀e ∈ E(TS),
 ι(e) = v ⇒ ∆(e) 6= {1} ∧
τ(e) = v ⇒ ∆(e) 6= {0}
 .
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Proposition 1.1. A choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD, and
IIP* if and only if there exist a unique nonempty correspondence ∆ : E  {0,1} and










Moreover, given ∆ : E  {0,1}, the expression of Z is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.1.
Example 1.3 (Choice Correspondence). This example gives a demonstration of
these equivalent choice procedures. Consider D given in Figure 1.4, where Γ(D) =
V (D) = {x, y, u, v}. (i) Suppose ∆((x, u)) = ∆((u, v)) = ∆((y, v)) = {0,1} (blue
edges), ∆((u, y)) = ∆((y, u)) = {0} (black edges) and ∆((x, y)) = ∆((x, v)) = {1}
(red edges). Clearly, A ◦ TD has topological sorting S1, S2. The DM eliminates x, u
from S1 since x is the initial of the edges labeled∆(·) = {1} ((x, y), (x, v)), while u is the
terminal of the edge labeled∆(·) = {0} ((y, u)) in TS1. Analogously, x, y are eliminated
from S2. As a result, Z(D) = {y, u, v}. (ii) Suppose v %1 x, v ∼∗ u, v ∼∗ y, y ∼0 u
and u %0 x in Figure 1.4. Again, the DM rejects x, u from S1 as v is listed after x,
satisfying v %1 x, while y appears before u, satisfying y %0 u. Similarly, the DM
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Figure 1.4 – Choice Correspondence from Architectures
In what follows, we establish a connection between the properties of choice from
the architectures and those of choice from sets. To this end, we explicitly distinguish
a nonempty subset V ⊆ X from the digraph (V, ∅) and consider the induced choice
correspondence Z∗(V ) := Z((V, ∅)) on nonempty subsets V ⊆ X. Then, Z∗ : 2X \
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{∅}  X represents the choice from sets of alternatives without explicit structures.
The next corollary shows that, under DAC*, DAD, and IIP*, Z∗ is rationalized by a
transitive binary relation.
Corollary 1.2.1. If a choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD
and IIP*, then a unique transitive binary relation ∗⊂ X×X exists such that Z∗(V ) =
{v ∈ V | @u ∈ V, u ∗ v} for all V ∈ 2X \ {∅}.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
Note that the rationale ∗⊂ X × X might lack explanatory power or normative
implication as a v ∈ X might exists such that ¬(u ∗ v) and ¬(v ∗ u) for all u ∈ X
even when # ∗ is sufficiently large. The following property provides a sufficient
condition under which every alternative is related to some alternatives regarding the
rationale. We show that, under the following property, Z∗ can be described by the
maximization of a semiorder.6
Axiom 1.6 (Relevance). For any u, v ∈ X, Z((u, v)) = {u, v} implies Z((v, u)) 6=
{u, v}.
Relevance requires that, in binomial choices, the DM should be sensitive or sophisti-
cated to either the alternatives or architectures, such that there is a simple architecture
(in this case, a digraph on two vertices with a single edge) under which she consis-
tently prefers one alternative over another. In terms of preference, the implication of
Relevance is restrictive in the sense that, even if some alternatives are indifferent or
incomparable, ties must be broken under some interventions.
Corollary 1.2.2. If a choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD,
IIP*, and Relevance, then there is a unique semiorder S⊂ X ×X such that Z∗(V ) =
{v ∈ V | @u ∈ V, u S v} for all V ∈ 2X \ {∅}.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
We now establish a connection between the properties of choice from architectures
and WARP of classical choice correspondences. In the context of choice from sets, a
choice correspondence Z : 2X \ {∅}  X satisfies WARP if for any A,B ⊆ X and
any x, y ∈ A ∩ B, x ∈ Z(A) and y ∈ Z(B) imply x ∈ Z(B). Similarly, we consider a
sufficient condition. The following property states that every binomial choice should
6See Luce (1956); Sen (1971); Jamison and Lau (1973).
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consistently yield a single alternative whenever they are intervened by simple choice
architectures (connected by a single edge).
Axiom 1.7 (Strong Relevance). For any u, v ∈ X, Z((u, v)) and Z((v, u)) are
singleton.
Proposition 1.2. If a choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD,
IIP*, and Strong Relevance then Z∗ : 2X \ {∅} X satisfies WARP.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.2.
1.5. Discussion
1.5.1. More on Axioms
The axioms imposed on z : D → X and Z : D  X are of the UNCAF type
proposed by Chambers et al. (2014). In addition, all of these except IIP* become
vacuous when we focus on the choice from sets (z∗ : 2X \{∅} → X and Z∗ : 2X \{∅}
X), meaning that choice data from sets might not be sufficient to falsify properties of
choice behavior. IIP* induces the following property in the restricted domain. Being
akin to the IIA axiom, it states that eliminating some alternatives that are rejected
from disjoint submenus does not alter the choice from the given menu.
Axiom 1.8 (IIP* on Sets). For any V ∈ 2X \ {∅}, it holds that (i) Z∗(V ) =
Z∗(⋃Vj∈{Vi}i Z∗(Vj)) for any partition {Vi}i of V , and (ii) if ⋃Vj∈{Vi}i Z∗(Vj) = V for
every non-trivial partition {Vi}i, then Z∗(V ) = V .
In the characterization of Z : D  X, DAD acts as a normative imposition rather
than a necessary condition. It is imposed since Theorem 1.2 has a strong normative
implication for the rationalization of Z∗ : 2X \ {∅}  X (the induced choice corre-
spondence from sets) when we consider the connection between Z and the choice from
the sets. We present a characterization of Z without DAD. For every D ∈ D, let
H(D) ⊆ [V (D)]2 be the collection of 2-element sets of isolated vertices in D. Formally,
H(D) := {{u, v} ∈ [V (D)]2 | TD[{u, v}] = {u, v}}.
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Proposition 1.3. A choice correspondence Z : D  X satisfies DAC* and IIP* if
and only if there exist a unique nonempty correspondence ∆ : E  {0,1} and a unique




Z∆ (ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD)
 ∩ Γ∗(D);









for any D ∈ D. Moreover, given γC , γI and ∆ the expression of Z is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.3.
1.5.2. Procedural Invariant and Sampling
Here, we study how our characterization of choice translates between the choice
function (the non-repeated experiment that forces single choices) and the choice corre-
spondence (sufficiently accumulated choice data). The following corollaries show that
the selection z%,δ : S → X and the elimination Z%δ : S  X are compatible, and every
singleton sample of Z reveals the unconditional choice observed in Z.7
Corollary 1.2.3. Let %:= ∪ ∼0 ∪ ∼1 be the preference obtained in Theo-
rem 1.1. Then a unique pair of partial orders Q0, Q1 ⊂ X × X exists such that: (i)
for every u, v ∈ X, u % v if and only if uQ0v or uQ1v, and (ii) ZQδ(S) = {z%,δ(S)}
for all S ∈ S.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
Corollary 1.2.4. Suppose that choice correspondence Z : D  X and binary
relation R follow the statement in Theorem 1.2. Let ẑ : D → X be a sample of Z such
that ẑ(D) ∈ Z(D) for every D ∈ D. Denote by %̂ := ̂ ∪ ∼̂0 ∪ ∼̂1 the binary relation
defined by ẑ : D → X following Remark 1.1. Then, (i) (%0 ∩ %1) ⊆ ̂, and (ii) for
any u, v ∈ X, if u %0 v or u %1 v, then u%̂v.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
Regarding the translation of choice behavior, the followings are invariant between
the choice function and correspondence: (i) the sorting of choice architectures and the
7Notice that ẑ : D → X in Corollary 1.2.4 does not necessarily satisfy DAC and IIP. The corollary
only requires those binary relations to be defined in the same way as in Theorem 1.1, according to
the data given by ẑ.
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selection/elimination procedure from each sorted list, and (ii) the unconditional choice
(∗:=%0 ∩ %1) observed in data of sufficient size. Moreover, the unconditional choice
cannot be underestimated theoretically in choice functions. Hence, when Γ(D) =
V (D) for all D ∈ D, the choice correspondence Z : D  X is a twofold extension of
z : D → X. That is, all possible sorted lists (i.e., ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD)) are considered in
the cumulative observation, with the extended description of preference.
1.5.3. Consideration Set Formation and Source of Stochasticity
In recent papers, consideration sets have been explicitly derived as the results
of models (Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013); Caplin et al. (2019)).8 Some choice-
theoretical studies also give insight into the formation of consideration sets.9 As with
these papers, our model has implications for the formation of consideration sets. For
every D ∈ D, Theorem 1.1 implies that z(D) ∈ {z%,δ(ϕD ◦A◦TD) | ϕD ∈ Φ(A◦TD)}
and does not falsify any outcome from the selection of topological sorting ϕD ∈ Φ(·).
Given the preference %:= ∪ ∼0 ∪ ∼1, the realization of ϕD uniquely determines the
choice from D. Since the set Φ(·) depends on D, z%,δ(ϕD(·)) = z%,δ(ϕ′D(·)) might hold
for some ϕD, ϕ′D ∈ Φ(·), or there might be a %-maximal alternative v ∈ V (D) such that
v 6= z%,δ(ϕD(·)) for all ϕD ∈ Φ(·). In addition, for some D, D̃ ∈ D with V (D) ⊆ V (D̃),
it is possible that z(D) 6= z%,δ(ϕD̃ ◦ A ◦ TD̃) for all ϕD̃ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD̃) and there is
a ϕ′
D̃
∈ Φ(A ◦ TD̃) such that z%,δ(ϕ′D̃ ◦ A ◦ TD̃) ∈ V (D), as if z(D) is ignored from
D̃. These observations support the notion of consideration sets. Consequently, the set
K(D) := {z%,δ(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD) | ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD)} can be identified as the consider-
ation set of a given D ∈ D. Note that, (i) the set K(D) is obtained as the result of
preference maximization and summarizes different resolutions of indifference, whereas
the consideration set studied in the literature serves as the subdomain of preference
maximization; (ii) our model identifies the consideration sets by isolating its formation
mechanism, which is often sidestepped in the literature.
Manzini and Mariotti (2014) proposed a model that links the preference maxi-
mization to the stochastic choice data, where the source of stochasticity is given by a
probabilistic membership of consideration sets. That is, each alternative is considered
with a fixed probability. In an analogy, our model signifies the realization frequency of
8Caplin et al. (2019) captured the formation of consideration sets by optimizing the Shannon
model, whereas in Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013), consideration sets are obtained by searching
process. For other econometric and experimental approaches, see Mehta et al. (2003); Caplin et al.
(2011).
9For instance, shortlisting in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and categorizing in Manzini and Mariotti
(2012a).
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topological sorting as a source of stochasticity. Given a choice architecture D, Propo-
sition 1.1 implies that each topological sorting ϕD ∈ Φ(A◦TD) uniquely determines a
subset ν(ϕD) := Z∆(ϕD(·)) ⊆ V (D), where, for every e ∈ E(T ◦ ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD[ν(ϕD)]),
we have ∆(e) = {0,1}. If we suppose the cumulative observation Z : D  X is
endowed with choice frequency data, then our model is related to the choice frequency
in the following manner. Upon generating the data, each ϕD ∈ Φ(·) might be real-
ized with a probability p(ϕD;D), and for every (u, v) ∈ {(u, v) ∈ E | ∆((u, v)) =
{0,1}}, the image of ∆((u, v)) might collapse to {0}, {1} or {0,1} with probability
q({0}; (u, v)), q({1}; (u, v)) and q({0,1}; (u, v)), respectively. Then, under suitable nu-
merical extensions of our axioms, one might characterize the choice frequency by those
probabilities, or represent all the frequencies as a function of alternatives (e.g., Luce
(1959)). Notably, since ν(ϕD) only contains ∗-maximal alternatives for every D ∈ D
and any ϕD ∈ Φ(·), our model conjectures that the choice reveals to be stochastic
because of the random tie-breaking. This implication is in analogy to Aguiar et al.
(2016), where the choice is described by satisficing with fixed preference and random
search orders.
1.6. Applications
In the abstract, our model can be interpreted as choice under exogenous irreflexive
orders, which are identified as digraph architectures. The architecture dependency
of choice can be exercised to a wide spectrum of choice-relevant studies due to the
abundance of real-world objects, rules, and information that can induce orders over
the alternatives in question. In what follows, we discuss two strands of applications in
terms of demand and equilibrium.
1.6.1. Choice Leading and Manipulation
One major strand of application is that, with the architecture dependency being
unveiled, interested parties can utilize the real-world objects or information (e.g., hy-
perlink connections, rules, user ratings) to lead the choice intentionally via shaping the
choice architectures.10 Here, we focus our argument on frequent choice situations, hence
on the choice correspondence Z : D  X. The following result shows the possibility
of such choice leading.
10Manzini et al. (2011) studied the choice manipulation problem in two-stage threshold framework.
In their paper, the manipulation is specified by varying one psychological variable with the other
variables being fixed; hence, they are implicit on how the manipulation is exercised. For the two-stage
threshold model, see also Manzini et al. (2013).
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Proposition 1.4. Suppose Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD, and IIP*. Then,
for every nonempty V ∈ 2X , there exist unique subsets Core(V ), Cl(V ) ⊆ V such that
(i) Core(V ) ⊆ Z(D) ⊆ Cl(V ) for any D(V,E) ∈ D and (ii) for every V ∗ ⊆ Cl(V ), a
connected DAG D∗(V,E∗) ∈ D exists such that (Core(V ) ∪ V ∗) ⊆ Z(D∗). Moreover,
if (Core(V ) ∪ V ∗) ⊂ Cl(V ), there is a D∗(V,E∗) ∈ D, in which {e ∈ E∗ | ι(e) =
v ∨ τ(e) = v} 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V , such that (Core(V ) ∪ V ∗) ⊆ Z(D∗) ⊂ Cl(V ).
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.4.
In the proposition, for a given menu V , (i) clarifies the spectrum of manipulation in
the sense that the alternatives in V \Cl(V ) or in Core(V ) are rejected or selected by the
DM solely according to her preference; hence, the variation of architecture cannot alter
the choice involving those alternatives. Probing further to (ii), given any submenu in
that spectrum, a connected DAG is sufficient to lead the choice to include the submenu,
while the latter part of (ii) reveals that, by a certain class of architectures, one can also
lead the DM not to choose particular alternatives. Incorporating the discussion on the
source of stochasticity, architecture shaping might also be related to leading the choice
frequency. We now demonstrate both the leading choice and, under some simplifying
assumptions, the leading choice frequency.
Example 1.4 (Leading Choice). Let a DM’s choice behavior Z : D  X sat-
isfy DAC*, DAD, and IIP*. Consider the menu V = {u, v, x, x̃, y} ⊂ X, where it
reveals xRI0x̃, vRP0 u, vRP0 x(x̃), vRP1 y, x(x̃)RP0 u, y ∼∗ x and y ∼∗ u. By default,
V is endowed with the architecture D0(V,E0) given in Figure 1.5. Since D0 has a
unique topological sorting ϕ0(D0) =
−−−−→
xux̃yv, we have Z(D0) = Z∆(ϕ0(D0)) = {x, v}.
Suppose the interested party intends to ensure u, x̃ would be chosen as well. This
could be managed by shaping the architecture to D(V,E) in the figure. In fact,




ux̃xyv, and ϕ3(D) =
−−−−→
ux̃yxv,
which yield Z∆(ϕ1(D)) = {u, x, v}, Z∆(ϕ2(D)) = Z∆(ϕ3(D)) = {u, x̃, v}. As a result,















Figure 1.5 – Leading Choice (Frequency)
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Example 1.5 (Leading Frequency). To simplify the argument, assume, in every
i.i.d. choice instance and for every architecture D̂, that: (i) the DM implements each
topological sorting ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD̂) with equal probability and picks an alternative w
uniformly from Z∆(ϕ(·)), and (ii) the realization of ϕ and the selection of w are i.i.d.







#Z∆(ϕi ◦ A ◦ TD̂)
) .
Hence, for D(V,E) in Figure 1.5, we have p(x,D) = 1/9 and p(u,D) = 1/3. In the




uxx̃yv, and ϕ̃3(D̃) =−−−−→
ux̃xyv. Notice that Z∆(ϕ̃1(D̃)) = {x, v}, Z∆(ϕ̃2(D̃)) = {u, x, v}, and Z∆(ϕ̃3(D̃)) =
{u, x̃, v}. Hence, we have 1/9 = p(x,D) < p(x, D̃) = 5/18 and 1/3 = p(u,D) >
p(u, D̃) = 2/9. As a result, the interested party can stimulate the frequency of x and
reduce that of u intentionally by shaping the architecture to D̃(V, Ẽ).
1.6.2. Choice Architectures as Games
Chambers et al. (2017) studied a sufficient condition under which the revealed pref-
erence formalization can reveal strategic group behavior, such as the Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, in the following, we apply choice architectures as an alternative language of
games with discrete strategies and present how our choice correspondence reveals the
pure-strategy Nash equilibria and the competitive equilibrium.
Let A,B be two DMs and V = {u, v, x, y} be the set of allocations. Suppose the
DMs’ preferences are given by the quasi-transitive binary relations %A,%B⊂ V × V .
Given V , %A and %B, define, for each DM i, a correspondence ∆i : V × V  {0,1}
and a mapping γi : [V ]2 → [V ]1 ∪ {∅} by
w i w̃ ⇐⇒
 ∆i((w, w̃)) = {0,1} ∧ ∆i((w̃, w)) = {1}
∧ γi({w, w̃}) = {w̃}
 ;
w ∼i w̃ ⇐⇒
 ∆i((w, w̃)) = {0,1} ∧ ∆i((w̃, w)) = {0,1}
∧ γi({w, w̃}) = {∅}
 .
(∗)
Let DA(V,EA) and DB(V,EB) be the digraphs given in Figure 1.6. Now, we consider
the set of allocations G({Di}i, {%i}i) := ZA(DA) ∩ ZB(DB), where for i = A,B,
Zi : D  V denotes the choice correspondence given in Proposition 1.1 with respect
to (∆i, γi) defined in Eq (∗).
Example 1.6. (i) Suppose x A u, u A v, v A y, and y B u, u B v, v B x.
Then, by Eq (∗), ZA(DA) = {x, v}, ZB(DB) = {y, v}. Hence, G({DA, DB}, {A,B








Figure 1.6 – 2× 2-Games
%A,%B being transitive. Then, we have G(·) = ZA(DA) = ZB(DB) = {u, v}. (iii)
Suppose u ∼A v, v A x, x ∼A y and x ∼B y, y B u, u ∼B v with %A,%B being
transitive. Then, ZA(DA) = {u, v}, ZB(DB) = {x, y}, and hence G(·) = ∅.
Under DA and DB, the preference profiles A and B given in (i), (ii), and (iii)
represent the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of Genders, and Matching Pennies, respec-
tively. In each case, G(·) captures the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Regarding this
formalization, the followings should be noted.
Remark 1.3. From each DM’s perspective, the choice problem is not strategic per
se, as it is degenerated to the choice from architectures. The strategic interaction,
however, is implicitly captured by the following aspects.
(a) The choice objects are given as allocations of payoffs. Hence, for each i, the
strict part of %i might differ from i’s strict preference over payoffs (e.g., %i
might incorporate envy).
(b) For each i, the intuition of (∆i, γi) in Eq (∗) is that, given u i v, if the game
allows someone (including i) to alter the allocation from v to u, or it is free
of alteration, then since i can always alter, u is the only possible allocation
(∆((v, u)) = {1}, γi({u, v}) = {v}). If someone (including i) can exercise the
alteration (u, v), then i must admit both u, v (∆((u, v)) = {0,1}), as other
players might make the alteration even if i would not.
(c) In Figure 1.6, each Di(V,Ei) describes the possible alterations of i’s that are
allowed by the game. For example, (x, y), (y, x) 6∈ EA as these alterations
require B to change her playing strategy.
Since the size of players is irrelevant to Remark 1.3-(a)(b)(c), the formalization and
the property of G(·) can be naturally extended to any finite set of players N .
Let V be the finite set of allocations in question. The set of players is denoted by
N , and each i ∈ N is described by the quasi-transitive preference %i⊂ V × V . For
each i ∈ N , define a correspondences ∆i : V × V  {0,1} and a mapping γi : [V ]2 →
[V ]1 ∪ {∅} following Eq (∗), and let Di be the digraph on V with E(Di) containing all
the edges on the allocations between which i can make the alteration. We consider the
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where each Zi : D  V is the correspondence given in Proposition 1.1 with respect to
(∆i, γi).
Proposition 1.5. G(G) is the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of G.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.5.
Suppose Di is the complete digraph for each i ∈ N , then by Eq (∗), each Zi(Di) co-
incides with the maximization of %i. Hence, this formalization can also accommodate
the individual choice with G(·) := ⋂i∈N Zi(Di) revealing the competitive equilibrium.
Moreover, given a set of allocations V and the preference profile {%i}i∈N , Proposi-
tion 1.4 implies that, if ⋂i∈N Cli(V ) 6= ∅, then there exists a game {Di}i∈N that has
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Similarly, if ⋂i∈N Corei(V ) 6= ∅, then both types of
equilibrium always exist for any form of game.
Integrating the leading choice with the above discussion, given a discrete set of
allocations and the preference profiles of N players, a social planner can lead a desirable
Nash equilibrium to exist (e.g., mechanism design or implementation) by designing
specific rules Di as choice architectures for each i ∈ N . The related axiomatization
then becomes equivalent to such an architecture design. A straightforward example is
the rights structures studied by Koray and Yildiz (2018).
1.6.3. Price as A Signal
Price is also an example of the information that induces orders (not necessarily lin-
ear) over the alternatives as choice architectures.11 Price is often incorporated into the
budget constraint in the standard revealed preference theory. Theorem 1.1, however,
can accommodate the preference maximization in a discrete choice with the signaling
effect of price (Milgrom and Roberts (1986)).
In this case, u ∼0 v indicates that the DM is indifferent between u and v and thus
prefers the one with the lower price, while u ∼1 v suggests she is unable to compare u, v
and is convinced that the higher price reflects the higher quality such that she tends to
compromise on price. Consequently, % divides X into two categories, where every ∼0-
indifferent set does not overlap with any ∼1-indifferent set (Claim 1.3), meaning that
the DM always prefers one alternative over the other between two categories. Given a
11For instance, given a menu V , let (u, v) ∈ E(D) only if the hundreds digit of the price of
v exceeds that of u. Then, the digraph D represents a nonlinear order on V . For the theoretical
foundation of such a specification, see Matějka and McKay (2015).
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choice architecture (D ∈ D) and the induced price perception as being a linear order
over the underlying menu (ϕD), the procedure z%,δ : S → X maximizes the preference
%, then resolves ∼0 and ∼1 by minimizing the price (expenditure) and maximizing the
quality signaling, respectively.12
1.7. Related Literature
The study of choice with explicit information was pioneered by Rubinstein and
Salant (2006, 2012); Salant and Rubinstein (2008). Their earlier paper considered
choice with linear orders over alternatives (hence, from lists). Our model is a general-
ization in the sense that digraphs represent the orders that are not necessarily linear,
or even cyclic. For the choice function, our selection procedure from sorted lists co-
incides with their characterization, which can also accommodate Simon (1955). Their
later paper studied choice with choice-relevant yet alternative-irrelevant properties in
terms of frames. The major difference between frames and architectures is that we
specify architectures in a homogeneous way as digraphs to allow our model to be more
translatable to various sources of architectures. Rubinstein and Salant (2012) proposed
a general model in which a DM reveals different preferences under different frames. In
our model, the description of preference is consistent throughout, and the realization
of topological sorting explains the revealed inconsistency of choice.
Another strand of literature related to our model is the searching approach (Caplin
et al. (2011); Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013)). In Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2013),
iterative searching serves as a formation mechanism of consideration sets. Neither their
choice function nor ours is informative about the identification of a search path or the
realization of topological sorting. In our model, however, for every given choice archi-
tecture, the potential topological sorting Φ(A ◦ TD) is predetermined by D, meaning
that one can predict the candidates of choice ⋃ϕ∈Φ(·) z%,δ(ϕ(·)). If each z%,δ(ϕ(·)) varies
sufficiently, one might infer the realized ϕD from z(D) = z%,δ(ϕD(·)). A limitation of
our model is that we implicitly assume the DM would inspect the entire given architec-
ture.13 Hence, our model is in an analogy of the hybrid of the fixed-sample-size search
and marginal search. los Santos et al. (2012), for example, provided an empirical study
on these two types of searching.
12In marketing literature, a similar interpretation is reported, e.g., in Wathieu and Bertini (2007).
For a more stylized analysis, see Erdem et al. (2008); Schmidbauer and Stock (2018).
13In some situations, this might be resolved practically. For instance, the server of an online
shopping site (e.g., Amazon) records the browsing history of each DM. According to the data, one
can construct an actual architecture by taking the induced subgraph over the reviewed pages and
including all the one-step-ahead pages.
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Probing further, Manzini and Mariotti (2007, 2012a,b) are seminal in incorporating
choice procedures into the preference maximization. In Manzini and Mariotti (2007)
(RSM), the choice is explained by the sequential maximization of asymmetric binary
relations. Our choice function is related to the canonical RSM in the sense that the
DM maximizes her preference %= ∪ ∼0 ∪ ∼1 in the first stage and resolves the
second stage among ∼0-indifferent (resp., ∼1-indifferent) alternatives. By definition of
∼0 and ∼1, the second stage can also be considered as an order maximization with
respect to the topological sorting.
1.A. Proofs
1.A.1. Preliminaries
Given a D ∈ D, let VC(D) be the set of all vertices contained in cycles in D.
Formally, VC(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | ∃C ∈ C(D), v ∈ V (C)}.
We say a set of vertices A ⊆ V (D) satisfies property L in D, denoted by A  L(D),
if the following condition is satisfied by any u, v ∈ A:
∃P ∈ P(D), uPv ⊂ D ⇐⇒ @P ′ ∈ P(D), vP ′u ⊂ D.
((u, v) ∈ E(TD) ⇐⇒ (v, u) 6∈ E(TD))
Claim 1.1. For any D ∈ D, if V (D)  L(D), then D is a DAG and has a unique
topological sorting ϕ ∈ Φ(D).
Proof. Let D be an arbitrary digraph that satisfies V (D)  L(D). Suppose
C(D) 6= ∅, and fix an arbitrary C ∈ C(D). Then, for any u, v ∈ V (C), it holds that
∃P ∈ P(C), uPv ⊂ C ⇐⇒ ∃P ′ ∈ P(C), vP ′u ⊂ C.
This contradicts to V (D)  L(D). Hence, D is a DAG as C(D) = ∅.
Since D is a DAG under V (D)  L(D), it follows that Φ(D) 6= ∅.14 Suppose
ϕ, ϕ̃ ∈ Φ(D) and ϕ 6= ϕ̃. Then, there must be u, v ∈ V (D) such that (u, v) ∈ E(Tϕ(D))
and (v, u) ∈ E(T ϕ̃(D)). Meanwhile, V (D)  L(D) implies that (u, v) ∈ E(TD) or
(v, u) ∈ E(TD) holds exclusively in TD. As a result, either E(Tϕ(D)) = E(T ϕ̃(D)),
or one of ϕ and ϕ̃ is not a topological sorting of D. By contradictions, ϕ, ϕ̃ ∈ Φ(D)
implies ϕ = ϕ̃. Hence, D has a unique topological sorting. Q.E.D.
14By Szpilrajn’s extension theorem, it is well-know that every DAG has a topological sorting.
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1.A.2. Proof of Theorem 1.1
Since it is easy to verify that z(D) = z%,δ (ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) satisfies DAC and IIP, we
show the sufficiency part. The proof is conducted by the following series of claims.
For every u, v ∈ X, define the following binary relations.
:= {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = z((v, u)) = u} ;
∼0:= {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = u ∧ z((v, u)) = v} ;
∼1:= {(u, v) | z((u, v)) = v ∧ z((v, u)) = u} .
Define accordingly %:= ∪ ∼0 ∪ ∼1, then %⊂ X ×X is connex on X.
Claim 1.2. , ∼0, and ∼1 are transitive.
Proof. Let u, v, w ∈ X be arbitrary, and denote by −−→uvw the string such that
V (−−→uvw) = {u, v, w} and E(−−→uvw) = {(u, v), (v, w)}.
(a) Suppose u  v and v  w. Consider S = −−→uvw and S ′ = −−→wvu. Then, we
have z((u, v)) = u and z((v, w)) = v. Since {(u, v), {w}} and {(v, w), {x}} define two
induced partitions of S, by IIP, we have z(TS[{u,w}]) = z(S) = z(TS[{u, v}]). As a
result, z((u,w)) = z((u, v)) = u. Similarly, it follows that z(TS ′[{v, u}]) = z(S ′) =
z(TS ′[{w, u}]). Hence, z((w, u)) = z((v, u)) = u. That is, u  w.
(b) Suppose u ∼0 v and v ∼0 w. By IIP, we have z(TS[{u,w}]) = z(TS[{v, u}]) =
Z(S). This implies z((u,w)) = z((u, v)) = u by the definition of ∼0. Analogously,
it holds that z(TS ′[{w, u}]) = z(S ′) = z(TS ′[{w, v}]), which implies z((w, u)) =
z((w, v)) = w. Hence, u ∼0 w. (c) The transitivity of ∼1 follows similarly. Q.E.D.
Claim 1.3. For every u, v, w ∈ X, it is impossible to have u ∼0 v and v ∼1 w.
Proof. Assume that u ∼0 v and v ∼1 w. Let S = −−→uwv and S ′ = −−→vuw. For
S, consider induced partitions {(u, v), {w}} and {(v, w), {u}}. By IIP, it follows that
z(TS[{u,w}]) = z(S) = z(TS[{u, v}]). Hence, z((u,w)) = z((u, v)) = u. Meanwhile,
for S ′, consider induced partitions {(v, w), {u}} and {(u, v), {w}}. Then, we have
z(TS ′[{u,w}]) = z(S ′) = z(TS ′[{v, w}]). As a result, z((u,w)) = z((v, w)) = w. This
contradicts to z((u,w)) = u obtained in S = −−→uwv. Q.E.D.
Under Claim 1.2, ∼0 and ∼1 are symmetric and transitive. Since %⊂ X × X is
connex on X, it follows Claim 1.3 that, for every %-indifferent set A, if there exist
u, v ∈ A with u ∼0 v, then x ∼0 y for all x, y ∈ A. Consequently, define a bivalent
function δ : X → {0,1} by as follows, then δ : X → {0,1} is well-defined.
δ(v) :=
 1, ∃u ∈ X, [u 6= v ∧ u ∼1 v]0, otherwise . ∀v ∈ X
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For a given %-indifferent set A, simply write A ∈ X/∼0 (resp., A ∈ X/∼1) if δ(v) = 0
(resp., 1) for any v ∈ A.
Claim 1.4. z(D) is %-maximal in V (D) for any D ∈ D.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ X be arbitrary and suppose x  y. By definition of %,
z ((x, y)) = z ((y, x)) = x. Note that the possible connected DAG on {x, y} is (x, y) or
(y, x). Hence by DAC, z(D) 6= y for any D with x, y ∈ V (D). That is, for any D ∈ D
and any v ∈ V (D), if there is a u ∈ V (D) such that u  v, then v 6= z(D). Q.E.D.
Given a D ∈ D, let M(D) be the set of all %-maximal vertices in V (D). Formally,
M(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | @u ∈ V (D), u  v} .
Then, for every D ∈ D, it follows that δ(v) = 0 for any v ∈ M(D) (M(D) ∈ X/∼0),
or δ(v) = 1 for every v ∈M(D) (M(D) ∈ X/∼1), exclusively.
Claim 1.5. The followings hold for all D ∈ D:
(a) M(D) ∈ X/∼0 =⇒ {e ∈ E (A ◦ TD[M(D)]) | τ(e) = z(D)} = ∅;
(b) M(D) ∈ X/∼1 =⇒ {e ∈ E (A ◦ TD[M(D)]) | ι(e) = z(D)} = ∅.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D and let z(D) = v.
(a) Suppose a u ∈M(D) exists with satisfying TD[{u, v}] = (u, v). Let {Vi}i be an
arbitrary partition of V (D) such that Vj∩M(D) 6= ∅ for all Vj ∈ {Vi}i, and a Vk ∈ {Vi}i
exists with satisfying Vk = {u, v}. Fix this k, and for each i, let Di := TD [Vi].
Then, {Di}i forms an induced partition of D. By Claim 1.4, z (Di) ∈ M(D) for all
i, and z (Dk) = u, since u ∼0 v with TD[{u, v}] = (u, v). That is, v 6∈ {z(Di)}i.
Hence, we have z(D) = v 6= z (TD [{z(Di)}i]) and v ∈ V (Dk) \ {z(Dk)}. By IIP-(ii),
(u, v) ∈ E(TD) if and only if (v, u) ∈ E(TD), which contradicts to TD[{u, v}] = (u, v).
Thus, by Claim 1.4, M(D) ∈ X/∼0 implies TD[{u, v}] 6= (u, v) for any u ∈ M(D),
meaning that {e ∈ E(A ◦ TD[M(D)]) | τ(e) = v} = ∅.
(b) Suppose there exists a u ∈ M(D) such that TD[{u, v}] = (v, u). Let {Di}i be
the induced partition of D defined in (a). By Claim 1.4, {z (Di)}i ⊂ M(D). Since
u ∼1 v and TD[{u, v}] = (v, u), we have z(Dk) = u. Thus, it yields z(D) = v 6=
z (TD [{z(Di)}i]) and v ∈ V (Dk) \ {z(Dk)}. In analogy to (a), a contradiction oc-
curs against TD[{u, v}] = (v, u) under IIP-(ii). Hence, M(D) ∈ X/∼1 implies that
TD[{u, v}] 6= (v, u) for all u ∈M(D). The statement follows. Q.E.D.
Claim 1.6. For any D ∈ D, M(D)  L(D) implies z(D) = z (TD [M(D)]).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D that satisfies M(D)  L(D).
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Let {Vi}i be an arbitrary partition of V (D) such that # (Vj ∩M(D)) = 1 for all
Vj ∈ {Vi}i. Define a digraph Dj := TD[Vj] for each Vj ∈ {Vi}i, then {Di}i forms an
induced partition of D. By Claim 1.4 and M(D)  L(D), we have z(D) ∈ M(D) =
{z (Di)}i and {z(Di)}i  L(D). That is, IIP-(i)(ii) are falsified for {Di}i. Hence, by
IIP, we have z(D) = z (TD [{z (Di)}i]) = z (TD[M(D)]). Q.E.D.
Claim 1.7. For any D ∈ D, if M(D)  L(D), then z(D) = z%,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) for
all ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD).
Proof. Let D ∈ D be an arbitrary digraph that satisfies M(D)  L(D). Under
Claim 1.6, it suffices to show z(TD[M(D)]) = z%,δ(ϕ ◦A ◦ TD) for all ϕ ∈ Φ(A◦ TD).
Note that V (S)  L(S) for any S ∈ S. Hence, by Claim 1.6, if there is a S ∈ S
such that V (S) = M(D) and TS = TD[M(D)], then we have z(TD[M(D)]) = z(S).
Since M(D)  L(D) implies M(D)  L(TD[M(D)]), by Claim 1.1, TD[M(D)] has
a unique topological sorting. Denote by ϕM this topological sorting, then we have
TϕM(TD[M(D)]) = TD[M(D)]. Moreover, by Claim 1.1, we have TD[M(D)] =
A ◦ TD[M(D)]. As a result, z(TD[M(D)]) = z(ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])).
Suppose that M(D) ∈ X/∼0. Then, by Claim 1.5-(a), if (u, v) ∈ E(TϕM(A ◦
TD[M(D)])), then z(ϕM(A◦TD[M(D)])) 6= v. Since M(D)  L(ϕM(A◦TD[M(D)]),
z(ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])) = u implies that (u, v) ∈ E(TϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])) for all
v ∈ M(D). Suppose now M(D) ∈ X/∼1. Then, by Claim 1.5-(b), z(ϕM(A ◦
TD[M(D)])) = u implies that (v, u) ∈ E(TϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])) for all v ∈ M(D).
Hence, z(ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])) = z%,δ(ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])).
Given A◦TD being a DAG, let ϕ ∈ Φ(A◦TD) be arbitrary. Then, we haveM(D) 
L(ϕM(A◦TD[M(D)])) and V (D)  L(ϕ(A◦TD)). Since ϕM is the unique topological
sorting of A ◦ TD[M(D)], it follows that Tϕ(A ◦ TD)[M(D)] = ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)]).
Hence, by Claim 1.4, we have z%,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) = z%,δ(ϕM(A ◦ TD[M(D)])) for all
ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD). The claim follows. Q.E.D.
Completion of Sufficiency. By the definition of topological sorting, for any
DAG D ∈ D and any u ∈ V (D), it follows that
[∀w ∈ V (D), (u,w) 6∈ E(TD)] =⇒
 ∃ϕ ∈ Φ(D),∀w ∈ V (D),
(w, u) ∈ E(Tϕ(D))
 ;
[∀w ∈ V (D), (w, u) 6∈ E(TD)] =⇒




Let D ∈ D be an arbitrary digraph, and let z(D) = v. By Claim 1.5, we have (i) if
M(D) ∈ X/∼0, then (u, v) 6∈ E(A◦TD) for all u ∈M(D), and (ii) (v, u) 6∈ E(A◦TD)
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for any u ∈M(D) when M(D) ∈ X/∼1. Since A ◦ TD is a DAG, by Eq (1.1),
[∀u ∈M(D), δ(u) = 0] =⇒
 ∃ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD),∀u ∈M(D),
(z(D), u) ∈ E(TϕD(A ◦ TD))
 ;
[∀u ∈M(D), δ(u) = 1] =⇒
 ∃ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD),∀u ∈M(D),
(u, z(D)) ∈ E(TϕD(A ◦ TD))
 .
Thus, it yields z(D) = z%,δ(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD).
Now we show the uniqueness. Let D, D̃ ∈ D be arbitrary digraphs such that
M(D) ∩ M(D̃) 6= ∅. Clearly, we have δ(u) = δ(ũ) for any u ∈ M(D), ũ ∈ M(D̃).
Suppose that M(D)  L(D),M(D̃)  L(D̃), and without loss of generality, assume
δ(u) = 0 for all u ∈ M(D). Then, it follows Claim 1.1 that every ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD)
yields the same permutation on M(D), and so does every ϕD̃ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD̃) on M(D̃).
Hence, by Claim 1.7, if a v ∈ M(D) ∩M(D̃) exists such that (v, u) ∈ E(TD) and
(v, ũ) ∈ E(TD̃) for all u ∈M(D) and any ũ ∈M(D̃), then
z(D) = z%,δ(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD) = v = z%,δ(ϕD̃ ◦ A ◦ TD̃) = z(D̃),
for all ϕD ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD) and any ϕD̃ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD̃). That is, for any D, D̃ ∈ D,
z(D) = z(D̃) whenever every topological sorting of A◦TD and A◦TD̃ yields the same
first (or the same last) %-maximal vertex. The uniqueness follows. Q.E.D.
1.A.3. Proof of Theorem 1.2
We show only the sufficiency part via the following series of claims.
Define the following binary relations on X.
∗:= {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = Z((y, x)) = {x}} ;
∼∗:= {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = Z((y, x)) = {x, y}} ;
RP0 := {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = {x} ∧ Z((y, x)) = {x, y}} ;
RI0 := {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = {x} ∧ Z((y, x)) = {y}} ;
RP1 := {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = {x, y} ∧ Z((y, x)) = {x}} ;
RI1 := {(x, y) | Z((x, y)) = {y} ∧ Z((y, x)) = {x}} .





, and RIδ are transitive for δ = 0,1.
Proof. Let u, v, w ∈ X be arbitrary, and without loss of generality, let δ = 0.
Denote by −−→uvw the string S such that V (S) = {u, v, w} and E(S) = {(u, v), (v, w)}.
Suppose u ∗ v and v ∗ w and consider−−→uvw. By IIP*, Z (−−→uvw) = Z((u, v)) = {u}.
Also IIP* implies that Z((u,w)) = Z (−−→uvw), hence Z((u,w)) = {u}. Similarly for −−→wvu,
it follows that Z((w, u)) = Z(−−→wvu) = Z((v, u)) = {u}. Thus u ∗ w.
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Now suppose u(∗ ∪RP0 )v and v(∗ ∪RP0 )w. Since ∗ is transitive, it suffices to
show: (i) uRP0 v and vRP0w implies u(∗ ∪RP0 )w; (ii) u ∗ v and vRP0w implies u(∗
∪RP0 )w. (i) Assume uRP0 v, vRP0w and consider −−→uvw,−−→wuv. By IIP* and the definition
of RP0 , Z((u, v)) = Z(−−→uvw) = Z((u,w)). Hence, we have Z((u,w)) = Z((u, v)) = {u}.
Again, by IIP*, Z((w, u)) = Z(−−→wuv) = Z(T−−→wuv[Z(w, u)∪{v}]) for −−→wuv. If Z((w, u)) =
{w}, it follows that Z(−−→wuv) = Z(T−−→wuv[Z(w, u) ∪ {v}]) = Z((w, v)) = {v, w}. Since





w. (ii) Assume u ∗ v, vRP0w and consider −−→uvw,−−→vwu. By IIP*,
Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→uvw) = Z((u, v)) = {u} and Z((w, u)) = Z(−−→vwu) = Z((v, u)) = {u}.
Thus, u ∗ v and vRP0w imply u ∗ w. Therefore, (∗ ∪RP0 ) ⊂ X ×X is transitive.
Suppose uRI0v, vRI0w and consider −−→uvw,−−→wvu. Then by IIP* we have Z((u,w)) =
Z(−−→uvw) = Z((u, v)) = {u} holds for −−→uvw; while Z((w, u)) = Z(−−→wvu) = Z((w, v)) =
{w} for −−→wvu. Hence, it yields that uRI0w. Q.E.D.
Claim 1.9. For any u, v, w ∈ X,
(a) [uRP0 v ∧ vRP1w] =⇒ u ∗ w; (b) [uRP1 v ∧ vRP0w] =⇒ u ∗ w;
(c) [uRP0 v ∧ wRP1 v] =⇒ u ∼∗ w; (d) [uRP0 v ∧ uRP1w] =⇒ v ∼∗ w;
(e) [uRP0 v ∧ vRI0w] =⇒ uRP0w; [uRP1 v ∧ vRI1w] =⇒ uRP1w;
(f) [uRI0v ∧ vRP0w] =⇒ uRP0w; [uRI1v ∧ vRP1w] =⇒ uRP1w;
(g) [u ∗ v ∧ vRIδw] =⇒ u ∗ w, δ = 0,1;
(h) [uRIδv ∧ v ∗ w] =⇒ u ∗ w, δ = 0,1;
(i) [u ∼∗ v ∧ vRIδw] =⇒ u ∼∗ w, δ = 0,1.
Proof. We show (a), (c), (e), (g) and (i) since the rest can be shown similarly.
(a) Suppose uRP0 v and vRP1w. For −−→uwv, IIP* implies that Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→uwv) =
Z((u, v)) = {u}. Similarly for −−→wuv, it holds that Z((w, u)) = Z(−−→wuv) = Z((u, v)) =
{u}. Hence, u ∗ w.
(c) Suppose uRP0 v and wRP1 v. For S = −−→uwv, it holds that Z(S) = Z((u,w)) =
Z(TS[Z((u,w)) ∪ {v}]). If Z((u,w)) = {w} then it yields that Z(S) = Z((u,w)) =
{v, w}, which suggests a contradiction. Hence, u ∈ Z((u,w)). For S ′ = −−→vuw, we have
Z(S ′) = Z((u,w)) = Z(TS ′[Z((u,w)) ∪ {v}]), which implies w ∈ Z((u,w)). Consider
S̃ = −−→vwu and S̃ ′ = −−→wuv. By IIP*, Z(S̃) = Z(T S̃[Z((w, u)) ∪ {v}]) = Z((w, u)) =
Z(T S̃ ′[Z((w, u)) ∪ {v}]) = Z(S̃ ′). If Z((w, u)) = {u} then Z(S̃) = Z(T S̃[{u, v}]) =
{u, v} 6= Z((w, u)). If Z((w, u)) = {w}, then we have Z(S̃ ′) = Z(T S̃ ′[{w, v}]) =
{w, v} 6= Z((w, u)). Thus, Z((w, u)) = Z((u,w)) = {u,w}.
(e) Suppose uRP0 v, vRI0w. Let S = −−→uvw, S ′ = −−→vwu, and S ′′ = −−→wvu. Then, IIP*
yields Z(S) = Z((u,w)) = Z((u, v)) = {u}, Z(S ′) = Z(TS ′[Z((w, u)) ∪ {v}]) =
Z((v, u)) = {u, v}, and Z(S ′′) = Z(TS ′′[Z((w, u))∪{v}]) = Z((w, u)). If u 6∈ Z((w, u))
then Z(TS ′[Z((w, u))∪ {v}]) = Z((w, v)) = {w}, which contradicts to Z(S ′) = {u, v}.
If w 6∈ Z((w, u)) then it yields Z(TS ′′[Z((w, u)) ∪ {v}]) = Z((v, u)) = {u, v}. This
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contradicts to Z(S ′′) = Z((w, u)), as v 6∈ Z((w, u)). Hence, Z((u,w)) = {u} and
Z((w, u)) = {u,w}. The case uRP1 v, vRI1w follows analogously.
(g) Let u ∗ v, vRI0w and S = −−→uvw, S ′ = −−→vwu. By IIP*, Z(S) = Z((u,w)) =
Z((u, v)) = {u} and Z(S ′) = Z((w, u)) = Z((v, u)) = {u}. Thus, Z((u,w)) =
Z((w, u)) = {u}, that is, u ∗ w. The case δ = 1 can be shown similarly.
(i) Suppose u ∼∗ v, vRI0w, and consider S1 = −−→uvw, S2 = −−→uwv, S3 = −−→wuv, S4 =
−−→vwu. By IIP*, it follows that Z(TS1[Z((u,w)) ∪ {v}]) = Z(S1) = Z(TS1[Z((v, w)) ∪
{u}]) = Z((u, v)) = {u, v}, which implies u ∈ Z((u,w)). For S2, IIP* implies
that Z(TS2[Z((u,w)) ∪ {v}]) = Z(S2) = Z(TS2[Z((w, v)) ∪ {u}]) = Z((u,w)). If
Z((u,w)) = {u}, it yields the contradiction {u} = Z((u,w)) = Z(S2) = Z((u, v)) =
{u, v}. Hence, Z((u,w)) = {u,w}. For S3, it holds that Z(TS3[Z((w, u)) ∪ {v}]) =
Z(S3) = Z(TS3[Z((w, v)) ∪ {u}]) = Z((w, u)). Similarly, Z((w, u)) = {u} yields
the contradiction {u, v} = Z((u, v)) = Z(S3) = Z((w, u)) = {u}, meaning that
w ∈ Z((w, u)). For S4, we have Z(TS4[Z((w, u))∪{v}]) = Z(S4) = Z(TS4[Z((v, w))∪
{u}]) = Z((v, u)) = {u, v}, which implies u ∈ Z((w, u)). As a result, Z((u,w)) =
Z((w, u)) = {u,w}. That is, u ∼∗ w. The case δ = 1 follows similarly. Q.E.D.
Claim 1.10. For any u, v, w ∈ X, it is impossible to have
(a) uRI0v ∧ vRI1w;
(b) uRI0v ∧ vRP1w (resp., uRP1 v ∧ vRI0w);
(c) uRI1v ∧ vRP0w (resp., uRP0 v ∧ vRI1w).
Proof. (a) Assume that there exist u, v, w ∈ X such that uRI0v and vRI1w. For
−−→uwv, IIP* implies that Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→uwv) = Z((u, v)) = {u}, while it follows that
Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→vuw) = Z((v, w)) = {w} for −−→vuw. A contradiction occurs.
(b) Suppose there exist u, v, w ∈ X that satisfy uRI0v and vRP1w. Consider −−→uwv and
−−→vuw. By IIP* and definition of RI0, RP1 , we have Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→uwv) = Z((u, v)) =
{u}. Since Z((u,w)) = {u}, it again follows IIP* that Z(−−→vuw) = Z((v, w)) = {v, w}
and Z(−−→vuw) = Z((v, u)) = {v}, which contradict to each other. The case uRP1 v and
vRI0w follows similarly by considering the same pair of digraphs.
(c) Let uRI1v and vRP0w. Then, by IIP*, Z(T−−→uwv[Z((u,w)) ∪ {v}]) = Z(−−→uwv) =
Z((w, v)) = {w, v} for −−→uwv. Hence, w ∈ Z((u,w)). Meanwhile, for −−→vuw, we have
Z((u,w)) = Z(−−→vuw) = Z((v, u)) = {u}, which contradicts to w ∈ Z((u,w)). Q.E.D.
Let %δ:=∗ ∪Rδ and Rδ := RPδ ∪ RIδ , where δ = 0,1. For a given D ∈ D, let
M∗(D) ⊆ V (D) be the set of all ∗-maximal elements in V (D). Formally,
M∗(D) := {v ∈ V (D) | @u ∈ V (D), u ∗ v} .
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{u}, Z(C({u, v})) = {v}
{v}, Z(C({u, v})) = {u}
∅, otherwise
, ∀{u, v} ∈ [X]2.
Accordingly, define a correspondence Γ : D  X by




 , ∀D ∈ D.
Claim 1.11. Let M∗Γ(D) = M∗(D) ∩ Γ(D), then Z(D) ⊆M∗Γ(D) for all D ∈ D.
Proof. For any D ∈ D, if there is a C ∈ C(D) with #V (C) = n, then given
any V ∈ [V (C)]k with 2 ≤ k ≤ n, there is a C̃ ∈ C(TD) such that V = V (C̃). In
particular, TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}) holds for any {u, v} ∈ Y(D). The claim is trivial if
C(D) = ∅. Suppose C(D) 6= ∅, and let v ∈ ⋃{x,y}∈Y(D) γ({x, y}) be arbitrary. Then, a
u ∈ VC(D) exists such that {u, v} ∈ Y(D), and thus TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}). By def-
inition of γ, γ({u, v}) = {v} implies Z(C({u, v})) = {u}. Hence, v 6∈ Z(C({u, v})) =
Z(TD[{u, v}]), which yields v 6∈ Z(D) by IIP*. As a result, v ∈ ⋃{x,y}∈Y(D) γ({x, y})
implies v 6∈ Z(D) for any v ∈ V (D), meaning that Z(D) ⊆ Γ(D).
Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D. Let u, v ∈ V (D) and suppose that u ∗ v. For the set
{u, v}, the possible connected DAGs are (u, v) and (v, u). Also, u ∗ v implies v 6∈
Z((u, v)) and v 6∈ Z((v, u)). Hence, by DAC*, we have v 6∈ Z(D), as {u, v} ⊆ V (D).
Since u, v ∈ V (D) are arbitrary, it yields that, for any D ∈ D and any v ∈ V (D),
v 6∈ Z(D) if there is a u ∈ V (D) such that u ∗ v. That is, Z(D) ⊆M∗(D). Q.E.D.
Claim 1.12. For any D ∈ D, any u ∈ V (D), and any v ∈ Z(D),
(a) uR0v =⇒ TD[{u, v}] 6= (u, v);
(b) uR1v =⇒ TD[{u, v}] 6= (v, u).
Proof. Let D ∈ D, u ∈ V (D), and v ∈ Z(D) be arbitrary. Set V = {u, v} and
V ′ = V (D) \ V , then {V, V ′} defines a partition of V (D). Thus, by IIP*,
Z(D) = Z (TD [Z(TD[V ′]) ∪ Z(TD[V ])]) . (1.2)
(a) Suppose that uR0v and TD[V ] = (u, v). Then, Z(TD[V ]) = {u}. Since
v 6∈ Z(TD[V ′]), by Eq (1.2), v 6∈ Z(D) = Z (TD [Z(TD[V ′]) ∪ {u}]). This contradicts
to v ∈ Z(D). As a result, uR0v implies TD[V ] 6= (u, v).
(b) Let uR1v and TD[V ] = (v, u). Then, Z(TD[V ]) = {u}. By Eq (1.2), we have
Z(D) = Z (TD [Z(TD[V ′]) ∪ {u}]), which implies v 6∈ Z(D) since v 6∈ Z(TD[V ′]).
Hence, by contradiction, uR1v implies TD[V ] 6= (v, u). The claim follows. Q.E.D.
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Claim 1.13. For any D ∈ D, if V (D)  L(D) then Z(D) = Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) for
the unique ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary such D ∈ D. Then, by Claim 1.1, D is a DAG and
#Φ(D) = 1. Thus, Γ(D) = V (D) and Φ(D) = Φ(A ◦ TD). Let Φ(A ◦ TD) = {ϕ}.
Suppose v ∈ Z(D). By Claim 1.11, Z(D) ⊆ M∗(D). Since D is a DAG, by
Claim 1.12, for any u ∈ V (D), (u, v) ∈ E(TD) implies ¬(uR0v), and ¬(uR0v) if
(v, u) ∈ E(TD). Hence, Z(D) ⊆ Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD).
Now suppose v 6∈ Z(D). Then, by IIP*, a V1 ⊂ V (D) exists such that v ∈ V1 and
v 6∈ Z(TD[V1]). Fix this V1. Then, it follows IIP* that there exists a V2 ⊂ V1 that
satisfies v ∈ V2 and v 6∈ Z(TD[V2]). Following the iterative manner, a u ∈ V (D) exists
such that v 6∈ Z(TD[{u, v}]). Since D is a DAG, it yields that
TD[{u, v}] = (u, v) =⇒ [u ∗ v ∨ uR0v] ;
TD[{u, v}] = (v, u) =⇒ [u ∗ v ∨ uR1v] .
Thus, we have v 6∈ Z%δ(ϕ ◦A◦TD), which implies Z%δ(ϕ ◦A◦TD) ⊆ Z(D). Q.E.D.
Completion of Sufficiency. Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D.
Suppose v ∈ Z(D). By Claim 1.12, for all u ∈ V (D), it holds that
uR0v =⇒ A ◦ TD[{u, v}] 6= (u, v);
uR1v =⇒ A ◦ TD[{u, v}] 6= (v, u).
(1.3)
Hence, a ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD) exists such that (i) Tϕ(A ◦ TD)[{u, v}] = (v, u) for all
u ∈ {u ∈ V (D) | uR0v}, and (ii) Tϕ(A ◦ TD)[{u, v}] = (u, v) for all u ∈ {u ∈
V (D) | uR1v}. Moreover, by Claim 1.11, v ∈ M∗Γ(D). As a result, it follows that
v ∈ Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) for some ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD), and v ∈ Γ(D). Consequently, we have
Z(D) ⊆ ⋃ϕ∈Φ(A◦TD) (Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) ∩ Γ(D)).
Suppose there is a v ∈ V (D) and a ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD) such that v ∈ Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦
TD)∩ Γ(D). Then, by definition of Z%δ : S  X, we have (i), (ii) and ¬(u ∗ v) held
for all u ∈ V (D). Hence, Eq (1.3) holds for all u ∈ V (D). By DAD, v ∈ Z({u, v})
as v ∈ M∗(D) and Z({u, v}) = Z((u, v)) ∪ Z((v, u)). Moreover, if v ∈ VC(D), then
a u ∈ VC(D) exists such that {u, v} ∈ Y(D) and TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}). Since
v ∈ Γ(D), Eq (1.3) implies that v ∈ Z(TD[{u, v}]) whenever E(TD[{u, v}]) 6= ∅. As a
result, v ∈ Z(TD[{u, v}]) for all u ∈ V (D). By IIP*, it follows that v ∈ Z(TD[V ]) for
any V ∈ [V (D)]3 such that v ∈ V . Following the iterative manner, v ∈ Z(TD[Vn−1])
for all Vn−1 ∈ [V (D)]n−1 with v ∈ Vn−1, where n = #V (D). Hence, it yields v ∈ Z(D)
when there is a ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD) such that v ∈ (Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) ∩ Γ(D)). That is,⋃





Z%δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) ∩ Γ(D)
)
, ∀D ∈ D.
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Now we show that the binary relation R ⊂ X × X given by R :=%0 ∪ %1 ∪ ∼∗
is quasi-transitive. Let u, v, w ∈ X be arbitrary. Denote by RP ,RI the asymmetric
and symmetric part of R, respectively. Then, uRv if and only if (u ∗ v) ∨ (uRP0 v) ∨
(uRP1 v) ∨ (uRI0v) ∨ (uRI1v) ∨ (u ∼∗ v), and vRu if and only if (v ∗ u) ∨ (vRP0 u) ∨
(vRP1 u) ∨ (uRI0v) ∨ (uRI1v) ∨ (u ∼∗ v). Hence, we have RP = (uRv) ∧ ¬(vRu) =∗
∪RP0 ∪ RP1 , and RI = (uRv) ∧ (vRu) =∼∗ ∪RI0 ∪ RI1. Since R is quasi-transitive
if and only if RP is transitive, it suffices to show RP is transitive. By Claim 1.8,
(u ∗ v) ∧ (v ∗ w) ⇒ (u ∗ w), (u ∗ v) ∧ (vRPδ w) ⇒ (u ∗ w) for δ = 0,1, and
(uRPδ v) ∧ (vRPδ w)⇒ (u ∗ w) ∨ (uRPδ w) for δ = 0,1. Moreover, by Claim 1.9-(a)(b),
we have (uRP0 v)∧ (vRP1w)⇒ (u ∗ w) and (uRP1 v)∧ (vRP0w)⇒ (u ∗ w). Therefore,
RP ⊂ X ×X is transitive, equivalently, R ⊂ X ×X is quasi-transitive.
The transitivity of RP and Claim 1.9-(e)(f)(g)(h) imply the transitivity of %0=∗
∪RP0 ∪RI0 and %1=∗ ∪RP1 ∪RI1. Since Φ(A ◦ TD) is singleton for those D ∈ D with
V (D)  L(D), thus by Claim 1.13, Z(D) = Z%δ(ϕ◦TD) is uniquely determined for all
such D ∈ D. Hence, given (%0,%1), the choice procedure is unique. Q.E.D.
1.A.4. Propositions
1.A.4.1. Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proof. Define a nonempty correspondence ∆ : E  {0,1} by
∆((u, v)) :=

{0}, Z((u, v)) = {u}
{1}, Z((u, v)) = {v}
{0,1}, Z((u, v)) = {u, v}
, ∀(u, v) ∈ E .
Then, by the definitions of ∗, RPδ , RIδ , it follows that
¬(u ∗ v) ⇐⇒ [∆((u, v)) 6= {0} ∨∆((v, u)) 6= {1}];
¬(uRI0v) ⇐⇒ [∆((u, v)) 6= {0} ∨∆((v, u)) 6= {0}];
¬(uRI1v) ⇐⇒ [∆((u, v)) 6= {1} ∨∆((v, u)) 6= {1}];
¬(uRP0 v) ⇐⇒ [∆((u, v)) 6= {0} ∨∆((v, u)) 6= {0,1}];
¬(uRP1 v) ⇐⇒ [∆((u, v)) 6= {0,1} ∨∆((v, u)) 6= {1}].
Fix an arbitrary S ∈ S. By Theorem 1.2, it suffices to show Z%δ(S) = Z∆(S). Suppose
v ∈ Z%δ(S). By the definition of Z%δ , for any u ∈ V (S), we have
TS[{u, v}] = (u, v) ⇒
[
¬(u ∗ v) ∧ ¬(uRP0 v) ∧ ¬(uRI0v)
]
⇔ ∆((u, v)) 6= {0};
TS[{u, v}] = (v, u) ⇒
[
¬(u ∗ v) ∧ ¬(uRP1 v) ∧ ¬(uRI1v)
]
⇔ ∆((v, u)) 6= {1}.
(1.4)
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Since V (S)  L(S), #E(TS[V ]) = 1 for all V ∈ [V (S)]2. As a result, v ∈ Z%δ(S)
implies ∆(e) 6= {0} for all e ∈ {e ∈ E(TS) | τ(e) = v}; and ∆(ẽ) 6= {1} for all
ẽ ∈ {e ∈ E(TS) | ι(e) = v}. Hence, Z%δ(S) ⊆ Z∆(S). Suppose v ∈ Z∆(S). By
the definition of Z∆ and Eq (1.4), we have ¬(u %0 v) when TS[{u, v}] = (u, v); and
¬(u %1 v) when TS[{v, u}] = (v, u). That is, v ∈ Z%δ(S). Therefore, Z∆(S) ⊆
Z%δ(S). Q.E.D.
1.A.4.2. Proof of Proposition 1.2
Since Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD and IIP*, Theorem 1.2 can be applied.
Under Strong Relevance, the binary relation Q :=∗ ∪RI0∪RI1 is connex on X. By
Claim 1.10, uRI0v and vRI1w cannot hold simultaneously for any u, v, w ∈ X. Define
an indicator function δ : X → {0,1} by
δ(v) =





Then, δ : X → {0,1} is well-defined, and it holds that δ(u) = δ(v) whenever ¬(u ∗ v)
and ¬(v ∗ u). To simplify the statements, given a nonempty A ⊆ X, write A ∈ X/RI0
(resp., A ∈ X/RI1) if uRI0v (resp., uRI1v) for any u, v ∈ A. Let zQ,δ : S → X be the
choice function defined in the same way in Theorem 1.1, with respect to the binary
relation Q and the indicator function δ.
Claim 1.14. Z(D) = ⋃ϕ∈Φ(A◦TD) ({zQ,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD)} ∩ Γ(D)) for any D ∈ D.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D.
Without loss of generality, suppose M∗(D) ∈ X/RI0.
Assume v ∈ Z(D). Then, by Claim 1.11 and 1.12, (i) v ∈M∗Γ(D), and (ii) (u, v) ∈
E(TD) only if (v, u) ∈ E(TD) for any u ∈ M∗(D). That is, v ∈ VC(TD[M∗(D)]),
or {e ∈ E(TD[M∗(D)]) | τ(e) = v} = ∅. As a result, it follows that {e ∈ E(A ◦
TD[M∗Γ(D)]) | τ(e) = v} = ∅. Hence, a ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD) exists such that, for any
u ∈M∗Γ(D), there exists a P ∈ P(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD) that satisfies vPu ⊂ ϕ(A ◦ TD). Thus,
it yields Z(D) ⊆ ⋃ϕ∈Φ(A◦TD) ({zQ,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD)} ∩ Γ(D)).
Now suppose v ∈
(⋃
ϕ∈Φ(A◦TD) ({zQ,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD)} ∩ Γ(D))
)
\ Z(D). Then, we
have {e ∈ E(Tϕ(A ◦ TD)[M∗Γ(D)]) | τ(e) = v} = ∅ for some ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD). By
IIP*, a V ⊂M∗Γ(D) exists such that v ∈ V and v 6∈ Z(TD[V ]). Following the iterative
manner, a u ∈ M∗Γ(D) exists such that v 6∈ Z(TD[{u, v}]). Since M∗Γ(D) ⊆ M∗(D) ∈
X/RI0 and {e ∈ E(Tϕ(A ◦ TD)[M∗Γ(D)]) | τ(e) = v} = ∅ for some ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD),
v 6∈ Z(TD[{u, v}]) implies that TD[{u, v}] = {u, v}, or TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}). By
DAD, we have Z({u, v}) = {u, v}, as {u, v} = (u, v) ∩ (v, u). Hence, TD[{u, v}] =
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C({u, v}) and Z(C({u, v})) = {u}. This contradicts to v ∈ M∗Γ(D). Consequently,
v ∈ ⋃ϕ∈Φ(A◦TD) ({zQ,δ(ϕ ◦ A ◦ TD)} ∩ Γ(D)) implies v ∈ Z(D), and the claim holds
for all D ∈ D such that M∗(D) ∈ X/RI0. Q.E.D.
Completion. Let V ∈ 2X \ {∅} be arbitrary. Denote by ω(V ) the string that
links every consecutive elements following a given permutation of V . Let Ω(V ) be the
set of all such strings on V . Clearly, Φ(A ◦ T ((V, ∅))) = Ω(V ) and Γ((V, ∅)) = V .
Hence, by Claim 1.14, Z∗(V ) = Z((V, ∅)) = {zQ,δ(ω(V )) | ω ∈ Ω(V )}. Note that,
given δ : X → {0,1}, each ω ∈ Ω(V ) represents a particular linear order on V , and
Q ⊂ X × X is connex and transitive. Therefore, by Rubinstein and Salant (2006,
Proposition 3, .pp 10-11), Z∗ : 2X \ {∅} X satisfies WARP. Q.E.D.
1.A.4.3. Proof of Proposition 1.3
Proof. Let ∗, R0, R1,∼∗⊂ X × X and ∆ : E  {0,1} follow the definitions
given in Theorem 1.2 and Proposition 1.1. Since Z : D  X satisfies DAC* and IIP*,
Claim 1.8-Claim 1.12 hold as primitives.
Define a mapping γI : [X]2 → [X]1 ∪ {∅} by
γI({u, v}) :=

{u}, Z({u, v}) = {v};
{v}, Z({v, u}) = {u};
∅, otherwise
.
Moreover, for every {u, v} ∈ [X]2, let γC({u, v}) = γ({u, v}). Then, by IIP*, for every
D ∈ D, the followings hold for every u, v ∈ V (D).
[TD[{u, v}] = {u, v} ∧ γI({u, v}) = {v}] =⇒ v 6∈ Z(D);
[TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}) ∧ γC({u, v}) = {v}] =⇒ v 6∈ Z(D).
Hence, for every D ∈ D, we have









Fix an arbitrary D ∈ D.
Suppose there exist a v ∈ V (D) and a ϕD ∈ Φ(A◦ TD) such that v ∈ Z∆(ϕD ◦A ◦
TD) ∩ Γ∗(D). By the definitions of Z∆ and Γ∗, for every u ∈ V (D), it holds that
TD[{u, v}] = (u, v) =⇒ ∆((u, v)) 6= {0} ⇐⇒ v ∈ Z((u, v));
TD[{u, v}] = (v, u) =⇒ ∆((v, u)) 6= {1} ⇐⇒ v ∈ Z((v, u));
TD[{u, v}] = {u, v} =⇒ γI({u, v}) 6= {v} ⇐⇒ v ∈ Z({u, v});
TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}) =⇒ γC({u, v}) 6= {v} ⇐⇒ v ∈ Z(C({u, v})).
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Hence, by IIP*, v ∈ Z(TD[V3]) for any V3 ∈ [V (D)]3 with v ∈ V3. By iteration, we
have v ∈ Z(TD[Vn−1]) for any Vn−1 ∈ [V (D)]n−1, where #V (D) = n. As a result,
v ∈ Z(TD[V ]) for every V ⊂ V (D) that contains v. If an induced partition {Di}i of
D exists such that V = ⋃Dj∈{Di}i Z(Dj) ⊂ V (D), then by IIP*-(i), v ∈ Z(TD[V ]) =
Z(D). Oppositely, if ⋃Dj∈{Di}i Z(Dj) = V (D) for all induced partition {Di}i, then by
IIP*-(ii), v ∈ V (D) = Z(D). Thus, it follows that ⋃ϕD∈Φ(A◦TD)(Z∆(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD) ∩
Γ∗(D)) ⊆ Z(D).
Suppose v ∈ Z(D). Then, by Claim 1.12, for any u ∈ V (D), A◦TD[{u, v}] 6= (u, v)
if uR0v, and A ◦ TD[{u, v}] 6= (v, u) when uR1v. In addition, by Claim 1.11, we have
¬(u ∗ v) for all u ∈ V (D). Under the definition of ∆ : E  {0,1}, for every
e ∈ E(A◦TD), ∆(e) 6= {1} if ι(e) = v, and ∆(e) 6= {0} when τ(e) = v. Hence, a ϕD ∈
Φ(A ◦ TD) exists such that v ∈ Z∆(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD). Since v ∈ Z(D) ⊆ Γ∗(D), it yields
Z(D) ⊆
(⋃
ϕD∈Φ(A◦TD) Z∆(ϕD ◦ A ◦ TD)
)
∩ Γ∗(D). The proposition follows. Q.E.D.
1.A.4.4. Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. Since Z : D  X satisfies DAC*, DAD, and IIP*, Theorem 1.2 and
Proposition 1.1 hold. Fix an arbitrary nonempty V ∈ 2X .
(i) For any D, D̃ ∈ D with V (D) = V (D̃) = V , it follows that M∗(D) = M∗(D̃).
By Claim 1.11, Z(D) ⊆M∗(D) ∩ Γ(D) for all D ∈ D. Hence, let
Cl(V ) := {v ∈ V | ∀u ∈ V,¬(u ∗ v)} ,
then it holds that Z(D) ⊆ Cl(V ) for all D(V,E) ∈ D. By Claim 1.12, if a v ∈ Cl(V )
exists such that v ∈ Z(D) for all D(V,E) ∈ D, then v ∗ u or v ∼∗ u, and γ({u, v}) 6=
{v}, for all u ∈ V . Define Core(V ) ⊆ V by
Core(V ) :=
v ∈ V
∣∣∣∣ ∀u ∈ V,
 ¬(v ∗ u)⇒ v (RP0 ∪RP1∪ ∼∗)u
∧ γ({u, v}) 6= {v}
 .
Then, it follows that Core(V ) ⊆ Z%δ(S) for all S(V,E) ∈ S, and Core(V ) ⊆ Γ(D) for
all D(V,E) ∈ D. That is, for any D(V,E) ∈ D, Core(V ) would be selected from every
ϕ ∈ Φ(A ◦ TD). Hence, Core(V ) ⊆ Z(D) ⊆ Cl(V ) for any D(V,E) ∈ D.
(ii) Let V̂ := V \ Cl(V ). By definition, for any u ∈ V̂ , there is a v ∈ Cl(V ) such
that v ∗ u. Thus, by Claim 1.8 and Claim 1.9-(g)(h), we have ¬(uR0v ∨ uR1v) for
any u ∈ V̂ , v ∈ Cl(V ).15 Let Ê ⊂ Cl(V ) × V̂ be the set that satisfies v ∗ u for any
(v, u) ∈ Ê, and #{e ∈ Ê | τ(e) = u} = 1 for all u ∈ V̂ .
Claim 1.8 implies that RP0 , RP1 are transitive on Cl(V ), and by DAD, Z({u, v}) =
{u, v} for every u, v ∈ Cl(V ). Let V 10 ⊆ Cl(V ) be the largest RI0-indifferent subset of
Cl(V ), and let V 20 be the largest such subset of Cl(V ) \ V 10 , and so on. Then, it yields
a collection of RI0-indifferent subsets {V 10 , . . . , V k0 }. Similarly, let {V 11 , . . . , V l1} be the
15It is shown in the proof of Claim 1.8 that for any u, v, w ∈ X, u ∗ v, vRPδ w imply u ∗ w.
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collection of RI1-indifferent subsets. Denote by V0 the set of remaining elements of
Cl(V ), and let {V 1, . . . , V m} be the collection of all singleton subsets of V0. Then, by
Claim 1.10, V(V ) := {V 1, . . . , V m, V 10 , . . . , V k0 , V 11 , . . . , V l1} defines a partition of Cl(V ).
By construction, RP0 ∪RP1∪ ∼∗ is connex on V0, and Claim 1.10, Claim 1.9-(a)(b) jointly
imply that v0 ∼∗ v1 for any v0 ∈ V i0 , v1 ∈ V
j
1 with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Moreover, by
Claim 1.9 and the transitivity of RP0 , RP1 , it follows that:
a1) ∀u, v, w ∈ Cl(V ), ¬
(




uRP1 v ∧ vRP0w)
)
;
a2) ∀V i, V j ∈ V(V ),∀Q ∈ {RP0 , RP1 ,∼∗},
∃u ∈ V i,∃v ∈ V j, uQv =⇒ ∀vi,∀vj, viQvj;
a3) ∀V i, V j, V h ∈ V(V ), ∀u ∈ V i,∀v ∈ V j,∀w ∈ V h,
uRP0w ∧ vRP1w
 ⇒







 ∀u ∈ V i,∀v ∈ V j,∀w ∈ V h,
wRP0 u ∧ wRP1 v
 ⇒








Hence, under the transitivity of RP0 , RP1 , a permutation (V1, . . . Vn) of V(V ) exists such
that, for any Vi, Vj ∈ {V1, . . . Vn}, i < j implies
∀vi ∈ Vi,∀vj ∈ Vj, (vjRP0 vi) ∨ (viRP1 vj) ∨ (vj ∼∗ vi). (1.6)
Fix this permutation. Since there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that u ∈ Vi for every
v ∈ Cl(V ), to simplify the statement, let vi (resp., vj, vh, ur, wt) imply vi ∈ Vi (resp.,
Vj, Vh, Vr, Vt) in (V1, . . . , Vn). Then, by Eq (1.5) and Eq (1.6), we have
 ∃Vi, Vj, Vh ∈ V(V ),
viR
P
0 vh ∧ viRP1 vj
 ⇒

∀Vr, Vt ∈ V(V ) : r ≥ i ≥ t,











 ∃Vi, Vj, Vh ∈ V(V ),
vjR
P
0 vi ∧ vhRP1 vi
 ⇒

∀Vr, Vt ∈ V(V ) : r ≥ i ≥ t,











Fix an arbitrary V ∗ ⊆ Cl(V ). Without loss of generality, suppose that Core(V ) ⊆
V ∗. Define the following subsets of Ṽ := Cl(V ) \ V ∗:
Ṽ Iδ :=
{
u ∈ Ṽ | ∃v ∈ Cl(V ), vRIδu
}
, δ = 0,1;
Ṽ Pδ :=
{
u ∈ Ṽ | ∃v ∈ Cl(V ), vRPδ u ∧ @v′ ∈ Cl(V ), uRIδv′
}
, δ = 0,1;
Ṽ+ :=
{







Then, by (a1), Ṽ = Ṽ P0 ∪ Ṽ P1 ∪ Ṽ I0 ∪ Ṽ I1 ∪ Ṽ+, and every pair of these sets excepting
Ṽ P0 , Ṽ
P
1 are disjoint, where Ṽ P0 ∩ Ṽ P1 satisfies Eq (1.8). Moreover, if Ṽ+ 6= ∅, then, for
any u ∈ Ṽ+, a v ∈ Cl(V ) exists such that γ({u, v}) = {u}.
The idea is that, if any of Ṽ Iδ and Ṽ Pδ is nonempty, say Ṽ I0 6= ∅, then construct
a connected DAG D = D∗ = D∗ that satisfies Core(V ) ∪ V ∗ ⊆ Z(D) ⊂ Cl(V ) and
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Ṽ I0 \ Z(D) 6= ∅. Otherwise, define a D∗(V,E∗) that satisfies Ṽ+ ∩ Z(D∗) = ∅, where
{e ∈ E∗ | ι(e) = v ∨ τ(e) = v} 6= ∅ holds for all v ∈ V .
Let Ẽ ⊂ V × V and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the sets given by the following criteria:
b1) for any ui ∈ Ṽ I0 and any us ∈ Ṽ I1 ,
[Vi ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅]⇒
[
∀v ∈ Vi ∩ V ∗, (v, ui) ∈ Ẽ
]
; Vi ∩ V ∗ = ∅ ∧
∃k ≥ i, vkRP0 ui
⇒
 i ∈ J ∧ ∀vj ∈ Vj, (vj, ui) ∈ Ẽ
(j = mink≥i k s.t. vkRP0 ui)
 ;
[Vs ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅]⇒
[
∀v ∈ Vs ∩ V ∗, (us, v) ∈ Ẽ
]
; Vs ∩ V ∗ = ∅ ∧
∃l ≤ s, vlRP1 us
⇒
 s ∈ J ∧ ∀vr ∈ Vr, (us, vr) ∈ Ẽ
(r = maxl≤s l s.t. vlRP1 us)
 ;
b2) for any Vi ∈ V(V ) that satisfies Vi ⊆ Ṽ I0 and ¬(vjRP0 ui) for all j ≥ i, we have
i ∈ J , and a unique v0i ∈ Vi exists such that
∀u ∈ Vi \ {v0i }, (v0i , u) ∈ Ẽ; i 6= 1∧
∃k ≤ i, Vk ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅
 ⇒
 ∀vh ∈ Vh ∩ V ∗, (vh, v0i ) ∈ Ẽ
(h = maxk≤i k s.t. Vk ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅)
 ;
 i 6= n∧
∃k ≥ i, Vk ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅
 ⇒

∀vj ∈ Vj ∩ V ∗, ∀u ∈ Vi \ {v0i },
(u, vj) ∈ Ẽ
(j = mink≥i k s.t. Vk ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅)
 .
(1.9)
b3) for any Vs ∈ V(V ) which satisfies Vs ⊆ Ṽ I1 and ¬(vrRP1 us) for all r ≤ s, we
have s ∈ J , and a unique v1s ∈ Vs exists such that
∀u ∈ Vs \ {v1s}, (u, v1s) ∈ Ẽ; s 6= n∧
∃l ≥ s, Vl ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅
 ⇒
 ∀vt ∈ Vt ∩ V ∗, (v1s , vt) ∈ Ẽ
(t = minl≥s l s.t. Vl ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅)
 ;
 s 6= 1∧
∃l ≤ s, Vl ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅
 ⇒

∀vr ∈ Vr ∩ V ∗,∀u ∈ Vs \ {v1s},
(vr, u) ∈ Ẽ
(r = maxl≤s l s.t. Vl ∩ V ∗ 6= ∅)
 .
(1.10)
b4) for any ui ∈ Ṽ P0 and any us ∈ Ṽ P1 \ Ṽ P0 ,
i ∈ J ∧ ∀vj ∈ Vj : (j = mink≥i k s.t. vkRP0 ui), (vj, ui) ∈ Ẽ;
s ∈ J ∧ ∀vr ∈ Vr : (r = maxl≤s l s.t. vlRP1 us), (us, vr) ∈ Ẽ.
Let J c := {1, . . . , n} \ J . Define a set EJ ⊂ Cl(V )× Cl(V ) by
EJ :=
{





Define D∗(V,E∗) by E := Ẽ ∪ EJ ∪ Ê. Then, by construction, D∗ is a connected
DAG. Moreover, by (b1)–(b4) and Eq (1.6)Eq (1.7)Eq (1.8), for any e ∈ E(TD∗),
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∆(e) 6= {1} when ι(e) ∈ V ∗, and ∆(e) 6= {0} when τ(e) ∈ V ∗. Hence, for any v ∈ V ∗, a
ϕ ∈ Φ(D∗) exists such that v ∈ Z∆(ϕ(D∗)).16 Consequently, (Core(V )∪V ∗) ⊆ Z(D∗).
Suppose that Core(V )∪ V ∗ ∪ Ṽ+ ⊂ Cl(V ). Then, not all of (b1)–(b4) are vacuous.
By (b4), for any u ∈ Ṽ P0 ∪ Ṽ P1 , an e ∈ E∗ exists such that u 6∈ Z(e). By (b1)–(b3), for
every u ∈ Ṽ I0 ∪ Ṽ I1 , if u is neither the vertex v0i in Eq (1.9) nor v1s in Eq (1.10), then an
e ∈ E∗ exists such that u 6∈ Z(e). Since D∗ is a DAG, TD∗[{u, v}] cannot be a cycle
for any u, v ∈ V . Hence, by IIP*, Core(V )∪V ∗∪ Ṽ+ ⊂ Cl(V ) implies Z(D∗) ⊂ Cl(V ).
Suppose that Cl(V ) \ (Core(V ) ∪ V ∗) = Ṽ+. In this case, Ẽ = ∅. Let Ẽγ ⊂
Cl(V )× Cl(V ) be the set that satisfies:
c1) ∀u, v ∈ Cl(V ), (u, v) ∈ Ẽγ ⇐⇒ (v, u) ∈ Ẽγ;
c2) ∀u ∈ Ṽ+,∃!v ∈ Cl(V ),
[
γ({u, v}) = {u} ∧ (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Ẽγ
]
.
Let Vγ := {v ∈ Cl(V ) | ∃u ∈ Cl(V ), (u, v) ∈ Ẽγ}, and let J̃ := {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Vi 6⊆
Ṽ+}.17 Define a set EJ̃ ⊂ V ∗ × V ∗ accordingly by
EJ̃ :=
{





Define D∗(V,E∗) by E∗ = Ê ∪ Ẽγ ∪ EJ̃ . Then, for any v ∈ V , a u ∈ V exists such
that (u, v) ∈ E∗ or (v, u) ∈ E∗. By Eq (1.6)Eq (1.7)Eq (1.8) and Theorem 1.2, for any
v ∈ Core(V )∪V ∗ and any u ∈ V , v ∈ Z(TD∗[{u, v}]). In particular, since a v ∈ Cl(V )
exists such that TD[{u, v}] = C({u, v}) with γ({u, v}) = {u}, thus u 6∈ Γ(D∗) holds
for any u ∈ Ṽ+. Hence, by Theorem 1.2 and IIP*, (Core(V ) ∪ V ∗) = Z(D∗) ⊂
Cl(V ). Q.E.D.
1.A.4.5. Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof. Given a G =
(
V,N, {(∆i, γi)}i∈N , {Di}i∈N
)
, denote by N (G) the set of
Nash equilibria of G. Let v ∈ V be an arbitrary allocation.
Suppose v ∈ G(G). By definition, v ∈ Zi(Di) for every i ∈ N , meaning that, for
every i ∈ N , (a) {v} 6= γi({u, v}) for any u ∈ V with TDi[{u, v}] = C({u, v}), and (b)
a ϕi ∈ Φ(A◦TDi) exists such that v ∈ Z∆i(ϕi◦A◦TDi), under Proposition 1.1. Hence,
it follows that ∆i((u, v)) 6= {0} for every u ∈ V that satisfies Tϕi(·)[{u, v}] = (u, v),
and ∆i((v, u)) 6= {1} for all u ∈ V with Tϕi(·)[{u, v}] = (v, u). By Eq (∗), since
∆i((w, w̃)) 6= {0} for any w, w̃ ∈ V , we have TDi[{u, v}] 6= (v, u) and TDi[{u, v}] 6=
C({u, v}) for all u ∈ V with ∆i((v, u)) = {1}. As a result, for every i ∈ N and
any u ∈ V , u i v implies that TDi[{u, v}] = (u, v) or TDi[{u, v}] = {u, v}. Thus,
G(G) ⊆ N (G) as v ∈ N (G).
Now suppose v ∈ N (G). Then, for every i ∈ N , we have v %i u for any u ∈ V with
(v, u) ∈ E(TDi[{u, v}]). By Eq (∗), it yields that, for every i ∈ N , ∆i((v, u)) = {0,1}
16See Eq (1.4) ff. in Appendix 1.A.4.1.
17Note that, for every ui ∈ Ṽ+, Vi = {ui} is singleton.
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for any u ∈ V with TDi[{u, v}] = (v, u), and γi({u, v}) 6= {v} for any u ∈ V with
TDi[{u, v}] = C({u, v}). Moreover, ∆i((w, w̃)) 6= {0} for any w, w̃ ∈ V . Hence, for
every i ∈ N , a ϕi ∈ Φ(·) exists such that v ∈ Z∆i(ϕi(·)), meaning that v ∈ Zi(Di) for
all i ∈ N . Consequently, N (G) ⊆ G(G) as v ∈ G(G). Q.E.D.
1.A.5. Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1.2.1. Let ω(V ) be the string that links every consecutive
elements following a given permutation of V . Denote by Ω(V ) the set of all such strings
on V . Then, for any V ∈ 2X \ {∅}, each ω ∈ Ω(V ) corresponds to a permutation of V .
Clearly, T ((V, ∅)) = (V, ∅), A((V, ∅)) = (V, ∅), and Γ((V, ∅)) = V for any V ∈ 2X \ {∅}.




Z∆(ω(V )) = V \
 ⋂
ω∈Ω(V )
V \ Z∆(ω(V ))
 .
Let Q(V ) := ⋂ω∈Ω(V ) V \ Z∆(ω(V )). Fix a V ∈ 2X \ {∅} and a q ∈ Q(V ) arbitrarily.
Then, by the definition of Z∆, for any ω ∈ Ω(V ), a v ∈ V exists such that ∆((v, q)) =
{0}, or ∆((q, v)) = {1}. Let ω+(V ) denote the string in which E(Tω+(V )[{v, q}]) =
(v, q) for all v with ∆((q, v)) = {1}. Note that q ∈ Q(V ) implies q 6∈ Z∆(ω+(V )).
Hence, a v ∈ V exists such that ∆((v, q)) = {0} and ∆((q, v)) = {1}. Consequently,
Q(V ) = {q ∈ V | ∃v ∈ V, {∆((v, q)) = {0} ∧∆((q, v)) = {1}}}. As a result, Z∗(V ) =
Z((V, ∅)) = V \Q(V ) = {v ∈ V | @u ∈ V, u ∗ v} for all V ∈ 2X \ {∅}. By Claim 1.8,
∗⊂ X ×X is transitive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1.2.2. Given Theorem 1.2 and Corollary 1.2.1, it suffices
to show ∗ is a semiorder under Relevance. By Relevance, for any u, v ∈ X, it
is impossible to have Z((u, v)) = {u, v} and Z((v, u)) = {v, u}. That is, ∼∗= ∅.
Hence, define a binary relation %S:=∗ ∪RPδ ∪RIδ , then %S⊂ X ×X is connex, where
δ = {0,1}. By Claim 1.9-(c)(d), for any u, v, w ∈ X, it is impossible to have uRP0 v and
wRP1 v. Let S:=∗ and ∼S:= RPδ ∪RIδ . Clearly, S is asymmetric. Let u, v, x, y ∈ X
be arbitrary. Suppose u ∗ x, x ∼∗ y, and y S v. Then, by Claim 1.8 and Claim 1.9-
(g)(h), u S y, and hence, u S v. Suppose x S u, u S y, and u ∼S v. If uRIδv for
δ = 0,1, then by Claim 1.9-(g)(h), x ∗ v and v ∗ y. If uRPδ v for δ = 0,1, then by
Claim 1.8, x S v. If vRPδ u for δ = 0,1, then by Claim 1.8, v S y. Thus, x ∼S v and
v ∼S y cannot be true simultaneously. Hence, S⊂ X ×X is a semiorder. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1.2.3. (i) By Theorem 1.1, %⊂ X ×X has a unique de-
composition %= ∪ ∼0 ∪ ∼1. Let Q0 := ∪ ∼0 and Q1 := ∪ ∼1. Then, (Q0, Q1)
is the pair that satisfies the statement (i).
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(ii) Let S ∈ S be arbitrary. By the definition of ZQδ and (Q0, Q1), we have ZQδ(S) ⊆
M(S). Then, by Claim 1.3, ZQδ(S) ∈ X/∼0 or ZQδ(S) ∈ X/∼1. Suppose ZQδ(S) ⊆
M(S) ∈ X/∼0. Then, for any u ∈ M(S), if {e ∈ E(TS[M(S)]) | τ(e) = u} 6= ∅, then
u 6∈ ZQδ(S). For S, a unique v ∈ M(S) exists such that {e ∈ E(TS[M(S)]) | τ(e) =
v} = ∅, i.e., the first %-maximal vertex. Suppose ZQδ(S) ⊆ M(S) ∈ X/∼1, then for
any u ∈ M(S), {e ∈ E(TS[M(S)]) | ι(e) = u} 6= ∅ implies u 6∈ ZQδ(S). Similarly,
there is a unique v ∈ M(S) that satisfies {e ∈ E(TS[M(S)]) | ι(e) = v} = ∅, the last
%-maximal vertex. Hence, ZQδ(S) is singleton in both cases, and by the definition of
z%,δ, we have ZQδ(S) = {z%,δ(S)}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1.2.4. (i) By Theorem 1.2, (u, v) ∈ (%0 ∩ %1) if and
only if Z((u, v)) = Z((v, u)) = {u}. Hence, for all (u, v) ∈ (%0 ∪ %1), we have
ẑ((u, v) = ẑ((v, u)) = u, as ẑ(D) ∈ Z(D) for all D ∈ D. Thus, it yields that u̂v for
all (u, v) ∈ (%0 ∩ %1).
(ii) Let u, v ∈ X be arbitrary and suppose that u %0 v or u %1 v. Then, by the
definition of %0,%1, we have v 6∈ Z((u, v)) or v 6∈ Z((v, u)). Since ẑ(D) ∈ Z(D) for all
D ∈ D, it follows that v 6= ẑ((u, v)) or v 6= ẑ((v, u)). Hence, we have (u̂v)∨ (u∼̂0v)∨
(u∼̂1v). That is, u%̂v. Q.E.D.
CHAPTER 2
Uncertainty Attitude and Variable Information Structures
2.1. Introduction
Seminal models of decision making under uncertainty often consider information
implicit and fixed (e.g., Anscombe and Aumann (1963); Schmeidler (1989); Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989); Klibanoff et al. (2005)). On this account, the information a decision
maker (DM) perceived, as well as the imprecision or ambiguity inherent in the decision
problem, are often reflected by parts (conditions) of the representations.1 Meanwhile,
attitude towards uncertainty is a primary feature to which the revealed choice behavior
is often attributed. However, when we apply the seminal models to the environments of
uncertainty that involve fixed contingencies with associated consequences yet allow ex-
ogenous information about the likelihoods of contingencies to vary, we might experience
difficulties in isolating the influence of information on the uncertainty attitude which
the DM’s choice exhibits. Namely, seminal models often become uninformative about
whether and how the revealed uncertainty attitude translates among the choices made
under different information. Explicating the translatability of uncertainty attitude
requires a model that accommodates information-dependency of choice under uncer-
tainty, thereby necessitating a formalism that takes variable information as primitive.
The objective of this chapter is to develop such a model by explicitly incorporating vari-
able information into the benchmark subjective expected utility (SEU, Anscombe and
Aumann (1963)) framework and connect the representation of preference to behavioral
definitions of uncertainty attitude.
In literature, there are attempts to treat exogenous information as variables. Ol-
szewski (2007); Ahn (2008); Gajdos et al. (2004, 2008); Hayashi (2012) modeled infor-
mation by sets of probability distributions over either the state space or the outcome
space. Since information is incorporated as a margin of choice objects, these mod-
els thus inevitably require “rich” observations on “large” domains of choice.2 Among
1For example, the perceived information is reflected by the unique set of priors in Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), by the first- and second-order belief in Klibanoff et al. (2005); Seo (2009).
2For instance, the preference studied in Gajdos et al. (2008) includes rankings over different
acts paired with different sets of probabilities over the state space, that is, rankings of the form
(f, P ) % (g,Q), where f and g are acts while P and Q denote sets of probabilities.
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the cited papers, Gajdos et al. (2008); Hayashi (2012) connected subjective beliefs to
objective information and achieved a separation between the way the DM processes
information and the machinery by which she assesses choice objects. Due to this,
information being specified by sets of probabilities becomes indispensable for the rep-
resentations obtained in these papers. Such a specification is arguably restrictive since,
in some instances, objective information about likelihoods of contingencies might be
too vague to be captured by sets of probabilities, yet nonetheless influences choice.3
In this strand of literature, information is variable in the sense that it may deliver
different underlying knowledge of likelihoods with various degrees of imprecision.
We, however, focus on a subtler aspect of variable information. In the real-world,
a fixed knowledge of likelihoods of contingencies (e.g., a statistical observation) can be
described in different frames, and one may interpret each of such descriptions as a piece
of information about likelihoods. We refer to those descriptive frames as information
structures. The DM’s choice may depend on the information structure in which a
fixed knowledge of likelihoods of contingencies is described to her, even when the
contingencies and associated consequences are fixed and of which she is fully aware.
More notably, the content of the knowledge becomes irrelevant for the machinery of
information-dependency in this vein.
R B Y G
`1 $100 $100 $0 $0
`2 $100 $0 $100 $0
`3 $0 $100 $0 $100
`4 $0 $0 $100 $100
Announced frequencies ρ(·)
Irb ρ({R,B}) ≈ .5, ρ({Y}) ≈ .2, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Iry ρ({R,Y}) ≈ .5, ρ({B}) ≈ .2, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Ig ρ({R,B,Y}) ≈ .7, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
IN ——
Table 2.1 – Four-Color Urn with Variable Information
To clarify this idea, consider a four-color urn (Ellsberg (1961)) in the following
manner. An urn contains balls in four colors: Red (R), Black (B), Yellow (Y) and
Green (G). The total quantity and that of each color are unknown. However, from a
series of trials in each of which one ball was drawn from and returned into the urn, the
host observed that the frequency ρ(·) of each color being drawn is approximately as
3The choice problem illustrated in Table 2.1 is an example.
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follows: ρ({R}) ≈ ρ({G}) ≈ .3 and ρ({B}) ≈ ρ({Y}) ≈ .2. Yet these frequencies are
undisclosed to the DM. Now, a single ball will be drawn from the urn. As illustrated
in Table 2.1, the DM is asked to rank bets {`1, `2, `3, `4}, after a piece of information in
{Irb, Iry, Ig, IN} is announced. In these hypothetically parallel situations, the DM may
reveal: `1 ∼ `4  `3 % `2 when Irb is given; `2 ∼ `3  `4 % `a for Iry; `4 ∼ `3  `2 ∼ `1
for Ig; and `1 ∼ `2 ∼ `3 ∼ `4 for IN . In this example, the available knowledge
of likelihoods of contingencies, “ρ({R}) ≈ ρ({G}) ≈ .3 and ρ({B}) ≈ ρ({Y}) ≈
.2,” is fixed, and information varies in the sense that this knowledge is described in
different frames. Nevertheless, if we discriminate the rankings observed under different
information, the example suggests that such variation of information may lead the DM
to rank the bets differently. Moreover, changes of information do not always alter
rankings over some bets (e.g., `3  `1 for both Iry and Ig, and `4  `2 for both Irb and
Ig), meaning that choice behavior may possess certain consistency up to such variation
of information, which in turn is related closely to the information-dependency of choice
alluded to above.
We, therefore, consider an environment wherein a fixed knowledge of likelihoods
of contingencies is described in variable information structures. Incorporated into the
SEU framework, we specify information structures as partitions of the state space and
study a family of preferences over Anscombe-Aumann (AA) acts which are indexed
by partitions.4 This formalism is of significant interest since it yields naturally the
separation between the situation being “more ambiguous” and the preference revealing
“more uncertainty-averse” with minimum technical requirements.
Equipped with this primitive, we axiomatize a representation which we call bi-











Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0},
where f is an AA act, L is a partition of the state space, and the integral takes the
form of Choquet integral. As for its elements, u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)
index, V is a capacity over the state space, and PL is a probability measure defined
on the σ-algebra induced by L. When information is given with structure L, the DM
assesses AA act f as if she first computes the conditional expected utility of f on each
learnable event E ∈ L with respect to vNM index u and capacity V , then evaluates
the overall expected payoff with respect to probability PL. Capacity V can be viewed
as the DM’s pure subjective belief, while PL captures how she interprets the fixed
4Dillenberger et al. (2014) studied a similar specification of information by a parsimonious model
which they named partition-learning.
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knowledge when it is given in information structure L. We also find that the suggested
decision rule is equivalent to that given by Choquet expected utility (CEU, Schmei-
dler (1989)) with partition-dependent belief formation. In this way, our model also
separates, from the machinery of act assessment, the functional relationship between
information structures and willingness-to-bet of each event.5 We then relate BCEU
to the definition of comparative uncertainty aversion by Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002) and that proposed by Epstein (1999) to study several characteristic conditions
regarding the translatability of uncertainty attitude.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the prelimi-
naries. Section 2.3 presents the representations under different impositions of axioms.
Translatability of uncertainty attitude are studied in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5
summarizes discussion. Proofs are included in Appendix 2.A.
2.2. Preliminaries
Let S be a finite set of states and P(S) be the power set of S. Each element of
P(S) is called an event and is denoted typically by E,B or D. Let Σ be a σ-algebra
of S. Then, we call a set function µ : Σ → [0, 1] a capacity on Σ if µ(∅) = 0, µ(S) = 1,
and for any B,D ∈ Σ, B ⊆ D implies µ(B) ≤ µ(D). All the integrals stand for the
Choquet integral throughout.
Denote by L a typical partition of S, and let Σ(L) be the σ-algebra (of S) generated
by L with respect to the set union and intersection. In particular, let L = {S} and
L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. Denote by L the set of all partitions of S (including L). Each
partition L ∈ L corresponds to an information structure. Define L = {(L, L̃) ∈
L × L | Σ(L) ⊆ Σ(L̃)}. That is, if (L, L̃) ∈ L , then L̃ carries more detailed (finer)
information about the underlying knowledge of likelihoods than L does. Clearly, L
defines a partial order under which (L,L ) becomes a lattice. Let A be the set of
consequences. Denote by Π(A) the set of all simple lotteries over A. An act is defined
by function f : S → Π(A). Let H denote the set of all acts, and denote by HC the
set of all constant acts in H. The act space H is endowed with a mixture operation
defined by (
αf + (1− α)g
)
(s) = αf(s) + (1− α)g(s), ∀s ∈ S,∀α ∈ [0, 1].
For any f, g ∈ H and E ∈ P(S), let [fEg] be the binary act such that for all s ∈ S,
[fEg](s) = f(s) when s ∈ E, and [fEg](s) = g(s) otherwise.
5Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) studied a general class of preferences, which they name bisep-
arable preferences, and introduced the term willingness-to-bet to interpret the monotone set function
obtained in the representation. It is known that CEU is a form of biseparable preferences.
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For every L ∈ L, let %L⊂ H×H be a binary relation, where L and ∼L denote the
asymmetric and symmetric part of %L, respectively. For every L ∈ L, we extend %L
to Π(A) by identifying lotteries with constant acts. The object being of our interest is
the family of those binary relations {%L}L∈L.
For every L ∈ L, let HL denote the set of all Σ(L)-measurable acts. For every
L ∈ L and any f ∈ H, denote by fL the constant act such that f(s) %L fL(s) on S
and f(ŝ) = fL(ŝ) for some ŝ ∈ S. Define, for any L ∈ L, D ∈P(S) and c ∈ HL,
CLD[c] =
{






Given L ∈ L and E ∈ L, it is worth noting the implication of acts in CLE (and those
in CLE[c] for a fixed c ∈ HC) in terms of the demand for informativeness, since this type
of acts play a central role in formalizing axioms, and the suggested implication is closely
related to the normative appeal of our axioms. By definition, an f ∈ CLE can be viewed
as a guaranteed minimal payoff fL(·) (according to %L) associated with a “gain-bet”
over the sub-events of E. Thus, %L over these acts, say f, g ∈ CLE, arguably depend
on the DM’s assessment of the gain-bets induced by f and g, and on the trade-off
between the anticipated utility increments delivered by those gain-bets and the utility
given by the corresponding minimal payoffs. Notice that fL(·) and gL(·) do not involve
any subjective uncertainty, and that the gain-bets are given over the sub-events of E.
Hence, the uncertainty inherent in ranking f and g can be described by (E,P(E))
which is beyond the descriptive power of L. In particular, when f, g ∈ CLE[c] for a fixed
c, they deliver a “sure-thing” payoff since c(·) = fL(·) = gL(·). Thus, it is reasonable
to ascribe the preference over f and g to the DM’s assessment of the aforementioned
gain-bets which solely depends on how she judges the relative likelihoods of event in
(E,P(E)). Consequently, the information carried by L is (should be) irrelevant for
such a demand for informativeness.6
2.3. Axioms and Results
In this section, we first present the baseline axioms that characterize our general
representation, then study two of its specific variations under stronger impositions in
terms of consistency.
6For example, let L = {{R,B,Y}, {G}} and E = {R,B,Y} in the four-color urn considered in
Section 2.1. Then, L uniquely identifies information Ig, and `1, `2 ∈ CLE [$0] provided that $100 %L $0.
In this case, Ig is completely irrelevant for the ranking between `1 and `2 because the rankings over
such acts (should) depend solely on the information about how the total quantity of “non-green” balls
is distributed over R, B and Y, instead of the information about the quantity itself.
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2.3.1. Bi-Criterion Expected Utility
The basic axioms that characterize our general representation are of two types.
Axiom 2.1-Axiom 2.6 are the assumptions for rationality which are applied to each
fixed information structure L. In particular, the first five are the standard impositions
(Fishburn (1970); Schmeidler (1989)) and collectively denoted as the SEU-CEU axioms.
The subsequent axioms (Axiom 2.7 and Axiom 2.8) address assumptions for consistency
across variable information structures.
Axiom 2.1 (Order). For any L ∈ L, %L is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2.2 (Continuity). For any L ∈ L and any f, g, h ∈ H with f L g L h,
there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α)h L g L βf + (1− β)h.
Axiom 2.3 (Monotonicity). For any L ∈ L and f, g ∈ H, if f(s) %L g(s) on S,
then f %L g.
Axiom 2.4 (Nondegeneracy). For every L ∈ L, not for all f, g ∈ H, f ∼L g.
Axiom 2.5 (Relevance Independence, RI).
(I) For every L ∈ L, any f, g, h ∈ HL, and any α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g if and only if
αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.
(II) For every L ∈ L, any E ∈ L, every pairwise comonotonic f, g, h ∈ CLE, and
any α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g if and only if αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.7
RI can be interpreted in line with the objective and subjective rationality introduced
by Gilboa et al. (2010). They argued that a choice is rational in the objective sense if the
DM can convince others of the rightness of her choices, while it is subjectively rational
if others cannot convince the DM that she is making the wrong choice. As we translate
into the AA framework, their paper considered the independence axiom an assumption
for the objective rationality.8 For a fixed partition L, the uncertainty inherent in Σ(L)-
measurable acts is described by (S,Σ(L)), and the given information structure L can
7For a fixed L ∈ L, acts f, g ∈ H are said to be comonotonic if, for any s, t ∈ S, f(s) L f(t)
implies g(s) %L g(t).
8% on H satisfies independence if for all f, g, h ∈ H and α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g if and only if
αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.
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accommodate such a demand for informativeness. Since the choices revealed by %L on
HL convey how the DM interprets the given information, the information carried by
L thus provides certain statistical evidence for the choices. Hence, we consider %L on
HL reflects the choices that are objectively rational, and thus impose the independence
axiom upon the restriction of %L on HL (i.e., RI-(I)). Meanwhile, we maintain that
the comonotonic independence is normative for the preference over certain acts when
the given information is irrelevant for the assessment of those acts. Consider the
implication of RI-(II) in conjunction with RI-(I). As argued in the previous section, an
act in CLE, for a learnable event E ∈ L, can be viewed as a minimal payoff associated
with a gain-bet over the sub-events of E. Notice that HL∩CLE 6= ∅, and that each act in
this intersection involves a degenerated gain-bet (constant) over the sub-events of E.9
For such acts, RI-(I) implies that the trade-off between the degenerated gain-bets and
the minimal payoffs is performed in a way obeying the independence axiom.10 Thus,
RI-(II) is essentially an assumption for the assessment of the gain-bets induced by acts
in CLE which is purely subjective. As a result, we consider comonotonic independence
normative for %L on each CLE.
Axiom 2.6 (Dominance). For any L ∈ L, any h ∈ H and f ∈ HL, if fL %L hL
and [hEhL] %L [fEhL] (resp., -L) for all E ∈ L, then h %L f (resp., -L).
Let f be a Σ(L)-measurable act and h be a normal act. For each learnable event
E ∈ L, [fEhL] and [hEhL] offer a sure-thing payoff hL(·) provided that fL %L hL.
As argued, the preference over [fEc] and [hEc] conveys how the DM’s evaluates the
gain-bets over E that are respectively induced by f and h. Notice that [fEhL] induces
a degenerated gain-bet over learnable event E. Thus, Dominance states that, given an
act h and its minimal payoff, if for every learnable event the DM prefers the subjective
gain-bet induced by h more than (resp., less than) the gain yielded by an objective
lottery, then she must prefer h over act f that gives the corresponding lottery on each
learnable event (resp., prefers f over h).
Our first result observes that the DM’s preference for each fixed information struc-
ture admits the CEU representation, where the influence of information structure is
manifested in the formation of the non-additive belief (the capacity). The implication
of the result will be discussed after the formal statement. For every L ∈ L, let S (L)
be the semi-ring (of S) given by S (L) = ⋃E∈L P(E).
9In the example given in Section 2.1, let L = {{R,B}, {Y}, {G}} and E = {R,B}. Then, `1 ∈
HL∩CLE provided that $100 %L $0, and it involves a degenerated gain-bet over {R,B} since both {R}
and {B} yield $100.
10This is also compatible with RI-(II) since acts in HL ∩ CLE are pairwise comonotonic.
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Theorem 2.1. Given an L ∈ L, the following statements are equivalent.
(I) %L⊂ H×H satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms and Dominance.
(II) There exist an affine function uL : Π(A) → R and a unique monotone set
function VL : S (L)→ [0, 1] such that for all f, g ∈ H,












Moreover, uL is unique up to positive linear transformation (p.l.t.).
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.2.
For a fixed information structure, the SEU-CEU axioms and Dominance jointly
characterize the following utility representation. Presented with the information given
in structure L, the DM places a weight on every sub-event of each learnable event in
L. Such a weighting is captured by the monotone set function VL : S (L) → [0, 1].
Notably, VL assigns a probability VL(E) to each learnable event E ∈ L (notice that
µL(S) = 1 =
∑
E∈L VL(E)) which reflects her judgment of the likelihoods of learnable
events based on the given information. According to this weighting, the DM judges
the likelihoods of other events by unpacking the event into the largest sub-events of
the learnable ones and summing the weights of those sub-events given by VL. This
defines the non-additive belief µL over P(S). The influence of information structure
is captured by such a process of belief formation, and the latter exhibits framing effect
since the assessed likelihood of an event depends on how this event is unpacked, that
is, depends on which events are learnable. The utility for each act is then computed
by CEU with respect to belief µL and a vNM index uL.
Now, we introduce the additional axioms which deal with consistency properties.
In formalizing these axioms, we consider preferences over a specific subset of acts and
focus on the demand for informativeness discussed in Section 2.2. The basic idea is
that if two pieces of information carried by different structures are both irrelevant for
assessing a set of acts, then the preference over this set of acts should be consistent
under those information structures. The next axiom, Certainty, states that preferences
over objective lotteries (hence, preferences over constant acts) are consistent across
variable information structures.
Axiom 2.7 (Certainty). For any L,L′ ∈ L and any c, c′ ∈ HC, c %L c′ if and only
if c %L′ c′.
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Axiom 2.8 (Consistency of Irrelevance, CoI). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any E ∈ L̃ \L,
and any c ∈ HC, if CL̃E[c]∩CLE[c] is not %L̃-indifferent, then for any f, g ∈ CL̃E[c]∩CLE[c],
f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g.11
CoI considers information refinements in conjunction with sets of acts which differ
from some fixed constant act only on a event. It suggests that, if sub-events of an
event E are not learnable from information structure L, nor from a finer information
structure L̃, then acts that deliver improvements from some fixed constant act only on
E are ranked the same under L and L̃. Let L, L̃ and E be as in the statement. As
argued in Section 2.2, preference over acts f, g ∈ CL̃E[c] ∩ CLE[c] (should) solely depends
on the DM’s evaluation of the gain-bets over sub-events of E, which are induced by
f and g. Since E ∈ L̃ \ L, both L̃ and L are irrelevant for ranking f and g, which is
thus purely subjective. Due to this, f and g should be ranked the same under L and
L̃, even though L̃ is finer than L and E itself is learnable from L̃. On this account, we
consider CoI a normative assumption for consistency.
Now, we are ready to characterize the entire family of preferences {%L}L∈L. The
next theorem shows that the SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance, Certainty, and CoI char-
acterize {%L}L∈L by a general representation which we call bi-criterion expected utility.
We first state the formal definition of this representation.
Definition 2.1 (Bi-Criterion Expected Utility). We say {%L}L∈L admits a bi-
criterion expected utility (BCEU) representation if there exist an affine function u :
Π(A) → R, a unique capacity V : P(S) → [0, 1], and for every L ∈ L, there is a
unique probability measure PL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] such that for all L ∈ L and f, g ∈ H,










Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.
Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
When such a tuple (u, V, {PL}L∈L) exists, we call it a BCEU representation.
BCEU can be read as follows. Each AA act delivers information-independent utility
u(·), and also being independent of information, the DM holds a subjective belief V
about the state space. Given the information carried by structure L, the DM entertains
a probabilistic interpretation of information PL over the learnable events. To evaluate
act f , she first coarsens the inherent uncertainty by computing the conditional expected
11Given an L ∈ L, a nonempty set of acts F ⊆ H is %L-indifferent if for any f, g ∈ F , f ∼L g.
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utility on each learnable event in the sense of CEU applying her subjective belief V ,
so that it can be fully assessed under the descriptive power of information structure L.
The overall utility for f is then evaluated by taking the expectation of those conditional
expected utilities on learnable events against PL. The twofold expectation suggests that
the DM tends to evaluate AA acts in a way adapting to the descriptive frames given
by information structures, where the coarsening at the first stage and non-additivity
of subjective belief allow for framing effect. Although the framing effect exhibited in
BCEU and the one observed in Theorem 2.1 have different manifestations, the next
theorem also shows that the resulting decision rules are behaviorally equivalent.
Theorem 2.2. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance, Certainty and CoI.
(II) {%L}L∈L admits a BCEU representation.
(III) There exist an affine real function u on Π(A), a unique capacity V on P(S),
and for every L ∈ L, there is a unique probability measure PL on Σ(L) such
that for all L ∈ L and f, g ∈ H,













Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.3.
We refer to the formulation of each µL given in statement (III) as bi-criterion belief
formation. As in BCEU, the DM holds a subjective belief V , and given the information
carried by L, she also entertains a probabilistic interpretation PL over the learnable
events. Since L equips each E ∈ L with stronger evidence, she may adjust her judgment
of likelihoods based on the subjective interpretation PL, and such an adjusted belief is
captured by capacity µL. The intuition behind the formulation of µL is akin to support
theory studied by Tversky and Koehler (1994); Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). They
took as primitive descriptions of events, called hypotheses, and considered probability
judgment of hypotheses under variable evaluation frames, which consist of mutually
exclusive hypotheses. Incorporated into our belief formation, information structure L
coincides with a complete collection of mutually exclusive hypotheses. Presented with
this evaluation frame, for event B, the DM rather considers how likely the realization of
uncertainty would meet the focal hypothesis B given each hypothesis E in evaluation
frame L is met. This process leads to the conditional likelihoods V (B ∩E)/V (E), and
the adjusted belief µL(B) is obtained by taking the expectation of those conditional
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likelihoods over L.12 This is because the realization of uncertainty would meet one of
the hypotheses in L, and each E ∈ L is assigned to a probability PL(E) by interpreting
the information carried by L.
Apart from characterizations, the theorem maintains that BCEU is behaviorally
equivalent to the CEU with bi-criterion belief formation. This equivalence is of sig-
nificant interest since it reduces the information-dependency of choice that hinged on
information structures to that of beliefs within CEU. Namely, one can study the im-
plications of the suggested information-dependency of choice by only focusing on the
information-adjusted beliefs obtained in the theorem.
Remark 2.1. Recall that L = {S} and L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. It is a straightforward
consequence that %L admits a standard CEU representation with respect to capacity
V , while %L has a standard SEU representation with respect to probability measure
PL : P(S)→ [0, 1].
2.3.2. More on Consistency
The general representation previously characterized does not specify any connec-
tion neither between the subjective belief V and subjective interpretation PL for each
L ∈ L, nor between subjective interpretations of the information carried by different
information structures. Here, we characterize, under stronger axioms of consistency,
two specific forms of BCEU which build such connections. The axioms presented in
what follows (Axiom 2.9 and Axiom 2.10) are also formulated based on the idea which
says preferences over a set of acts should be consistent whenever the corresponding in-
formation is irrelevant for assessing those acts. However, they involve more restrictive
interpretations of “irrelevance” compared with Certainty and CoI, respectively.
Axiom 2.9 (Consistency of Separation, CoS). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , E ∈ (L ∩ L̃) ∪
{∅} and any f, g ∈ CL̃E ∩ CLE, f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g.
CoS states that, if information structure L̃ is finer than L, and an event E is
learnable from both L and L̃, then acts that yield improvements from some constant
acts only on E (i.e. acts in CL̃E ∩ CLE) are ranked the same under L and L̃. For acts in
CL̃E ∩ CLE, CoS considers such a variation of information structures irrelevant because,
although L̃ carries the finer information about the likelihoods of sub-events of S \ E,
12The expression of conditional likelihood, V (B |E) = V (B ∩ E)/V (E), is characterized as an
updating rule of ambiguous belief in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
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each act in CL̃E ∩ CLE is constant and delivers its minimal payoff on S \ E. In addition,
it is a straightforward observation that CoS implies Certainty since it follows that
CL̃E ∩ CLE = HC when E = ∅.
The following proposition characterizes a class of BCEU representations, as well as
the equivalent CEU with bi-criterion belief formation, wherein the subjective interpre-
tations of information PL are compatible across variable information structures.
Proposition 2.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance, CoI and CoS.
(II) {%L}L∈L admits a BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L), where a unique prob-
ability measure P exists on P(S) such that for all L ∈ L and B ∈ Σ(L),
PL(B) = P (B).
(III) There exist an affine real function u on Π(A), a unique capacity V on P(S),
and a unique probability measure P on P(S) such that for all L ∈ L and
f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dµL ≥
∫
S u(g) dµL, where for every




V (E ∩B)P (E)
V (E) .
Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.4.
We denote the BCEU representation characterized in the proposition by (u, V, P ).
Recall that, in our formalism, information varies in the sense that a fixed knowledge of
likelihoods of contingencies is described in variable information structures. Thus, rep-
resentation (u, V, P ) suggests that the DM’s interpretation of information is determined
by the underlying knowledge of likelihoods, thereby being independent of information
structures in which this knowledge is transmitted. In other words, the DM’s judg-
ment of P rejects framing effects, and there is no specified connection between purely
subjective belief V and P .
In what follows, we present another class of BCEU representations wherein each PL
and V are related such that the DM’s subjective interpretations of information exhibit
framing effects.
Axiom 2.10 (Strong Consistency of Irrelevance, SCoI). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any
E,E ′ ∈ L̃, any c ∈ HC, and for any f ∈ CL̃E[c] ∩ CLE[c] and g ∈ CL̃E′ [c] ∩ CLE′ [c], f %L g
if and only if f %L̃ g.
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Proposition 2.2. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance, Certainty and SCoI.
(II) {%L}L∈L admits a BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L), where for any L ∈ L
and E ∈ L, PL(E) = V (E)/(
∑
D∈L V (D)).
(III) There exist an affine real function u on Π(A) and a unique capacity V on
P(S) such that for all L ∈ L and f, g ∈ H,







where for every L ∈ L, µL is the unique capacity such that for all B ∈P(S),
µL(B) =
∑
E∈L V (B ∩ E)∑
E∈L V (E)
.
Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.5.
Denote by (u, V ) a typical BCEU representation given in statement (II). For a
fixed information structure L, the DM interprets the information as if she performs
a non-extensional judgment of the likelihoods of learnable events based on her pure
subjective belief V . Such a judgment is expressed by the same formula with the one
characterized as part of the partition-dependent expected utility (PDEU) representa-
tion introduced by Ahn and Ergin (2010) and is also compatible with support theory
developed by Tversky and Koehler (1994); Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). How-
ever, in our formalism, the connection between PL and V has an intrinsically disparate
behavioral interpretation. It can be viewed as a manifestation of confirmation bias
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1974); Nickerson (1998), that is, the DM tends to
interpret information in a way that supports her pure subjective belief V , where the
non-additivity of V allows for framing effects. We address more details about such a
difference in Section 2.5.1.
2.4. Uncertainty Attitude
In this section, we connect BCEU to the behavioral definitions of comparative
uncertainty attitude and explore the implied characteristic conditions regarding the
revealed uncertainty attitude and its translatability under variable information struc-
tures. For simplicity, given a BCEU preference, the subsequent analysis will assume
that P(S) does not have any V -null event.
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) proposed a behavioral definition of comparative
uncertainty aversion with respect to preferences over Savage’s domain (Savage (1954)).
We restate this definition in our formalism.
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Definition 2.2 (Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)). Given two orderings % and
%′ on H, we say % is more uncertainty averse than %′ if for every c ∈ HC and any
f ∈ H, c %′ f implies c % f , and c ′ f implies c  f .
Our first result considers two BCEU preferences with the same vNM index. Doing
so allows us to fix the risk attitude of the two families of preferences and focus only on
the uncertainty attitude revealed from choices of acts. Applying BCEU to the above
definition, the following proposition characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition
for a BCEU preference under a given information structure being more uncertainty
averse than the other one observed under a different information structure. Besides,
we also consider a special case that the two BCEU preferences are identical in the
absence of exogenous information (i.e., under L).
Proposition 2.3. Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be BCEU preferences that admit
representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L) and (u, V ′, {P ′L}L∈L), respectively.













(II) Suppose that %L=%′L on H × H. Then, for every L ∈ L, the followings
are equivalent: (a) %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L. (b) %′L is more
uncertainty averse than %L. (c) PL = P ′L on Σ(L). (d) %L=%′L on H×H.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.6.
By Theorem 2.2, a BCEU preference can also be represented by a CEU with bi-
criterion belief formation. Thus, statement (I) of the proposition states that %L is
more uncertainty averse than %′
L̃





dominates µL event-wise. Statement (II) shows that, if {%L}L∈L and {%′L
}L∈L reflect the same behavior in the absence of exogenous information (i.e., they are
identical in purely subjective sense), then facing the same information structure L, the
revealed uncertainty attitudes of %L and %′L are comparable according to Definition 2.2
if and only if they yield the identical behavior.
In the presence of exogenous information, it is of interest to relate the strength of
informativeness to the degree of uncertainty attitude revealed from choices of acts, and
in our formalism, L is indeed an indicator of informativeness. Although it might be
intuitive to argue that choices under coarse information would exhibit a higher degree
of uncertainty aversion than those under finer information do, this is not true in general
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for BCEU preferences. The result below presents necessary and sufficient conditions
for this statement.
Proposition 2.4. Let {%L}L∈L admit a BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L).
Then, the following statements are equivalent.
(I) For every (L, L̃) ∈ L , %L is more uncertainty averse than %L̃.
(II) There exists a unique probability measure P ∈ Core(V ) such that {%L}L∈L
admits BCEU representation (u, V, P ).13 Moreover, for any B ∈ P(S) and
any nonempty disjoint D,D′ ∈P(S),
V (B ∩ (D ∪D′))P (D ∪D′)
V (D ∪D′) ≤
V (B ∩D)P (D)
V (D) +
V (B ∩D′)P (D′)
V (D′) .
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.7.
Epstein (1999) also proposed a definition of comparative uncertainty attitude based
on an exogenously identified set of unambiguous acts. The paper defined unambiguous
acts using measurability with respect to some fixed algebra, which is closely related
to λ-system studied by Zhang (2002); Epstein and Zhang (2001). In our model, each
information structure L also yields naturally a focal algebra Σ(L), and RI discriminates
the set of Σ(L)-measurable acts HL to some extent. Although HL does not necessarily,
in primitive, corresponds to the set of unambiguous acts, BCEU suggests that %L on
HL admits standard SEU representation, meaning that HL, in result, can be viewed
as so under L.14 Thus, in what follows, we apply BCEU to Epstein’s definition. Since
this definition is also given on Savage’s domain, we start with restating the definition
using our notations.
Definition 2.3 (Epstein (1999)). Let Σ be a σ-algebra of S, and denote by F the
set of all Σ-measurable acts in H. Given Σ and two orderings % and %′ on H, we say
% is more Σ-uncertainty averse than %′ if for every f ∈ F and any h ∈ H, f %′ h
implies f % h, and f ′ h implies f  h.
Now, we consider two BCEU preferences, {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L, and study the
characteristic conditions for %L being more uncertainty averse than %′L in the sense of
Definition 2.3. However, unlike Proposition 2.3, we only consider comparisons under
13For a capacity µ, Core(µ) denotes the core of µ, that is, the set of all probability measures
which dominates µ eventwise.
14In light of this, Epstein and Zhang proposed a definition of unambiguous events with respect to
a given preference relation (Epstein and Zhang (2001, Definition, .p 273)), and it can be shown that
events in Σ(L) are unambiguous with respect to %L when we apply this definition to HL.
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the same information structure. This is due to that Definition 2.3 requires a commonly
fixed set of unambiguous acts.
Proposition 2.5. Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L admit BCEU (u, V, {PL}L∈L) and
(u, V ′, {P ′L}L∈L), respectively. Then, for any L ∈ L, the followings are equivalent.
(I) %L is more Σ(L)-uncertainty averse than %′L.
(II) PL = P ′L on Σ(L), and for any E ∈ L and B ∈ P(E), V (B)/V (E) ≤
V ′(B)/V ′(E).
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.8.
Epstein (1999) also introduced a definition of absolute (definitive) uncertainty aver-
sion based on the suggested definition of comparative uncertainty aversion. Our last
result shows that, for every BCEU preference and any information structure, if it reveals
uncertainty aversion in the sense of Schmeidler (1989, .p 582), then it is uncertainty
aversion according to Epstein (1999).
Proposition 2.6. Let {%L}L∈L admit a BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L).
Then, for any L ∈ L, statement (I) implies (II).
(I) For any f, g ∈ H and any α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼L g implies αf + (1− α)g %L f .
(II) There exists a probability measure P : P(S) → [0, 1] such that if denote by
%P⊂ H×H the preference that admits SEU representation (u, P ), then %L is
more Σ(L)-uncertainty averse than %P .
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.9.
2.5. Discussion
2.5.1. Causes of Framing Effects
As to the formalism, the closet model of which we are aware is the PDEU introduced
by Ahn and Ergin (2010). On a finite state space, the primitive of PDEU is also a
family of partition-indexed preferences {L}L∈L over AA acts. Yet for each partition
L, the corresponding preference is given over the set of Σ(L)-measurable acts instead
of the full domain, that is, L⊂ HL×HL. A PDEU representation (u, v) has the form




where ρL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] is the unique probability such that





If we disregard interpretations, then for every partition L, the BCEU given in Proposi-
tion 2.2 (i.e., (u, V )) induces, on HL, the exact functional form of PDEU. In particular,
framing effects are expressed by the same formula in PDEU and BCEU (u, V ), respec-
tively. However, this is nothing but a fortunate coincidence.
The fundamental difference between BCEU and PDEU lies on the disparate aspects
to which framing effects are attributed, respectively. In their paper, each partition cor-
responds to a description of the state space, and under each description L, an act
cannot be identified unless it is Σ(L)-measurable. Presented with a description L, the
perceived uncertainty inherent in the choice problem is thus (S,Σ(L)), meaning that
the variation of such descriptions leads the DM to entertain different coarse under-
standings of the state space. In this way, the framing effect exhibited in the judgment
of each ρL is ascribed to unforeseen contingencies, thereby being an (un)awareness is-
sue. Similar approaches that relate choice behavior to (un)awareness also appear in
Nehring (2000); Ghirardato (2001); Dekel et al. (2001); Epstein et al. (2007); Karni
and Vierø (2013).
Contrarily, in our model, the uncertainty inherent in choice problem is (S,P(S))
across variable information structures. However, for each information structure L, the
information carried by L may equip (S,Σ(L)) with stronger evidence about likelihoods
than what the DM entertains previously. Consequently, the implied framing effects are
due to the friction between awareness (S,P(S)) and descriptive power of exogenous
information (S,Σ(L)).
2.5.2. Distinguishing Perception and Attitude
Some studies discriminated perceived uncertainty and the DM’s attitude towards it
to isolate a robust characterization of uncertainty attitude. Nehring (1999, 2009) con-
sidered these notions based on incomplete orderings over events, to which he referred as
comparative likelihood relations, that summarize information about likelihoods avail-
able to the DM. Ghirardato et al. (2004); Hayashi (2012) addressed this separation in
the vein of the multiple-prior model (MP, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), wherein the
DM’s perception of uncertainty is related to the set of priors, and her revealed degree
of uncertainty attitude is attributed to other conditions of the corresponding repre-
sentations. In Hayashi (2012)’s approach, perception of uncertainty is predetermined
by exogenously given sets of probabilities that correspond to imprecise information
available to the DM. Contrarily in Ghirardato et al. (2004), it is revealed from choices
by characterizing, in their terminology, unambiguous preference, hence being a sub-
jective matter. A primary implication of their results is that the characterization of
uncertainty attitude revealed from choices is independent of the perceived uncertainty.
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BCEU, however, has a different implication on this aspect.
Let {%AL}L∈L and {%BL}L∈L be BCEU preferences, and for i ∈ {A,B}, denote by
(ui, V i, {P iL}L∈L) the representation. Let {µiL}L∈L be the family of capacities derived




i(f) dµiL. Then, I i(·, L) represents %iL on H.
For i ∈ {A,B}, assume that
(S0) ∀L ∈ L,∀f, g ∈ H,∀α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼iL g ⇒ αf + (1− α)g %iL f .
Then, by Theorem 2.2 and Schmeidler’s proposition (Schmeidler (1989, .pp 582-583)),
for any L ∈ L, µiL is convex, and CEU coincides with MP in the sense that






ui(h) dρiL, ∀h ∈ H.
By definition, µiL = P iL on Σ(L), meaning that
(A0) ∀ρiL ∈ Core(µiL), ∀B ∈ Σ(L), ρiL(B) = P iL(B).
Suppose further that uA = uB = u. Then, by Proposition 2.3, for any L ∈ L,
(H0) %AL is more uncertainty averse than %BL iff Core(µAL) ⊇ Core(µBL ).
Connecting (A0) to (H0), we have PAL = PBL on Σ(L). Finally, consider acts in HL. For
i ∈ {A,B}, due to the previous observations, it is easy to verify that for any f, g ∈ HL,
(G0) ∀h ∈ H,∀α ∈ (0, 1), f %iL g ⇔ αf + (1− α)h %iL αg + (1− α)h;
(G1) f %iL g iff ∀ρiL ∈ Core(µiL),
∫
S u(f) dρiL ≥
∫
S u(g) dρiL;
(G2) f %AL g ⇔ f %BL g.
To summarize, if the preferences of two BCEU maximizers are (definitive) uncer-
tainty averse in the spirit of Schmeidler (1989) (i.e., condition (S0)), then facing the
same information structure, the one with a larger set of priors is revealed to be more
uncertainty averse than the other in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
This observation (i.e., condition (H0)) also agrees with the characterization given by
Hayashi (2012). Moreover, in this case, they have the same unambiguous preferences,
which reveal the same degree of ambiguity in the sense of Ghirardato et al. (2004)
(conditions (G0)-(G2)).15
The presented argument differs from the implication given by Ghirardato et al.
(2004). In this case, %AL and %BL revealing the same degree of ambiguity becomes
necessary for the exhibited attitudes towards uncertainty being comparable, while ac-
cording to the cited paper whether %AL and %BL reveal the same degree of ambiguity or
not does not, in principle, concern if one is more uncertainty averse than the other.
15See Ghirardato et al. (2004) cf. Definition 3, .p 143.
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2.5.3. Prediction Rule
For every partition L, the bi-criterion belief formation can be viewed as the process
in which the DM predicts the likelihood of each event based on the information carried
by L. Then, one may think of µL(·) as the indicator of such a prediction and the
determination of µL as the corresponding prediction rule.
Recall that, in Proposition 2.1, the family of probability measures {PL}L∈L is de-
termined by a unique P . Thus, given a BCEU representation (u, V, P ), the bi-criterion
prediction rule (belief formation) associated with the CEU-counterpart can be rewrit-
ten as follows. Let m : P(S) × L → [0, 1] be the function such that for all L ∈ L
and B ∈ P(S), m(B,L) = µL(B). In addition, given V and P , define a function
v : P(S)×P(S)→ [0, 1] by
v(B,D) = V (B ∩D)P (D)
V (D) .





The above expression of “global” bi-criterion belief formation takes a reduced form
of the case-based prediction rule introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003), where
P(S) corresponds to both the set of eventualities and that of cases, and each partition
L can be interpreted as the predictor’s (DM’s) perceived knowledge.
2.A. Proofs
2.A.1. Preliminaries
In what follows, we present some auxiliary observations and notations which will
be invoked in the subsequent proofs. The following lemma shows that the the SEU-
CEU axioms, Dominance and Certainty characterize, for every L ∈ L, a standard
SEU representation for the preference over Σ(L)-measurable acts, wherein the lottery
assessment does not depend on variable partitions.
Lemma 2.1. The followings are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance and Certainty.
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(II) There exist an affine function u : Π(A)→ R, and a unique family of probability
measures {PL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1]}L∈L such that for any L ∈ L and f, g ∈ HL,







Moreover, uL is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. Assume statement (I). Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L.
Then, %L⊂ HL ×HL satisfies Order, Continuity, Monotonicity and Independence.
Thus, by AA theorem (Anscombe and Aumann (1963)), there exist an affine function
uL : Π(A) → R and a unique probability measure PL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] such that for









any f ∈ HL and E ∈ L, xfE = uL(f(s)) for s ∈ E. Moreover, uL is unique up to p.l.t.




EPL(E) coincides with the Choquet integral
when PL is additive on Σ(L). As a result, for any f, g ∈ HL, f %L g if and only if∫
S uL(f) dPL ≥
∫
S uL(g) dPL.
By Certainty, (HC , %L) and (HC , %L̂) are order isomorphic for any L ∈ L. Notice
that Π(A) is a mixture space with respect to the lottery mixture. As a result, for any
L ∈ L, a bounded continuous and strictly increasing function ϕL : R → R exists such
that uL̂ = ϕL ◦ uL. Set u = uL̂. Since u and uL are unique up to p.l.t. with satisfying
mixture linearity, ϕL is thus linear for any L ∈ L. Hence, for every L ∈ L, the previous
equivalence is satisfied by u.
The opposite direction is trivial. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.2. The following statement hold.
(a) Let L = {S}. %L on H satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms if and only if there exist
an affine real function u on Π(A) and a unique capacity V on P(S) such that
for all f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dV ≥
∫
S u(g) dV . Moreover, u
is unique up to p.l.t.
(b) Let L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. %L on H satisfies the SEU-CEU axioms if and only if
there exist an affine real function u on Π(A) and a unique probability measure
P on P(S) such that for all f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dP ≥∫
S u(g) dP . Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. (a) Clearly, CLS = H and HL = HC . Thus, for L, RI-(II) implies RI-(I),
and coincides with Comonotonic Independence axiom. Therefore, the statement is a
direct consequence of Schmeidler’s theorem (Schmeidler (1989)).
(b) Let L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. Then, it holds that HL = H and Σ(L) = P(S). As a
result, the statement is implied by Lemma 2.1. Q.E.D.
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Consider an arbitrary L ∈ L. By the previous lemma, there exists a uL : Π(A)→ R
that represents the induced %L on Π(A) (hence, on HC), and uL is unique up to p.l.t.16
Hence, without loss of generality, suppose that uL(f(s)) ∈ X for every f ∈ H and
s ∈ S, where X ⊂ R is a closed convex set satisfying [−1, 1] ⊆ X.
For each f ∈ H, define a function ψf : S → X by ψf (s) = (uL ◦ f)(s), and
typically write ψ whenever the choice of f ∈ H does not concern the argument. Let
Ψ = {uL ◦ f | f ∈ H} be the set of all such functions. Let <L⊂ Ψ× Ψ be the binary
relation such that for every ψf , ψg ∈ Ψ,
ψf <L ψg ⇐⇒ f %L g.
Then, ≥ and <L coincide on X. Denote by ΨL and ΨC the set of Σ(L)-measurable
functions and that of constant functions, respectively. Let ψL be the Ψ-counterparts
(with respect to <L) of the one defined on H. Then, for every ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, it holds that
ψL(s) = mins∈S ψ(s) on S. For every D ∈P(S) and ψx ∈ ΨC , define
MLD[ψx] =
{










Claim 2.1. For any L ∈ L, D ∈ P(S) and any ψz ∈ ΨC, MLD and MLD[ψz] are
closed under the mixture (henceforth, convex).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary D ∈P(S). Suppose that ψ, ψ′ ∈ MLD with ψ = [ψDψx]
and ψ′ = [ψ′Dψy], where ψx(s) = x and ψy(s) = y on S. Then, for any α ∈ [0, 1],
we have αψ+ (1−α)ψ′ = [(αψ + (1− α)ψ′)D(αψx + (1− α)ψy)]. Since ψ(s) ≥ x and
ψ′(s) ≥ y for any s ∈ D, it follows that (αψ + (1− α)ψ′)(s) ≥ (αx+ (1− α)y) for any
s ∈ D, which implies (αψ + (1− α)ψ′) ∈MLD.
For any ψz ∈ ΨC , the convexity ofMLD[ψz] can be shown by letting ψx = ψy = ψz
in the above proof. Q.E.D.
2.A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.1
The necessity part is trivial given statement (II). The sufficiency part will follow
all the notations and claims given in Appendix 2.A.1. Assume statement (I).
Lemma 2.3. For every E ∈ L, there exists a unique monotone set function µEL :










16Notice that the existence of uL : Π(A)→ R does not require Certainty.
2.A. PROOFS 60
Proof. Fix an arbitrary E ∈ L. By Claim 3.7, MLE is convex. The restriction
of <L on MLE satisfies Order, Continuity, Monotonicity, Comonotonic Independence,
and Nondegeneracy. Thus, by Schmeidler (1989, the prood of Theorem, .p 579), a
functional JE : MLE → R exists such that for every ψ, ψ′ ∈ MLE, ψ <L ψ′ if and only
if JE(ψ) ≥ JE(ψ′), and JE satisfies:
(a) ∀ψx ∈ ΨC , JE(ψx) = x;
(b) JE(ψ) > JE(ψ′) implies JE(αψ + (1 − α)ψ′′) > JE(αψ′ + (1 − α)ψ′′) for any
pairwise comonotonic ψ, ψ′, ψ′′ ∈MLE and any α ∈ (0, 1); and
(c) ∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, [∀s ∈ S, ψ(s) ≥ ψ′(s)] =⇒ JE(ψ) ≥ JE(ψ′).
Define a monotone set function νE : P(E) ∪ {S} → [0, 1] by νE(B) = JE(1B) for
every B ∈ P(E) ∪ {S}, where 1B is the indicator function of B. Then, by Schmei-
dler’s corollary (Schmeidler (1986, .p 258)), νE is the unique monotone set function on




Fix an arbitrary ψ ∈MLE. Let (x(i), . . . x(K)) be the permutation of {ψ(s) | s ∈ S}
such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . K − 1}, x(i) < x(i+1), and let νE(i) = νE({s ∈ S | ψ(s) ≥

































Let µEL : P(E)→ [0, 1] be the restriction of νE on P(E). Then, by the uniqueness
of νE, µEL is the unique monotone set function such that JE represents <L on MLE,




L + (1− µEL (E)) mins∈S ψ(s). Q.E.D.
Let PL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] be the capacity obtained in Lemma 2.1. Let IL be the
functional given by IL(ψ) =
∫
S ψdPL for every ψ ∈ ΨL. Let N(L) be the set of all
PL-null cells in L. Formally,
N(L) = {E ∈ L | PL(E) = 0} .
Then, by the SEU-CEU axioms, N(L) ⊂ L.
Claim 2.2. For every E ∈ L, µEL (E) = PL(E).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary E ∈ L. Clearly, ΨL∩MLE 6= ∅, and by Claim 2.1,MLE∩ΨL
is convex. Since both JE :MLE → R and IL : ΨL → R represent <L onMLE∩ΨL, there
17Caution should be exercised on the domain of νE . Let LE = {{s} | s ∈ E} ∪ {S \ E} and
BE = {(S \ E) ∪ B | B ⊂ E}. Then, any ψ ∈ MLE is Σ(LE)-measurable, and {BE ,P(E) ∪ {S}}
partitions Σ(LE). However, for any B ∈ BE , 1B 6∈ MLE . Thus, νE cannot be defined on BE .
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is a continuous and strictly increasing function ϕE : JE(MLE ∩ΨL)→ R such that for
every ψ ∈MLE ∩ΨL, ϕE (JE(ψ)) = IL(ψ). Note that ΨC ⊂ (ΨL∩MLE). Thus, we have
ϕE(x) = x for every x ∈ X. As a result, for every [ψyEψz] ∈ ΨL ∩MLE, it follows that
JE([ψyEψz]) = µEL (E)y + (1− µEL (E))z
= PL(E)y + (1− VL(E))z = IL([ψyEψz]),
where y = ψy(s) and z = ψz(s) on S. Set x = y− z. Since ψz and ψy are arbitrary, the
above equality implies that µEL (E)x = PL(E)x for every x ∈ R+. Therefore, for every
E ∈ L, µEL (E) = PL(E) as E is assumed to be arbitrary. Q.E.D.
Claim 2.3. Given a ψ ∈ Ψ and a ψL ∈ ΨL, let ψz be the constant function such
that ψz(s) = z = min {ψL(s), ψLL(s)}. Then, [ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz] for every E ∈ L if




L )/PL(E) on E.
Proof. Fix a ψ ∈ Ψ and a ψL ∈ ΨL arbitrarily. Let x = ψL(s) = mins∈S ψ(s)
on S. By construction, it holds that [ψEψz] ∈ MLE and [ψLEψz] ∈ MLE ∩ ΨL for
every E ∈ L. Hence, by Lemma 3.2, [ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz] for every E ∈ L if and
only if JE([ψEψz]) = JE([ψLEψz]) for every E ∈ L. Meanwhile, for any E ∈ L,




L = µEL (E)ψEL , where ψEL = ψL(t) for
any E ∈ L and t ∈ E. Thus, under Claim 2.2, the followings are equivalent: (i) for




L = PL(E)ψEL .
By Claim 2.2, for all E ∈ L \ N(L), µEL (E) = PL(E) > 0. As a result, for all




L )/PL(E) on E. Q.E.D.
Claim 2.4. Suppose that a mapping QL : Ψ → ΨL exists such that for all ψ ∈ Ψ,
(i) mins∈S QL(ψ)(s) ≥ mins∈S ψ(s) on S; and (ii) [ψEψL] ∼L [QL(ψ)EψL] holds for






Proof. Let QL be such a mapping.
By (i) and Monotonicity, QL(ψ)L <L ψL holds for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Hence, by Dominance,
(ii) implies ψ ∼L QL(ψ). Therefore, by transitivity, for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, ψ <L ψ′ if and
only if QL(ψ) <L QL(ψ′). Note that QL(ψ), QL(ψ′) ∈ ΨL. Thus, by Lemma 2.1, ψ <L
ψ′ if and only if IL(QL(ψ)) ≥ IL(QL(ψ′)), where for any ψL ∈ ΨL, IL(ψ) =
∫
S ψLdPL.












where for every E ∈ L, ψEL = ψL(s) for s ∈ E, and the second equality holds since
E ∈ N(L) implies PL(E) = 0. As a result, the claim follows. Q.E.D.
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Sufficiency. Let ∆(L) = L \N(L).
Let QL : Ψ → ΨL be a mapping such that mins∈S QL(ψ)(s) ≥ mins∈S ψ(s) on
S. Then, by Claim 2.3, QL satisfies condition (ii) in Claim 2.4 if and only if for any






/PL(E). Therefore, a mapping













xÊ + mins∈S ψ(s)
)
1Ê,
where xÊ ∈ R+ for each Ê ∈ N(L).



















Recall that S (L) = ⋃E∈L P(E). Define a set function VL : S (L) → [0, 1] such
that for all B ∈ S (L) and E ∈ L, B ∈ P(E) implies VL(B) = µEL (B). Then, VL is
























In addition, the uniqueness of {µEL}E∈L implies that of VL.




E ψdVL. Then, QL : Ψ → R satisfies:
(i) for all x ∈ X, QL(x1) = x; (ii) for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, ψ(s) ≥ ψ′(s) on S implies
QL(ψ) ≥ QL(ψ′); and (iii) for any pairwise comonotonic ψ, ψ′, ψ̃ ∈ Ψ and any α ∈
(0, 1), QL(ψ) > QL(ψ′) implies QL(αψ + (1− α)ψ̃) > QL(αψ′ + (1− α)ψ̃). Therefore,
by Schmeidler’s corollary, defining µL(B) = QL(1B) for all B ∈ P(S), then for any





Finally, for all B ∈P(S), it follows that





2.A.3. Proof of Theorem 2.2
Invoke all the notations and claims given in Appendix 2.A.1. The proof will be
conducted by showing that both (I) and (III) are equivalent to (II). First, we show the
equivalence between (I) and (II). Assume statement (I). Under Certainty, Lemma 2.1
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implies that {uL}L∈L can be fixed by a u : Π(A)→ R, meaning that ψ 7→ ψL andMLE
are no longer subject to the choice of L ∈ L. Thus, in what follows, we simply write ψ
andME, respectively.
For every L ∈ L, let PL be the unique probability measure obtained in Lemma 2.1,
and let ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | PL(E) > 0}. Recall that L = {S}. Let V : P(S)→ [0, 1] be
the unique capacity obtained in Lemma 2.2-(a).
Claim 2.5. Under Certainty and CoI, the following statements hold.
(a) For every L ∈ L and any E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) implies V (E) > 0.
(b) For any L ∈ L and E ∈ ∆(L), there exists a ϑEL ∈ R++ such that for every
B ∈P(E), µEL (B) = ϑELV (B).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L.
(a) Fix an E ∈ L and a ψx ∈ ΨC , where x = ψx(s) on S. Consider ψ, ψ′ ∈ME[ψx].












L + (1 − µEL (E))x ≥ x holds for any ψ ∈ ME[ψx]. Thus,
ME[ψx] is not <L-indifferent if and only if µEL (E) > 0. Hence, by Claim 2.2, for any
ψx ∈ ΨC ,ME[ψx] is not <L-indifferent if and only if E ∈ ∆(L).
Suppose E ∈ ∆(L). Then, for any ψx ∈ ΨC , there exist ψ, ψ′ ∈ ME[ψx] such that
ψ L ψ′. Thus, by CoI, ψ L ψ′ holds for every such ψ, ψ′ ∈ME[ψx], meaning that for
any ψx ∈ ΨC ,ME[ψx] is not <L-indifferent. By Lemma 2.2-(a), the latter statement
is equivalent to V (E) > 0.
(b) Fix an E ∈ ∆(L) and a ψz ∈ ΨC arbitrarily. Then, by CoI, for any ψ, ψ′ ∈





L + (1 − µEL (E))z ≥
∫
E ψ
























By (a), E ∈ ∆(L) implies V (E) > 0. Let [ψyEψz] ∈ ME[ψz] ∩ ΨL, and suppose
ψy(s) = y > z on S. Then, it holds that
∫
E [ψyEψz]dµEL = µEL (E)y and
∫
E [ψyEψz]dV =
V (E)y. Set ϑEL = µEL (E)/V (E). Then, V (E) > 0 and µEL (E) > 0 imply ϑEL >
0. Therefore, by CoI, for any ψ ∈ ME[ψz] that satisfies ψ ∼L [ψyEψz], we have∫
E ψdµ
E
L = µEL (E)y = ϑELV (E)y = ϑEL (
∫







E ψdV holds for any ψ ∈ ME. As a result,
µEL (B) = ϑELV (B) for every B ∈P(E). Q.E.D.
Proof of (I) =⇒ (II). For every L ∈ L, let Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.
By Claim 2.3 and Claim 2.4, the equivalence obtained in Eq (2.1) holds for every
L ∈ L. Given QL in Eq (2.1), define a mapping Q : Ψ× L → Ψ by Q(ψ,L) = QL(ψ).
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By Claim 2.5-(a), for any L ∈ L, ∆(L) ⊆ E ∈ Ω(L). By Claim 2.2 and Claim 2.5-
(b), for every L ∈ L and E ∈ ∆(L), PL(E) = ϑELV (E) with ϑEL > 0. Therefore, for

















V (E) . (2.2)














The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Proof of (II) =⇒ (I). Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits a BCEU representation
(u, V, {PL}L∈L). The SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance and Certainty are trivially implied.
(CoI) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary. For any Ẽ ∈ L̃ and c ∈ HC , CL̃Ẽ[c] is not
%L̃-indifferent if and only if PL(E) > 0. Let ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | PL(E) > 0}.
Fix an Ẽ ∈ ∆(L̃) and a c ∈ HC arbitrarily. Given that (L, L̃) ∈ L , let E ∈ L
be the unique cell such that Ẽ ⊆ E. By definition, ∆(L) ⊆ Ω(L) and ∆(L̃) ⊆ Ω(L̃).
Thus, by the monotonicity of V , Ẽ ∈ ∆(L̃) implies E ∈ ∆(L). In turn, we have
V (E) > 0 and V (Ẽ) > 0. Consequently, for any h ∈ CL̃
Ẽ
[c], it holds that






U(h, L) = β
(∫
Ẽ













where β̃ = PL̃(Ẽ)/V (Ẽ) > 0, β = PL(E)/V (E) > 0, and uc = u(c(s)) on S.
Therefore, for any f, g ∈ CL̃
Ẽ
[c], U(f, L̃) ≥ U(g, L̃) if and only if
∫
Ẽ u(f)dV ≥∫




Ẽ u(g)dV . As a result,




Proof of (II) ⇐⇒ (III). Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L.
Let V : P(S) → [0, 1] be a capacity and PL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] be a probability
measure. Define ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | PL(E) > 0} and Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.




V (B ∩ E)PL(E)
V (E) .
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By Theorem 2.2, {%L}L∈L admits the BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L) if and
only if for all L ∈ L, QL represents <L on Ψ. Thus, given that L ∈ L is fixed arbitrarily,
it suffices to show that µL is a capacity, and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, QL(ψ) =
∫
S ψ dµL.
Clearly, µL(S) = 1 and µL(∅) = 0. Let B,D ∈ P(S) be such that B ⊂ D. Then,




(V (D ∩ E)− V (B ∩ E))PL(E)
V (E) ≥ 0.
As a result, µL is a capacity, and by definition, for all B ∈P(S), µL(B) = QL(1B).
Fix an arbitrary ψ ∈ Ψ. Let τ : S → {1, . . . , n} be a bijection such that for all
s, t ∈ S, τ(s) ≥ τ(t) implies ψ(s) ≥ ψ(t). Fix this τ .
Given τ , for all s ∈ S, define eτ (s) = {t ∈ S | [τ(t) > τ(s)] ∧ [∃E ∈ L, t, s ∈ E]}.
Then, for any E ∈ L and s ∈ S, eτ (s) ∩ E 6= ∅ if and only if s ∈ E. Moreover, for
every s ∈ S, let bτ (s) = {t ∈ S | τ(t) ≥ τ(s)}.
Given τ , define a function yτ : S → R by yτ (s) = ψ(s) if τ(s) = 1, and yτ (s) =
ψ(s)− ψ(τ−1(τ(s)− 1)) otherwise. In addition, given τ , define pτ : S → [0, 1] by




























The proof is complete as ψ and τ are fixed arbitrarily. Q.E.D.
2.A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.1
The equivalence between (II) and (III) is implied by Theorem 2.2. The equivalence
between (I) and (II) will be concluded.
Proof of (I) =⇒ (II). Assume statement (I), and let L = {{s} | s ∈ S}.
Since CoS implies Certainty, by Theorem 2.2, {%L}L∈L admits a BCEU represen-
tation (u, V, {PL}L∈L). Fix this tuple, and for every L ∈ L, define ∆(L) = {E ∈ L |
PL(E) > 0}. Then, by the definition of BCEU, ∆(L) ⊆ Ω(L) holds for all L ∈ L. It
suffices to show that, for any (L, L̃) ∈ L , L∩ L̃ 6= ∅ implies PL(E) = PL̃(E) whenever
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E ∈ L∩ L̃. Then, given that (L,L ) is a lattice, for any L ∈ L, PL is the restriction of
PL on Σ(L), and P = PL is the unique probability claimed in (II).
Invoke the notations given in Appendix 2.A.1.
Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be an arbitrary such that L ∩ L̃ 6= ∅. Fix an E ∈ L ∩ L̃.
Suppose E 6∈ ∆(L̃). Then, for any ψz ∈ ΨC , ME[ψz] is <L̃-indifferent. Thus,
by CoS, ME[ψz] is also <L-indifferent, meaning that E 6∈ ∆(L). That is, PL(E) =
PL̃(E) = 0. Suppose E ∈ ∆(L̃). Then, ∆(L̃) ⊆ Ω(L̃) implies that E ∈ Ω(L̃). In addi-
tion, for any ψz ∈ ΨC ,ME[ψz] is not <L̃-indifferent. Thus, by CoS,ME[ψz] is not <L-
indifferent. Therefore, we have E ∈ ∆(L), thereby E ∈ Ω(L). Fix ψx, ψy ∈ ΨC arbi-
trarily, where ψx(s) = x and ψy(s) = y on S. Let ψ ∈ME[ψx] and ψ′ ∈ME[ψy] be ar-
bitrary such that ψ ∼L ψ′. Then, by Theorem 2.2, zPL(E)+(1− PL(E))x = z′PL(E)+
(1− PL(E)) y, where z = (
∫
E ψ dV )/V (E) and z′ = (
∫
E ψ
′ dV )/V (E). By CoS, we have
ψ ∼L̃ ψ′, which implies zPL̃(E)+(1− PL̃(E))x = z′PL̃(E)+(1− PL̃(E)) y. Therefore,
we have (z − z′ + y − x) (PL(E)− PL̃(E)) = 0. Since ψ, ψ′, ψx and ψy are arbitrary,
thus z − z′ + y − x is not always zero. As a result, PL(E) = PL̃(E).
The proof is complete since (L, L̃) and E are fixed arbitrarily. Q.E.D.
Proof of (II) =⇒ (I). Assume statement (II).
The SEU-CEU axioms and Dominance are trivial, while CoI is implied by Theo-
rem 2.2.
(CoS) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary.
When L ∩ L̃ = ∅, CoS yields Certainty for %L and %L̃. Thus, consider L ∩ L̃ 6= ∅,
and let E ∈ L ∩ L̃. Fix ψx, ψy ∈ ΨC arbitrarily, where ψx(s) = x and ψy(s) = y on S.
Let ψ ∈ME[ψx] and ψ′ ∈ME[ψy] be arbitrary.
Suppose P (E) = 0. Then, ψ′ L̃ ψ if and only if y > x, and ψ′ L ψ if and
only if y > x. CoS follows. Now, suppose P (E) > 0. Then, by the definition of
BCEU, V (E) > 0. Thus, by statement (II), ψ′ L̃ ψ if and only if (z′ − y)P (E) + y >
(z − x)P (E) + x, where z = (
∫
E ψ dV )/V (E) and z′ = (
∫
E ψ dV )/V (E). Similarly,
ψ′ L ψ if and only if (z′− y)P (E) + y > (z− x)P (E) + x. Hence, we have ψ′ L̃ ψ if
and only if ψ′ L ψ. As a result, CoS holds. Q.E.D.
2.A.5. Proof of Proposition 2.2
The equivalence between (II) and (III) is a straightforward consequence of Theo-
rem 2.2. Thus, we focus on the equivalence between (I) and (II).
Assume statement (I). Since SCoI implies CoI, by Theorem 2.2, {%L}L∈L admits
a BCEU representation (u, V, {PL}L∈L). Fix this tuple, and for every L ∈ L, define
∆(L) = {E ∈ L | PL(E) > 0}. Let L = {S}.
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Claim 2.6. Under Certainty and SCoI, the following statements hold.
(a) For any L ∈ L and E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) if and only if E ∈ Ω(L).
(b) For any L ∈ L, there exists a unique ϑL ∈ R++ such that for any E ∈ L,
PL(E) = ϑLV (E).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L \ {L}. Then, (L,L) ∈ L .
Invoke the notations given in Appendix 2.A.1.
(a) By Claim 2.5-(a), for any E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) implies E ∈ Ω(L). Hence, it
suffices to show the opposite direction. Let E ∈ L, and suppose that E 6∈ ∆(L). Then,
by Lemma 2.3, ME[ψz] is <L-indifferent for any ψz ∈ ΨC . Thus, SCoI implies that
ME[ψz] is also <L-indifferent for all ψz ∈ ΨC . By Nondegeneracy and Lemma 2.2-(a),
it follows that V (E) = 0. As a result, E ∈ Ω(L) implies E ∈ ∆(L).
(b) Let E,E ′ ∈ L. Fix an arbitrary ψx ∈ ΨC , and suppose that ψ ∈ ME[ψx] and
ψ′ ∈ME′ [ψx] satisfy ψ ∼L ψ′. Then, SCoI implies ψ ∼L ψ′.





′dV , which yields that∫
E
ψdV − V (E)x =
∫
E′
ψ′dV − V (E ′)x,
where x = ψx(s) on S. On the other hand, by Lemma 2.3, JE and JE′ represents <L on
ME andME′ respectively. By definition, ΨC =ME ∩ME′ , and for every ψz ∈ ΨC , it
holds that JE(ψz) = JE′(ψz) = z, where z = ψz(s) on S. Thus, by transitivity, ψ ∼L ψ′
if and only if JE(ψ) = JE′(ψ′). Similarly, JE(ψ) = JE′(ψ′) yields∫
E








Since (a) implies that ∆(L) = Ω(L), thus Claim 3.11-(b) holds for any E ∈ L. As









ψdV − V (E)x
)
.
Hence, ϑEL = ϑE
′
L as E,E ′, ψx, ψ and ψ′ are chosen arbitrarily. Let ϑL = ϑEL for an
arbitrary E ∈ L. Then, ϑL ∈ R++ is the unique number satisfies the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of (I) =⇒ (II). Let L ∈ L be arbitrary. Then, by Claim 2.6-(b), for any
E ∈ L, we have PL(E) = ϑLV (E), meaning that
∑
E∈L PL(E) = ϑL(
∑
E∈L V (E)).
Since PL is a probability measure, it thus yields that ϑL = 1/(
∑
E∈L V (E)).
As a result, for any L ∈ L and E ∈ L, PL(E) = V (E)/(
∑
D∈L V (D)). Q.E.D.
Proof of (II) =⇒ (I). Assume statement (II).
The SEU-CEU axioms, Dominance and Certainty are trivial.


















Note that for any L ∈ L, ∑E∈L V (E) is a constant, and the above equality holds










Let IV : H×L → R denote the functional given by IV (h, L) = ∑E∈Ω(L) ∫E u(h)dV .
Let (L, L̃) ∈ L , E,E ′ ∈ L̃, and c ∈ HC . Then, fix an f ∈ CL̃E[c] and a g ∈ CL̃E′ [c]
arbitrarily. Let D,D′ ∈ L denote the cells that satisfy E ⊆ D and E ′ ⊆ D′. Let
uc = u(c(s)) on S. Then, exactly one of the following cases holds.
Case 1) E,E ′ 6∈ Ω(L̃). Then, we have IV (f, L̃) = IV (g, L̃) = ∑Ẽ∈Ω(L̃) ucV (Ẽ) and
IV (f, L) = IV (g, L) = ∑D̃∈Ω(L) ucV (D̃). Hence, f ∼L g and f ∼L̃ g.
Case 2) E ∈ Ω(L̃) and E ′ 6∈ Ω(L̃). Then, it holds that IV (g, L̃) = uc
∑
Ẽ∈Ω(L̃) V (Ẽ)
and IV (g, L) = uc
∑
D̃∈Ω(L) V (D̃). Moreover, by the monotonicity of V , D ∈ Ω(L).
Thus, it yields that














IV (f, L) =
∫
E











Note that f ∈ CL̃E[c] implies
∫
E u(f)dV ≥ ucV (E). Thus, it holds that IV (f, L̃) ≥
uc
∑
Ẽ∈Ω(L̃) V (Ẽ) and IV (f, L) ≥ uc
∑
D̃∈Ω(L) V (D̃). As a result, f %L g and f %L̃ g.
Case 3) E,E ′ ∈ Ω(L̃). Then, by the monotonicity of V , we have D,D′ ∈ Ω(L).
In this case, the equations in Case 2 also hold for g with respect to E ′. Since
uc
∑
Ẽ∈Ω(L̃) V (Ẽ) and uc
∑
D̃∈Ω(L) V (D̃) are constants, it thus yields that







⇐⇒ f %L̃ g.
As a result, it holds in all cases that f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g. Consequently,
SCoI is satisfied as (L, L̃), E,E ′, c, f and g are arbitrary. Q.E.D.
2.A.6. Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be as assumed, and denote by U and U ′ the correspond-
ing functionals. The following claim translates Definition 2.2 into BCEU.
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Claim 2.7. For every L, L̃ ∈ L, %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only
if for all h ∈ H, U(h, L) ≤ U ′(h, L̃).
Proof. Let L, L̃ ∈ L be arbitrary. Notice that {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L admit the
BCEU representations which comprise a same affine function u on Π(A). Thus, for all
c ∈ HC , U(c, L) = U ′(c, L̃).
Suppose %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L. Let f ∈ H be an act that satisfies
U(f, L) > U ′(f, L̃). Then, by Continuity, there exists a c ∈ HC such that U(f, L) >
uc > U
′(f, L̃), where uc = U(c, L) = U ′(c, L̃). Thus, we have f L c and c ′L̃, which
yields a contradiction. The opposite direction is trivial. Q.E.D.
Statement (I). Fix L, L̃ ∈ L arbitrarily.
Given V , V ′, PL and P ′L̃, define set functions µL : P(S)→ [0, 1] and µL̃ : P(S)→




V (B ∩ E)PL(E)










Then, by Theorem 2.2, for all h ∈ H, U ′(h, L̃) ≥ U(h, L) if and only if
∫
S u(h) dµ′L̃ ≥∫
S u(h) dµL. Hence, the previous claim, %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L̃ if and
only if for all h ∈ H,
∫
S u(h) dµ′L̃ ≥
∫
S u(h) dµL. Therefore, it suffices to show that the
followings are equivalent:
(i) For all h ∈ H,
∫
S u(h) dµ′L̃ ≥
∫
S u(h) dµL.
(ii) For all B ∈P(S), µL(B) ≤ µ′L̃(B).
Assume (i). Then, since u is unique up to p.l.t., for any B ∈ P(S), it holds that∫
S 1B dµL ≤
∫





(B)). Now, assume (ii). For an arbitrary h ∈ H, let (s1, . . . , sn) be a
permutation of S such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}, u(h(si)) ≤ u(h(si+1)). Fix this
permutation. For every i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, letmi = µL({sj | j ≥ i}),m′i = µ′L̃({sj | j ≥ i}),
and di = u(h(si))−u(h(si−1)). Then, by construction and (ii), for every i ∈ {2, . . . , n},




















di (m′i −mi) ≥ 0.
Therefore, (ii) implies (i) since h ∈ H is given arbitrarily.
As a result, (i) and (ii) are equivalent. The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Statement (II). Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L, and assume %L=%′L. Then, by Theo-
rem 2.2, it follows immediately that V = V ′ on P(S).
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By (I), statement (a) (resp., (b)) holds if and only if for all B ∈P(S),
∑
E∈L
V (B ∩ E)
V (E) (P
′
L(E)− PL(E)) ≥ 0 (resp., ≤).
Notice that E ∩ E ′ = ∅ holds for any E,E ′ ∈ L. Thus, for every E ∈ L, setting






E∈L PL(E) = 1,
P ′L(E) = PL(E) holds for all E ∈ L. Hence, by additivity, PL = P ′L onΣ(L). Therefore,
both statement (a) and (b) are equivalent to (c).
In addition, under V = V ′, the equivalence between (c) and (d) is a trivial conse-
quence of Theorem 2.2. Q.E.D.
2.A.7. Proof of Proposition 2.4
Let {%L}L∈L be as assumed, and let U be the corresponding functional.
Proof of (I) =⇒ (II). Assume statement (I).
Since (L,L) ∈ L holds for all L ∈ L, thus for every L ∈ L, %L is more uncertainty
averse than%L. By Proposition 2.3-(I), for any L ∈ L and E ∈ L, it holds that PL(E) ≤
PL(E) as
∑




E∈L PL(E) = 1, this
yields that PL = PL on Σ(L). Set P = PL. Then, for all L ∈ L, PL is the restriction of
P on Σ(L). Therefore, {%L}L∈L admits BCEU representation (u, V, P ). Meanwhile,
by assumption, %L is more uncertainty averse than %L. Hence, by Proposition 2.3-(I),
for any B ∈P(S), it holds that
V (B ∩ S)P (S)
V (S) = V (B) ≤
∑
s∈S




P ({s}) = P (B).
Therefore, P ∈ Core(V ). Fix a B ∈ P(S) and nonempty disjoint D,D′ ∈ P(S)
arbitrarily. Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be the unique pair of partitions such that L̃ \L = {D,D′}.
Then, we have (D ∪D′) ∈ L. By assumption, %L is more uncertainty averse than %L̃.
Thus, by Proposition 2.3-(I), it follows that
V (B ∩ (D ∪D′))P (D ∪D′)
V (D ∪D′) +
∑
E∈L∩L̃
V (B ∩ E)P (E)
V (E)
≤ V (B ∩D)P (D)
V (D) +




V (B ∩ E)P (E)
V (E) .
As a result, statement (I) implies (II). Q.E.D.
Proof of (II) =⇒ (I). Assume statement (II), and fix (L, L̃) ∈ L arbitrarily.
By assumption, for any Ẽ ∈ L̃ \ L and D ∈ P(Ẽ), it holds that Given V and P ,
let µL and µL̃ be the capacities defined as in Theorem 2.2. For every Ẽ ∈ L̃ \ L, let
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V (B ∩ Ẽ)P (Ẽ)
V (Ẽ)
.
Let E ∈ L \ L̃ be arbitrary. Let K and K ′ be arbitrary partitions of E that satisfy
1 < |K| < |K ′|, and for any D′ ∈ K ′, there is a unique D ∈ K such that D′ ⊆ D.
Then, by the last condition in (II), we have








V (B ∩D′)P (D′)
V (D′) .
Thus, for any E ∈ L \ L̃, it holds that




V (B ∩ Ẽ)P (Ẽ)
V (Ẽ)
≤ 0,
which implies µL(B) ≤ µL̃(B). Therefore, by Proposition 2.3-(I), for any (L, L̃) ∈ L ,
%L is more uncertainty averse than %L̃. Statement (II) implies (I). Q.E.D.
2.A.8. Proof of Proposition 2.5
Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be as assumed. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L. By assumption,
for any c ∈ HC , we have U(c, L) = U ′(c, L). Given the representation tuples, let µL
and µ′L be the capacities defined as in Theorem 2.2 respectively for %L and %′L.
Proof of (II) =⇒ (I). Assume statement (II). Then, for all B ∈P(S), we have
µL(B) ≤ µ′L(B). Thus, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.3-(I), for any h ∈ H,
it holds that U(h, L) ≤ U ′(h, L). Moreover, notice that PL = P ′L on Σ(L). Hence, for
any f ∈ HL, U(f, L) = U ′(f, L).
Let f ∈ HL and h ∈ H be arbitrary. Suppose f %′L h (resp., ′L). Then, it
follows that U(f, L) = U ′(f, L) ≥ U ′(h, L) ≥ U(h, L) (resp., U(f, L) = U ′(f, L) >
U ′(h, L) ≥ U(h, L) ). Therefore, we have f %L h (resp., L), meaning that %L is more
Σ(L)-uncertainty averse than %′L. Q.E.D.
Proof of (I) =⇒ (II). Assume statement (I). Then, for any c ∈ HC and f ∈ HL,
c %′L f (resp., ′L) implies c %L f (resp., L). Thus, by Claim 2.7, for any f ∈ HL,
it holds that U(f, L) ≤ U ′(f, L). In addition, by Theorem 2.2, for any f ∈ HL,
we have ∑E∈L xfEPL(E) ≤ ∑E∈L xfEP ′L(E), where for all E ∈ L, xfE = u(f(s)) for
s ∈ E. Therefore, it follows that PL = P ′L on Σ(L). As a result, for all f ∈ HL,
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U(f, L) = U ′(f, L). Let f ∈ HL and h ∈ H be arbitrary such that f %′L h (resp., ′L).
Then, by assumption, we have f %L h (resp., L). Recall that U(f, L) = U ′(f, L).
Set xf = U(f, L) = U ′(f, L). Then, xf ≥ U ′(h, L) (resp., >) implies xf ≥ U(h, L)
(resp., >), meaning that U ′(h, L) ≥ U(h, L). Since f and h are arbitrary, thus for any
h ∈ H, we have U ′(h, L) ≥ U(h, L). As shown in the proof of Proposition 2.3-(I), this
is equivalent to that for all B ∈P(S), µ′L(B) ≥ µL(B).
Therefore, for any E ∈ L and D ∈ P(E), it yields that (V ′(D)P ′L(E))/V ′(E) =
µ′L(D) ≥ µL(D) = (V (D)PL(E))/V (E). Given that PL = P ′L on Σ(L), we have
V ′(D)/V ′(E) ≥ V (D)PL(E)/V (E). Q.E.D.
2.A.9. Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. Let {%L}L∈L be as assumed, and fix an L ∈ L. Assume statement (I).
Given V and PL, define a capacity µL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] as in Theorem 2.2. Then, by
Theorem 2.2, for any f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dµL ≥
∫
S u(g) dµL. Thus,
by Schmeidler’s proposition (Schmeidler (1989, .pp 582-583)), %L satisfies statement
(I) if and only if µL is convex on P(S).18 Given that µL is convex, Core(µL) 6= ∅, and


















V (E) = PL(B).
Therefore, for any P ∈ Core(µL), PL = P on Σ(L).
Fix an arbitrary P ∈ Core(µL). Let %P⊂ H×H be the preference such that for all
f, g ∈ H, f %P g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dP ≥
∫
S u(g) dP . Let IP denote this functional.
Then, by the above arguments, for any h ∈ H, U(h, L) = minP ′∈Core(µL)
∫
S u(h) dP ′ ≤
IP (h), and in particular, for any f ∈ HL, U(f, L) = IP (f). Thus, for any f ∈ HL and
h ∈ H, IP (f) ≥ IP (h) (resp., >) implies U(f, L) = IP (f) ≥ IP (h) ≥ U(h, L) (resp.,
U(f, L) = IP (f) > IP (h) ≥ U(h, L)), thereby yielding U(f, L) ≥ U(h, L) (resp., >).
Therefore, by Definition 2.3, %L is more Σ(L)-uncertainty averse than %P .
As a result, statement (I) implies (II). The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
18A capacity µ : P(S) → [0, 1] is said to be convex (or supermodular) if for any B,D ∈ P(S),





Models of decision making under uncertainty have identified a range of significant
behavioral consequences of (un)awareness or unforeseen contingencies. The general
approach of a decision maker (DM) with a coarse understanding of the contingencies is
adopted in Ghirardato (2001); Dekel et al. (2001); Epstein et al. (2007). In particular,
Ahn and Ergin (2010) studied a framework wherein coarse descriptions of contingen-
cies are given exogenously, while Karni and Vierø (2013, 2017) developed models of
the evolution of DMs’ belief in the wake of growing awareness. In this chapter, we fo-
cus on a different perspective of awareness issue and consider an environment wherein
the DM has a complete understanding of contingencies yet perceives the friction be-
tween awareness and the frame of information given by exogenous information. In
many problems of choice under uncertainty, some knowledge about the contingencies
in question is often available to the DM, and her choice may exhibit particular depen-
dence on objective information that describes that knowledge of contingencies. Studies
featuring such dependency mainly focused on situations wherein the variation of infor-
mation also includes that of the underlying knowledge of contingencies.1 However, in
real-life situations, one may present a fixed knowledge of contingencies to the DM in
different descriptive frames, and each description corresponds to a piece of information
about the contingencies. In such situations, choices often depend on the framing of
information even when the contingencies in question are fixed and of which she is fully
aware. Explicating this dependence is the objective of this chapter.
To clarify this idea, consider the intuition behind our approach in the context of the
following extended four-color urn experiment (Ellsberg (1961)). An urn contains balls
in four colors: Red (R), Black (B), Yellow (Y), and Green (G). The total quantity and
1For example, in Gajdos et al. (2004, 2008); Hayashi (2012), information is assumed to take the
form of a set of probability distributions over the state space, and thus different pieces of information
may suggest disparate underlying statistical knowledge of the state space.
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that of each color are unknown. The host have run a series of trials in each of which
one ball was drawn from and returned into the urn, and observes that the frequency
ρ(·) of each color being drawn is approximately as follows: ρ({R}) ≈ ρ({G}) ≈ .3 and
ρ({B}) ≈ ρ({Y}) ≈ .2. Yet those frequencies are undisclosed to the DM. Now, a ball
Fixed Available Knowledge ρ(·)
ρ({B}) ≈ ρ({Y}) ≈ .2, ρ({R}) ≈ ρ({G}) ≈ .3,
ρ({B,Y}) ≈ .4, ρ({R,G}) ≈ .6,
ρ({R,B}) ≈ ρ({R,Y}) ≈ ρ({B,G}) ≈ ρ({Y,G}) ≈ .5,
ρ({R,B,Y}) ≈ ρ({B,Y,G}) ≈ .7, ρ({R,B,G}) ≈ ρ({R,Y,G}) ≈ .8,
R B Y G
`1 $100 $100 $0 $0
`2 $100 $0 $100 $0
`3 $0 $100 $0 $100
`4 $0 $0 $100 $100
Announced Frequencies
Irb ρ({R,B}) ≈ .5, ρ({Y}) ≈ .2, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Iry ρ({R,Y}) ≈ .5, ρ({B}) ≈ .2, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Ig ρ({R,B,Y}) ≈ .7, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
IN ——
Table 3.1 – Framing of Information in Four-Color Urn
will be drawn from the urn, and the DM is asked to rank bets {`1, `2, `3, `4}, after a
piece of information in {Irb, Iry, Ig, IN} is announced. The bets and information are
given as in Table 3.1. In these hypothetically parallel situations, the DM may reveal:
`1 ∼ `4  `3 % `2 when Irb is given; `2 ∼ `3  `4 % `1 for Iry; `4 ∼ `3  `2 ∼ `1 for Ig;
and `1 ∼ `2 ∼ `3 ∼ `4 for IN .2
In this example, as shown in the table, there is a fixed knowledge of the contingencies
in question, and the suggested pieces of information describe this knowledge in different
frames. More notably, in each of the parallel situations, the DM is fully aware of all
the possible outcomes from the ball drawn. Nevertheless, different information frames
lead the DM to rank the bets differently. One may argue that the suggested different
2The combination of rankings for Irb and Irg is in the spirit of Machina (2009, Reflection Example,
.p 390). As argued by Machina (2009), whether the DM reveals such rankings (or, whether she even
exhibits any strict ranking under Irb or Iry) is an empirical matter, however, if she has a strict ranking
either over {`1, `2} or over {`3, `4} in whichever direction under Irb, this ranking would be reversed
under Iry.
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rankings are due to the numbers assigned to the frequencies rather than the variation
of information frames. Yet this is not quite comprehensive. Although the exact form
of rankings, e.g., which bet in {`3, `4} is ranked higher under Iry, indeed depends
on those numbers, we maintain that information frames do have certain “structural”
influence on the machinery that governs the DM’s ranking, and that such an influence
is independent of the content (in this case, the numbers) of the underlying knowledge
of contingencies. To see this, one may consider the “dual” property, consistency. In
the example, `1 and `2 (resp., `3 and `4) are ranked the same under IN and Ig, and
notice that this ranking would still be consistent no matter what number in (0, 1) is
assigned to ρ({G}).
Explicating the information-dependency of choice that hinged on information frames
is of significant interest. First, this approach allows us to explore the connection be-
tween characteristic conditions of such dependence and those of revealed attitude to-
wards uncertainty as in, for example, Hayashi (2012); Li (2018). Moreover, in the wake
of Machina (2009, 2014), the suggested dependence explains the behavioral pattern
known as ambiguity-aversion. That is, it may relate ambiguity aversion and frame-
dependency in the same vein. Uncovering such dependency is of importance not only
from the decision-theoretical perspective but also for economic applications. In the
economic problems that involve both uncertainty and variable information, decision
models are often considered models of beliefs. However, the dependency we alluded to
suggests that the frame of information per se may also be an argument of the models,
hence providing an additional dimension to the related analysis.
We, therefore, focus on an environment wherein the DM entertains a complete
awareness of contingencies, and a fixed exogenous knowledge of uncertainty is described
coarsely to her within variable information frames. The objective is to develop a
model to accommodate the influence that the friction between awareness and variable
information frames exerts on decision making under uncertainty.
3.1.2. Frame-Adaptivity of Choice
We invoke the standard Anscombe and Aumann (henceforth, AA) framework and
take as primitive a family of information-dependent preferences over AA acts that are
indexed by partitions of the state space.3 Each partition corresponds to an information
frame in which a fixed knowledge of contingencies is described to the DM.
3Caution should be exercised on the difference between the standard AA framework given by
Fishburn (1970) and the original one introduced in Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
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We impose two types of baseline axioms on the family of preferences, the uniform
and consistency axioms. Those axioms characterize a general representation that takes












where f is an AA act, L is a partition of the state space S, 1E denotes the indica-
tor function of event E, and the integrals are Choquet integrals. As for its elements,
u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) index, V is a capacity on S, and for each
partition L, VL is a null-additive capacity on the σ-algebra induced by L. The repre-
sentation suggests that the DM makes choices as if she entertains a twofold assessment
of acts featuring information-frame-dependency. When the fixed exogenous knowledge
of contingencies is described in information frame L, she firstly computes the con-
ditional expected payoff on each learnable event against her subjective belief V in a
rank-dependent manner. This process coarsens the inherent uncertainty such that it
can be assessed in the frame L. She then applies VL, which captures how she interprets
the given information, to evaluate the overall expected payoff based on the conditional
expected payoff on each learnable event. Such an assessment manifests itself as if the
DM evaluates AA acts in a way adapting the given frame of information L. Hence, we
call the representation frame-adaptive expected utility (FAEU).
One interpretation of the frame-adaptivity is that exogenous information alters
the salience of the frame in which that information is encoded (Taylor and Thompson
(1982)). Presented with the information given by L, descriptive frame L is perceived to
be more salient such that the DM may discriminate her awareness of contingencies (i.e.,
the state space) and the information frame, and tends to evaluate AA acts according
to frame L (Kahneman (2011, .p 324)). Bordalo et al. (2012) developed a model of
choice under risk featuring salience in which the true probabilities given by lotteries
are distorted in favor of salient payoffs. In our model, however, salience is attributed
to the frames which the DM entertains to resolve the inherent uncertainty.
Having the general representation, we focus on two specific forms of FAEU charac-
terized under modified impositions of consistency axioms. These representations sug-
gest different manifestations of frame-adaptivity and highlight attitude towards frames
of information and the degree of salience effect, respectively. In each form of repre-
sentation, the influence of the suggested behavioral feature is captured by a family of
normalized parameters. Given the same mapping U as in the general FAEU, the first
representation, which we call ω-FAEU, takes the form
Uω(f, L) = ωL
∫
S




where for every partition L, parameter ωL ∈ (0, 1] captures the DM’s attitude towards
the informativeness of frame L. The second representation, S-FAEU, has the form















where for each L, positive parameter ϑL reflects the degree of salience.
As mentioned, our representations allow us to explore the translatability of uncer-
tainty attitude as in Li (2018). We connect frame-adaptive models to the definition of
(definitive) uncertainty attitude given by Schmeidler (1989) and to that of comparative
uncertainty attitude proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and isolate partic-
ular properties regarding whether and how the uncertainty attitude exhibited under
a given information frame is related to those revealed under other frames. Applying
different forms of FAEU, we also conduct a comparative analysis to study the separat-
ing roles of the conditions of representations in determining the degree of uncertainty
attitude revealed under each given information frame. Later in the chapter, we dis-
cuss the possibility of attributing ambiguity-aversion to the frame-adaptive reasoning
and explore the applications of frame-adaptive models to economic problems wherein
the interested party can manipulate individual behavior via releasing information in
suitable frames to achieve desirable goals.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the prelim-
inaries. In Section 3.3, basic axioms and general representation are presented. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the suggested two specific forms of frame-adaptive expected utility
under stronger impositions of axioms. Translatability of uncertainty attitude is studied
in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 discusses ambiguity-aversion and applications to
economic problems. Proofs are included in appendices.
3.2. Model
3.2.1. Partitions as Information Frames
Let S be a finite set of states and P(S) be the power set of S. Each element of
P(S) is called an event and is denoted typically by E,B, or D. Denote by L a typical
partition of S, and let Σ(L) be the σ-algebra (of S) generated by L. Let L be the set of
all partitions of S. In particular, let L = {S} and L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. Each partition L
is interpreted as an information frame. Define L = {(L, L̃) ∈ L × L | Σ(L) ⊆ Σ(L̃)}.
That is, L̃ is finer than L whenever (L, L̃) ∈ L . Intuitively, if (L, L̃) ∈ L , then L̃
carries more detailed information about the underlying knowledge of likelihoods than
L does. Endowed with L , partially ordered set (L,L ) becomes a lattice.
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Remark 3.1. Regarding the transparency of information frames, one may consider
the following formalism. Let K be a fixed knowledge of contingencies which is specified
either by a mapping K : P(S) → Y with Y being a co-domain of discourse or by a
binary predicate K ⊂P(S)×P(S). For every L ∈ L, let KL : L→ Y , or KL ⊂ L×L,
denote the restriction of K on L. For each partition L, KL corresponds to a description
of knowledge K (hence, a piece of information). Each L ∈ L uniquely specifies the
descriptive frame — that is, the restricted domain of K whose elements are mutually
exclusive and collectively describe the state space — of information KL, thereby being
referred to as an information frame.
For example, in the four-color urn example discussed in Section 3.1.1, the under-
lying knowledge of contingencies K has interpretation “the approximated frequencies
of events observed in trials,” and the information frame of Irb corresponds to partition
{{R,B}, {Y}, {G}}.
3.2.2. Preliminaries
For every B ∈P(S), 1B : X → {0, 1} denotes the indicator function of B. Let Σ
be a σ-algebra of S. We call a set function µ : Σ → [0, 1] a capacity on Σ if µ(∅) = 0,
µ(S) = 1, and for any B,D ∈ Σ, B ⊆ D implies µ(B) ≤ µ(D). A capacity µ is said
to be null-additive if µ(B) = 0 implies µ(B ∪D) = µ(D) for every disjoint B,D ∈ X .
All the integrals stand for the Choquet integral throughout.
Let A be the set of consequences assumed to be a separable metric space. Denote by
Π(A) the set of all simple lotteries over A. An act is defined by function f : S → Π(A),
and denote by H the set of all acts. Let HC ⊂ H be the set of all constant acts. The
act space H is endowed with a mixture operation defined by(
αf + (1− α)g
)
(s) = αf(s) + (1− α)g(s), ∀s ∈ S,∀α ∈ [0, 1].
For any f, g ∈ H and E ∈ P(S), let [fEg] be the binary act such that for all s ∈ S,
[fEg](s) = f(s) when s ∈ E, and [fEg](s) = g(s) otherwise. For every L ∈ L,
let %L⊂ H × H be a binary relation where L and ∼L denote the asymmetric and
symmetric part of %L, respectively. For every L ∈ L, we extend %L to Π(A) by
identifying lotteries with constant acts. The object being of our interest is the family
of those binary relations {%L}L∈L.
For every L ∈ L, act h is said to be Σ(L)-measurable if for any π ∈ Π(A), {s ∈
S |h(s) = π} ∈ Σ(L). Let HL denote the set of all Σ(L)-measurable acts. For every
L ∈ L and any f ∈ H, denote by fL the constant act such that f(s) %L fL(s) on S,
and f(ŝ) = fL(ŝ) for some ŝ ∈ S.
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Definition 3.1 (Relevant Acts). Given an L ∈ L, a D ∈P(S), an act f is called
an (L,D)-relevant act (simply (L,D)-act) if f = [fDfL]. In addition, for a fixed
c ∈ HL, we call an act f an (L,D, c)-act if f = [fDc] and c = fL.
Note that the notion of (L,D)-acts does not require event D to be a cell of partition
L. That is, the given partition L affects the specification of (L,D)-acts solely through
the induced preference %L over lotteries. Let CLD and CLD[c] denote the set of all (L,D)-
acts and that of all (L,D, c)-acts, respectively.
Formulations of our key axioms, as well as their normative implications, will be
based on the following properties of Σ(L)-measurable acts and (L,D)-acts in terms of
demand for informativeness in the DM’s assessment of AA acts.
Remark 3.2. For an L ∈ L, in order to rank the Σ(L)-measurable acts, the DM
may need information about the likelihoods of events in L. Thus, if the underlying
knowledge of contingencies is knowledge of likelihoods, then the information carried
by L provides a reference for such demand of informativeness. In this way, the in-
herent uncertainty in evaluating Σ(L)-measurable acts can be accommodated by the
descriptive power of information frame L.
Remark 3.3. For a fixed L ∈ L and an E ∈ L, an (L,E)-act f ∈ CLE guarantees
its payoff on S \ E as the least preferred payoff (with respect to %L) regardless of the
realized state, meaning that f can be viewed as a minimal payoff fL(s) associated with
a “gain-bet” over the sub-events of E. For example, let L = {{R,B,Y}, {G}} and
E = {R,B,Y} in the four-color urn discussed in Section 3.1.1, and suppose $100 L
$50 L $30 L $0. Then, the following table gives an illustration of (L,E)-acts with
the induced minimal payoffs and gain-bets.
R B Y G
`1 $100 $100 $0 $0
`5 $50 $100 $30 $30
`1 `5
Minimal Payoff $0 $30
Gain-Bets
(
{R,B} $100 instead of $0
{Y} $0 instead of $0
) 
{R} $50 instead of $30
{B} $100 instead of $30
{Y} $30 instead of $30

Table 3.2 – (L,E)-acts, Minimal Payoff, and Induced Gain-Bets
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Presumably, rankings over (L,E)-acts depend on (i) the DM’s assessment of the
gain-bets induced by those acts, and (ii) trade-off between the anticipated utility in-
crements delivered by those gain-bets and utility given by the corresponding minimal
payoffs. Since the uncertainty inherent in those gain-bets is described by (E,P(E)),
it is thus plausible to argue that both of the assessment of gain-bets and the afore-
mentioned trade-off would depend on how she judges the likelihoods of sub-events of
E. However, this is beyond the descriptive power of frame L, hence being purely-
subjective. In particular, for a c ∈ HC , since (L,E, c)-acts share common “sure-thing”
payoff c, rankings over these acts can be ascribed to (i), which solely depends on her
judgment of the relative likelihoods of the sub-events of E. Hence, the information
frame L is completely irrelevant for such demand for informativeness.
3.3. Basic Axioms and General Representation
First, we present the baseline axioms that characterize the general representation
of {%L}L∈L. These axioms are akin to those considered by Li (2018) and categorized
into two types: uniform and consistency axioms.
3.3.1. Uniform Axioms
The first five axioms are applied to each fixed partition L and collectively denoted
as the uniform axioms.
Axiom 3.1 (Order). For any L ∈ L, %L is complete and transitive.
Axiom 3.2 (Continuity). For any L ∈ L and any f, g, h ∈ H with f L g L h,
there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α)h L g L βf + (1− β)h.
Axiom 3.3 (Monotonicity). For any L ∈ L, any f, g ∈ H and any h ∈ HL
(I) f(s) %L g(s) on S implies f %L g.
(II) if hL %L fL and [fEfL] %L [hEfL] (resp., -L) for all E ∈ L, then f %L h
(resp., -L).
Axiom 3.4 (Nondegeneracy). For every L ∈ L, not for all f, g ∈ H, f ∼L g.
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Axiom 3.5 (Comonotonic Relevance Independence, CRI).
(I) For every L ∈ L, every pairwise comonotonic f, g, h ∈ HL, and any α ∈ (0, 1),
f %L g if and only if αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.4
(II) For every L ∈ L, E ∈ L, any pairwise comonotonic f, g, h ∈ CLE, and any
α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g if and only if αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.
Presented with the information given in frame L, the DM may discriminate the un-
certainty accommodated by the descriptive power of L, (S,Σ(L)), and the uncertainty
of which she is aware (S,P(S)). It is because the given information may either carry
the knowledge of likelihoods of learnable events or alter the salience of contingencies
that are describable in frame L. Hence, there might be friction between her awareness
and the exogenously given information frame.
In CRI, we maintain that such a difference in perception of uncertainty matters
when we consider comonotonic independence axiom as in the Choquet expected utility
model (CEU, Schmeidler (1989)).5 Precisely, the comonotonic independence is not as
normatively appealing for the acts which involve the trade-off between uncertainty with
different perceptions as it is for those who do not. As argued in Remark 3.2, frame L ac-
commodates the uncertainty inherent in Σ(L)-measurable acts, meaning that %L over
HL does not involve such a trade-off. We thus find the comonotonic independence nor-
mative for %L on HL.6 The implication of CRI-(II) should be discussed in conjunction
with that of CRI-(I). Given that HL∩CLE 6= ∅, consider first f, g, h ∈ HL∩CLE. Clearly,
f, g, and h are pairwise comonotonic. Hence, CRI-(I) implies that the restriction of
%L on HL ∩ CLE obeys the independence axiom. Meanwhile, following the argument in
Remark 3.3, f, g and h can be respectively viewed as a minimal payoff associated with
a gain-bet over E, yet they differ from acts in CLE \ HL in the sense that they induce
degenerated gain-bets over E. Thus, CRI-(I) implies that the trade-off between the
anticipated increment from the gain-bets over E and the minimal payoffs is exercised
in a way obeying the independence axiom. Due to this, CRI-(II) is essentially reduced
to an assumption for the evaluation of the gain-bets over E induced by acts in CLE. As
discussed in Remark 3.3, L is irrelevant for the assessment of those gain-bets, which
is purely subjective, hence there being no trade-off between uncertainty with different
perceptions in evaluating the anticipated increments of those gain-bets. Therefore, for
each learnable event E ∈ L, we consider the comonotonic independence normative for
the restriction of %L on CLE.
4For a fixed L ∈ L, acts f, g ∈ H are said to be comonotonic if, for any s, t ∈ S, f(s) L f(t)
implies g(s) %L g(t).
5The comonotonic independence can be restated in our notation: for any L ∈ L, any pairwise
comonotonic f, g, h ∈ H, and any α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g iff αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.
6Note that HL and CLE for each E ∈ L are closed under the mixture operation. Otherwise, it
becomes invalid to consider the mixture on these sub-domains.
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3.3.2. Consistency Axioms
The general intuition behind our baseline consistency axioms is that if two pieces
of information carried by different frames are both irrelevant for the assessment of a
set of acts, then the preference over this set of acts should be consistent under those
information frames.
Axiom 3.6 (Certainty). For any L,L′ ∈ L and any c, c′ ∈ HC, c %L c′ if and only
if c %L′ c′.
Axiom 3.7 (Consistency of Irrelevance, CoI). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any E ∈ L̃, and
any c ∈ HC, if CL̃E[c] is not %L̃-indifferent, then for any f, g ∈ CL̃E[c] ∩ CLE[c], f %L g if
and only if f %L̃ g.7
Certainty states that the preference over constant acts should stay identical across
all information frames. Such consistency separates the resolution of uncertainty and
that of physical risk governed by objective probabilities. CoI suggests that for an
information frame L, if sub-events of an event E are not learnable from L, nor a finer
frame L̃, then acts that yield improvements from some fixed constant act only on E
should be ranked the same under L and L̃, even when E itself is learnable from L̃.
For example, let L = {{R,B,Y}, {G}}, L̃ = {{R,B}, {Y}, {G}}, and E = {R,B}
in the four-color urn given in Section 3.1.1. Consider bet `1 and `6 given in the following
table respectively under information Irb and Ig. Suppose $120 L $100 L $80 L $0
R B Y G
`1 $100 $100 $0 $0
`6 $120 $80 $0 $0
Information: Frequencies in The Trials
Irb ρ({R,B}) ≈ .5, ρ({Y}) ≈ .2, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Ig ρ({R,B,Y}) ≈ .7, ρ({G}) ≈ .3
Table 3.3 – CoI in Four-Color Urn
(resp., L̃). Then, we have `1, `6 ∈ CLE[$0] ∩ CL̃E[$0]. Thus, CoI requires that `1 and `6
should be ranked the same under information Irb and Ig.
7Given an L, we say a nonempty set of acts F ⊆ H is %L-indifferent if f ∼L g holds for any
f, g ∈ F .
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3.3.3. General Representation: Frame-Adaptive Expected Utility
We now have all the necessary elements to characterize our general representations.
First, we consider %L for each fixed information frame L. Our first result establishes
an equivalence between the uniform axioms and a representation wherein information-
frame-dependency is captured by a twofold partition-dependent integral.
Theorem 3.1. Given an L ∈ L, the following statements are equivalent.
(I) %L⊂ H×H satisfies the uniform axioms.
(II) An affine function uL : Π(A) → R and a capacity vL : P(S) → [0, 1] exist
such that, for any f, g ∈ H,
















∆(L) = {E ∈ L | vL(E) > 0}.
Moreover, vL is null-additive on Σ(L), and is unique in the sense that: if
there is another capacity v′ being such, then v′(B) = vL(B) for every B ∈
(⋃E∈L P(E) ∪Σ(L)). Finally, uL is unique up to positive linear transforma-
tions (p.l.t.), and ∆(L) 6= ∅.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.1.
In the theorem, capacity vL can be interpreted as the DM’s willingness-to-bet or
subjective belief. Presented with information frame L, act f is evaluated in the fol-
lowing way. First, UL translates f into a Σ(L)-measurable utility act UL(f) which
maps each learnable event E ∈ L to a utility level which can be roughly interpreted
by the conditional expected utility on the learnable event obtained with respect to
vL. Mapping UL indicates that the DM coarsens the uncertainty inherent in f such
that utility act UL(f) can be assessed within information frame L, thereby reflecting
information-frame-dependency which is manifested as if the DM tends to evaluate f in
a way adapting frame L. Then, the overall utility of f is evaluated by computing the
rank-dependent expectation of utility act UL(f) against vL. The suggested uniqueness
of vL is also significant. One possible explanation can be given related to rational
(motivated) inattention. Since the DM entertains the aforementioned frame-adaptive
assessment of AA acts, she only needs to judge the likelihoods of the event that are
relevant to coarsening the uncertainty or to computing the overall expected utility.
Thus, given information frame L, it is unnecessary to consider likelihoods of the events
which are not included in (⋃E∈L P(E)) ∪ Σ(L), and utility of acts must not depend
on the subjective likelihoods which vL assigns to those events.
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Recall that L = {{s} | s ∈ S} and L = {S}. As direct consequences, it can be
shown that %L and %L admit standard CEU representations on its full domain.
Corollary 3.1.1. The following statements hold.
(I) %L⊂ H × H satisfies the uniform axioms if and only if there exist an affine
function u : Π(A) → R and a unique capacity v : P(S) → [0, 1] such that
f %L g if and only if
∫
S u(f) dv ≥
∫
S u(g) dv for every f, g ∈ H. Moreover, u
is unique up to p.l.t.
(II) %L⊂ H × H satisfies the uniform axioms if and only if there exist an affine
function û : Π(A) → R and a unique null-additive capacity V̂ on P(S) such
that, for any f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if
∫
S û (f) dV̂ ≥
∫
S û (g) dV̂ .
Moreover, û is unique up to p.l.t.
Proof. (I) By Theorem 3.1, L = {S} implies ∆(L) = L = {S}. Hence, vL is
unique since it holds that Σ(S) = P(S) = P(⋃∆(L)). Also, ∆(L) being singleton
implies that UL(f) ∈ HC for every f ∈ H. Therefore, for every f, g ∈ H, f %L g if
and only if UL(f) ≥ UL(g). Set v(B) = vL(B) for every B ∈ P(S). Then, for every
f ∈ H, it follows that UL(f) =
∫
S u(f) dv.
(II) L = {{s} | s ∈ S} implies HL = H, since Σ(L) = P(S). Thus, by Lemma 3.1
in Appendix 3.A.2, the equivalence follows. Q.E.D.
In what follows, we present the general representation theorem for {%L}L∈L. Clarify
a notion. We say a functional U : H×L → R represents {%L}L∈L on H if for all L ∈ L
and f, g ∈ H, f %L g if and only if U(f, L) ≥ U(g, L). We can now formally define the
general utility representation.
Definition 3.2 (Frame-Adaptive Expected Utility). We say {%L}L∈L admits a
Frame-Adaptive Expected Utility (FAEU) representation if there exist an affine function
u : Π(A) → R, a unique capacity V : P(S) → [0, 1], and for every L ∈ L, there is
a unique null-additive capacity VL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] such that U is well-defined and












∆(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) > 0}.
Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
When such a tuple (u, V, {VL}L∈L) exists, we call it an FAEU representation.
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In comparison with Theorem 3.1, FAEU involves a globally unique capacity V on
P(S) capturing the DM’s purely subjective belief, which is used to coarsen the uncer-
tainty inherent in each act so that it can be accommodated by the given information
frame. For each partition L, capacity VL reflects the DM’s subjective interpretation of
the information carried by L.
Theorem 3.2. {%L}L∈L satisfies the uniform axioms, Certainty and CoI if and
only if it admits an FAEU representation.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.2.
3.4. Frame-Adaptivity: Attitude and Salience
Here, we study two specific forms of FAEU under stronger impositions of con-
sistency axioms. In either of the representations, frame-adaptivity is performed in a
parameterized manner with respect to a family of parameters that indicate the strength
of the effect of the corresponding behavioral feature towards each information frame.
The intuition behind the consistency axioms considered in this section is in line with
the one discussed previously. That is, if two information frames are both irrelevant for
the assessment of a particular set of acts, then these acts should be ranked the same
under the two information frames. However, the axioms presented in this section are
formulated based on more restrictive interpretations of irrelevance.
3.4.1. Attitude towards Informativeness
The general form of FAEU does not establish any connection between the DM’s
subjective interpretations of information carried by different frames. Here, we study
a form of FAEU in which the DM’s interpretation of information is invariant across
variable information frames. As to the axioms, we focus on additional consistency
properties when finer information frames yield redundancy of informativeness for a
particular set of acts.
Axiom 3.8 (Coarseness Aversion). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any f ∈ HL and c ∈ HC,
f %L (L) c implies f %L̃ (L̃) c.
Axiom 3.9 (Consistency of Redundancy, CoR). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any D,D′ ∈
Σ(L) \ {S, ∅}, and any c ∈ HC, if neither CLS\D[c] nor CLS\D′ [c] is %L-indifferent, then
for any f ∈ CLD[c] ∩HL and g ∈ CLD′ [c] ∩HL, f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g.
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Coarseness Aversion is, in the formulation, akin to the comparative uncertainty
aversion defined by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). Let f and c be as in the state-
ment. The axiom states that if the DM (weakly) prefers act f to objective lottery c
under an information frame that fully accommodates the uncertainty inherent in that
act, then redundancy of informativeness resulted by any finer information frame does
not reverse this ranking. It can be shown that Coarseness Aversion implies Certainty.
Let L, L̃, D,D′, f and g be as in the statement of CoR. Notice that, both D
and D′ are describable within information frame L as D,D′ ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅}. Thus,
f ∈ CLD[c] ∩ HL and g ∈ CLD′ [c] ∩ HL jointly imply that the uncertainty inherent in
f and g can be accommodated by frame L, and that they involve a same minimal
payoff. Hence, the finer frame L̃ yields redundancy of informativeness for the acts. As
a result, CoR states that if act f and g have a common minimal payoff, then additional
redundancy of informativeness does not alter the ranking over f and g, which is revealed
under the frame that accommodates the uncertainty inherent in assessing the acts.
We now formally define the first special form of FAEU.
Definition 3.3 (ω-FAEU). We say {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation if
the followings are satisfied:
(1) There exist an affine function u on Π(A), a unique capacity V on P(S), a
unique null-additive capacity V̂ on P(S) and a unique normalized family of
positive parameters ω = {ωL}L∈L with ωL = 1 such that Uω is well-defined
and represents {%L}L∈L on H, where
Uω(f, L) = ωL
∫⋃
Ω(L)













Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V̂ (E) > 0}.
(2) For any L, L̃ ∈ L \ {L}, ωL ∈ (0, 1], and (L, L̃) ∈ L implies ωL ≤ ωL̃. The
family of parameters ω is unique in the sense that: ωL is arbitrary, while for
every L ∈ L \ {L}, ωL is unique. Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
When such a tuple (u, V, V̂ ,ω) exists, we call it an ω-FAEU representation.
The decision rule given by ω-FAEU differs from that the general FAEU suggests
only on the machinery by which the frame-adaptivity in the second stage is manifested.
First, the DM interprets information in a compatible way such that her interpretations
of information given in variable frames are summarized by the unique capacity V̂
on the finest algebra P(S). Presented with the information given in frame L, the
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DM coarsens the uncertainty inherent in each act based on purely subjective belief
V as in the general FAEU. Yet having adapted to frame L, she considers the worst-
case learnable event such that the overall utility of each act is evaluated by a convex
combination of (i) the rank-dependent expected utility of the corresponding utility
act U(·, L) obtained applying her subjective interpretation V̂ , and (ii) the worst-case
conditional expected utility given by the utility act U(·, L). Such a convex combination
is taken with respect to a parameter ωL which, in conjunction with the implication of
Coarseness Aversion, reflects her attitude towards the informativeness of L. Notably,
Definition 3.3-(2) suggests that the DM puts more weight on the worst-case conditional
expected utility while facing the coarser frame.
Probing further, it is possible in general to have{
s ∈ S











U(f, L)(s) > min
s∈S
u(f)(s).
Since U(·, L) is a functional of u and V , the above observation thus implies that the
worst-case which the DM takes into consideration is purely subjective. Moreover, in ω-
FAEU, this worst-case conditional expected utility level plays a role related to a subjec-
tive reference point. If we adopt such an interpretation of mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(·, L), then ω-
FAEU indeed connects the frame-adaptivity and an endogenous reference-dependency
which differs from the one studied by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
Theorem 3.3. {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation if and only if it satisfies
the uniform axioms, CoI, CoR and Coarseness Aversion.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.3.
In what follows, we present a special case of ω-FAEU in which the frame-adaptivity
appears in the same vein as in the general FAEU, yet the DM holds a consistent
interpretation of information across variable frames. The following axiom states that
act f and g should be ranked the same under L and a finer frame L̃, whenever L can
accommodate the demand for informativeness of both f and g.
Axiom 3.10 (Strong Consistency of Redundancy, SCoR). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , and
for any f, g ∈ HL, f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g.
Corollary 3.3.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the uniform axioms, SCoR and CoI.
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(II) {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ,ω) in which ωL = 1 for












Proof. See Appendix 3.B.3.1.
Let (u, V, V̂ ) denote this representation.
3.4.2. Pure Salience Effects
Here, we explore another special form of FAEU in which the DM’s subjective likeli-
hoods of events are not affected by the variation of information frames. That is to say,
variable information influences choices solely through altering the salience of frames
in which information is described to the DM. Preferences admit such a form of FAEU
might be observed when the underlying knowledge of contingencies does not contain
information about the likelihoods of contingencies in question.
Axiom 3.11 (Strong Consistency of Irrelevance, SCoI). For any (L, L̃) ∈ L , any
E,E ′ ∈ L̃, any c ∈ HC, and for any f ∈ CL̃E[c] ∩ CLE[c] and g ∈ CL̃E′ [c] ∩ CLE′ [c], f %L g
if and only if f %L̃ g.
SCoI is a strictly restrictive version of CoI. It states that for a frame L and a
finer one L̃, if L̃ does not unpack the sub-events of event E and E ′, then acts that
deliver improvements from some fixed objective lottery (constant act) only on E and
E ′, respectively, should be ranked the same under L and L̃.
Definition 3.4 (Salience-FAEU). We say {%L}L∈L admits a Salience-FAEU (S-
FAEU) representation if the followings are satisfied.
(1) There exist an affine function u on Π(A), a unique capacity V on P(S), and
a unique normalized family of positive parameters ϑ = {ϑL}L∈L with ϑL = 1
such that US is well-defined and represents {%L}L∈L on H, where



























Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.
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(2) For all L ∈ L, define a set function VL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] by: VL(B) = 1 if
V (S \ B) = 0, and VL(B) = ϑLV (B) otherwise. Then, VL is a null-additive
capacity. Finally, u is unique up to p.l.t.
When such a tuple (u, V,ϑ) exists, we call it an S-FAEU representation.
Each information frame L carries a parameter ϑL which captures the degree of the
salience of L. As in ω-FAEU, the DM takes the worst-case conditional expected utility
level mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(·, L) into account. However, S-FAEU suggests that the DM rather
focuses on the Choquet expected utility-increment from mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(·, L), where the
salience may exert influence on her assessment. Thus, the overall utility of each act
is computed by adding the modified expected utility-increment to the reference utility
level given by mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(·, L).
Theorem 3.4. {%L}L∈L admits an S-FAEU representation if and only if it satisfies
the uniform axioms, Certainty, CoR and SCoI.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.4.
The following result establishes a connection between ω-FAEU and S-FAEU. It
states that they are equivalent if and only if {%L}L∈L does not exhibit attitude towards
informativeness and has a fixed degree of salience across variable information frames.
Corollary 3.4.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the uniform axioms, SCoR and SCoI.
(II) {%L}L∈L admits an S-FAEU representation (u, V,ϑ) wherein a ϑ ∈ R++ exists
such that for all L ∈ L \ {L}, ϑL = ϑ.
(III) {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ) in which there is a ϑ ∈
R++ such that for all B ∈P(S), V (S \B) > 0 implies V̂ (B) = ϑV (B).
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.4.1.
Let (u, V, ϑ) denote this equivalent representation.
Throughout the rest of the chapter, we call {%L}L∈L an FAEU (resp., ω- or S-
FAEU) preference whenever it admits an FAEU (resp., ω- or S-FAEU) representation.
For simplicity, given an FAEU preference, the subsequent analysis will always assume
that for every L ∈ L, measurable space (S,P(S)) does not have any nonempty VL-null
(resp., V̂ -null) event. Then, by definitions, it follows immediately that V (B) > 0 holds
for all nonempty B ∈ P(S). It can be shown that such a non-nullity is equivalent to
imposing, instead of Nondegeneracy, the following assumption on {%L}L∈L.
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Axiom 3.12 (Richness). For any L ∈ L and E ∈ L, not for all c ∈ HC, CLE[c] is
%L-indifferent.
3.5. Translatability of Uncertainty Attitude
In this section, we establish a connection between frame-adaptivity and the trans-
latability of revealed attitude towards uncertainty. In what follows, since we focus our
discussion on FAEU preferences, meaning that Certainty will always be considered, we
thus use CD, instead of CLD, to denote the set of (L,D)-acts.
3.5.1. Definitive Properties
Here, we focus on the implied properties of uncertainty attitude in a definitive
manner. Schmeidler (1989) proposed a behavioral definition of uncertainty attitude
and provided a characterization using the capacity obtained in the CEU model (see
also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). We restate this definition using our notations.
Definition 3.5 (Uncertainty Attitude). Given an L ∈ L and a set of acts F ⊆ H
that is closed under the mixture operation, we say the preference %L⊂ H×H reveals
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on F if for any f, g ∈ F and any α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼L g
implies αf + (1− α)g %L f (resp., αf + (1− α)g -L f).
Under this definition, we consider a question that if %L for a fixed L ∈ L re-
veals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on a convex sub-domain, say F , then for
which L̃ ∈ L and F̃ ⊆ H we can predict that %L̃ reveals uncertainty aversion (resp.,
loving) on F̃ without further observations. Explicating this question is intrinsically
to isolate every inference kernel (%L,F) of uncertainty attitude and the correspond-
ing scope of inference. The following proposition observes a general property regard-
ing tranlatability of uncertainty attitude which is satisfied by any FAEU preference.
We start with the formal definition of this property. Define R ⊂ L × P(S) by
R = {(L,D) | [∅ 6= D] ∧ [∃E ∈ L, D ⊆ E]}.
Definition 3.6 (Relevance Translation). We say {%L}L∈L reveals relevance trans-
lation of uncertainty attitude (simply, relevance translation) if it satisfies the following
condition: for every (L,D) ∈ R, if %L reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on
CD, then for any (L̃, D̃) ∈ R, %L̃ reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CD̃
whenever D̃ ⊆ D.
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Proposition 3.1. Every FAEU preference reveals the relevance translation.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.1.
Now, we state additional translation properties which are satisfied by ω- and S-
FAEU, respectively. Define R ⊂ L×P(S) by R = {(L,B) | B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅}}.
Proposition 3.2. The following statements holds.
(I) Let {%L}L∈L be an ω-FAEU preference. For every (L,B) ∈ R, if %L reveals
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩ HL, then for all (L̃, B̃) ∈ R, %L̃
reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB̃ ∩ HL̃ whenever B̃ ⊆ B and
there exists a K ⊆ (L ∩ L̃) such that B̃ = ⋃K.
(II) Let {%L}L∈L be an S-FAEU preference. For every (L,D) ∈ R, if %L exhibits
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CD, then for all (L̂, B) ∈ R, %L̂ exhibits
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩HL̂ whenever B ⊆ D.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.2.
The following result shows that when {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation
(u, V, V̂ ), the translatability of uncertainty attitude can be related to the measurability
given each information frame.
Proposition 3.3. Let ΣF be a σ-algebra of S and F be the set of all ΣF -measurable
acts. Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ). Let (L, L̃) ∈
L be such that %L and %L̃ reveal uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on F .
(I) If ΣF ⊆ Σ(L), then for any L̂ ∈ L that satisfies ΣF ⊆ Σ(L̂), %L̂ reveals
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on F .
(II) If Σ(L) ⊆ ΣF ⊆ Σ(L̃), then for any L̂ ∈ L, %L̂ reveals uncertainty aversion
(resp., loving) on F if (L, L̂) ∈ L .
(III) If Σ(L̃) ⊆ ΣF , then for any L̂ ∈ L satisfying Σ(L) ⊆ Σ(L̂) ⊆ Σ(L̃), %L̂
reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on F .
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.3.
3.5.2. Comparative Property: The Role of Framing of Information
In what follows, we study how information frames influence the revealed uncertainty
attitude in a comparative manner. To this end, we follow the definition of comparative
uncertainty aversion proposed by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). We restate the
formal definition using our notations.
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Definition 3.7 (Comparative Uncertainty Attitude). Let F ⊆ H be an arbitrary
set of acts that satisfies HC ⊆ F . Given two orderings on H, % and %′, we say % is
more uncertainty averse than %′ if for every c ∈ HC and any f ∈ F , c %′ f implies
c % f , and c ′ f implies c  f .
In accordance with this definition, we say % is as uncertainty averse as %′ if % is
more uncertainty averse than %′, and %′ is more uncertainty averse than %. The next
result presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for an FAEU preference revealing
the same degree of uncertainty aversion across nontrivial information frames.
Proposition 3.4. For any FAEU preference {%L}L∈L, the followings statements
are equivalent.
(I) For every L,L′ ∈ L \ {L}, %L is as uncertainty averse as %L′.
(II) {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, P ), where P is a probability
measure on P(S), and there exists a ϑ ∈ R++ such that for all B ∈ P(S) \
{S}, P (B) = ϑV (B).
(III) {%L}L∈L satisfies all the axioms given in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. More-
over, for every L ∈ L, any f, g, h ∈ HL, and any α ∈ (0, 1), f %L g if and
only if αf + (1− α)h %L αg + (1− α)h.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.4.
The representation given in statement (II) of the proposition is more restrictive than
representation (u, V, ϑ) characterized in Corollary 3.4.1. In other words, FAEU (resp.,
ω- or S-FAEU) in general does not ensure that the degree of uncertainty aversion is in-
variant across nontrivial information frames. It means that the framing of information,
as well as the DM’s reaction to it, do play a role in shaping the degree of uncertainty
attitude revealed from choices. Besides, it can be shown that an FAEU preference re-
veals the same degree of uncertainty attitude across all information frames if and only
if it admits a global subjective expected utility representation. Thus, the DM holds
a probabilistically sophisticated belief in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992)
under variable information frames.
The last result presents a comparative analysis of uncertainty attitude. In order to
isolate the role of the DM’s reaction to information frames, we focus on two “ex-ante”
identical FAEU preferences, {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L, with respect to the presence of
nontrivial information frames, which means that they have the same vNM index and
purely subjective belief such that %L=%′L on H×H.
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Proposition 3.5. Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be FAEU preferences that satisfy
u = u′ and V = V ′. Then, for every L ∈ L \ {L}, the following statements hold.
(I) %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if for all B ∈ Σ(L),
VL(B) ≤ V ′L(B).
(II) Suppose that {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L are ω-FAEU preferences. Then, %L is
more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if for every B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S},
ωLV̂ (B) ≤ ω′LV̂ ′(B).
(III) Suppose that {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L are S-FAEU preferences. Then, %L is
more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if ϑL ≤ ϑ′L.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.5.
3.6. Discussion
3.6.1. “Ambiguity-Aversion” and Machina’s Concern
Machina (2009, 2014) maintained that models based on tail-separability (e.g., CEU)
may have particular difficulties in accommodating ambiguity-averse behavior (see also
Baillon et al. (2011)). In our model, tail-separability is also imposed as a part of basic
axioms (CRI), yet in a restricted manner. In what follows, we apply our model to the
thought-experimental examples proposed in these papers and subsequently discuss that
the frame-adaptive reasoning might be a plausible approach to explaining Ellsberg-type
behavior.
Reflection Example. Suppose there is another four-color urn containing 50
balls in R or B, and 50 balls in Y or G. Consider the choice between {f1, f2} and
that between {f3, f4} in Table 3.4 (in the table, x > 0). Clearly, CEU cannot accom-
modate the reversed strict rankings such as f1  f2 and f3 ≺ f4.8
50 balls 50 balls
R B Y G
f1 $ x $2x $ x $ 0
f2 $ x $ x $2x $ 0
f3 $ 0 $2x $ x $ x
f4 $ 0 $ x $2x $ x
Table 3.4 – Reflection Example
8L’Haridon and Placido (2010) reported that 90% of subjects revealed strict rankings in analogous
problems, and that 70% revealed reversed rankings.
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The example is a choice problem under information frame L = {{R,B}, {Y,G}}.
Set S = {R,B, Y,G}, and let (uL, vL) denote the representation tuple obtained in
Theorem 3.1. To sharpen the argument, we present FAEU accommodates reversed
strict rankings for this example in an intuitive way: for all E,E ′ ∈ L, vL(E) = vL(E ′),
and for all s, t ∈ S, vL({s}) = vL({t}). Adding to which, if (uL, vL) satisfies:
(i) uL($0) < uL($x) < uL($2x);





uL($0) + vL({s})vL(E) uL($2x); and
(iii) ∀E ∈ L,∀s ∈ E, 2vL({s}) 6= vL({s})vL(E) ,
then FAEU yields reversed strict rankings, where the direction of the strict ranking
between f1 and f2 aligns with that of inequality (iii). (See Appendix 3.D.1 for details.)
Slightly-Bent Coin. Consider a coin that is bent slightly in an unknown di-
rection and an urn containing an unknown quantity of balls in two colors: R and B.
The mechanics of the coin-flip does not depend on the content of the urn. Also, the
coin-flip and ball-drawing will be performed only once simultaneously. As discussed in
Machina (2014), CEU cannot deliver a strict ranking in either direction between Bet
I and II given in the following table if {HR} and {TB} are assigned an equal value of
measure due to the symmetrical information (in the table, x > 0).
Bet I (h1) Bet II (h2)
R B R B
H + $x $ 0 H $ 0 $ 0
T − $x $ 0 versus T − $x + $x
Table 3.5 – Slightly-Bent Coin Problem
Due to the independence between coin-flip and ball-drawing, the description sug-
gests that the probability of {HR,HB} and {TR, TB} would be very close to 1/2.
Thus, the example is intrinsically the choice between two bets under information frame
L = {{HR,HB}, {TR, TB}}. Let (uL, vL) be the representation tuple given in Theo-
rem 3.1. For this example, if tuple (uL, vL) satisfies:
(i) uL(− $x) < uL($0) < uL(+ $x);





uL(− $x) + vL({s})vL(E) uL(+ $x) < uL($0); and




then FAEU yields a strict ranking between Bet I and II with the direction aligning
with that of the inequality in (iii). (For details, see Appendix 3.D.1.)
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In his analysis, Machina evinced a seminal viewpoint which says that, in situations
of objective, subjective, and mixed objective/subjective uncertainty, the DM’s trade-
offs between subjective and objective (sub-)bets result in ambiguity-aversion. Our
model, on the other hand, suggests that, in the presence of exogenous information,
what we observe as ambiguity-aversion is a manifestation of DM evaluating the acts
described in the frame of awareness (i.e., the frame yielded by identifying acts) in a
way adapting to the coarse frames given by exogenous information.
To a certain extent, this explanation supports the insights offered by Machina
(2014). Namely, that a piece of exogenous information leads a particular algebra of the
state space to involve objective uncertainty is exactly a typical environment wherein
the DM entertains coarse frames given by exogenous information and performs the
frame-adaptive reasoning. Note that this is not the only type of situation in which the
DM considers a coarse frame in decision making. Slightly-Bent Coin Problem can be a
relevant example. Machina (2014, Section IV) suggested that choices of an ambiguity-
averter may also exhibit different attitudes towards different degrees of ambiguity. In
our formalism, however, information endowing a particular algebra with uncertainty
in a disparate degree is another analogy of situations that lead the DM to exhibit
ambiguity aversion via the frame-adaptive reasoning.
3.6.2. Example: Allocation with Framing of Information
In what follows, we firstly apply FAEU to an analogy of allocation problems with
exogenous knowledge of uncertainty, then discuss its general application to related
economic problems. The following example shows that a planner can distribute the
market uncertainty solely through releasing the knowledge of uncertainty in a suitable
frame, without creating asymmetry of information.
Distributing Uncertainty. Suppose S = {r, s, t} describes the uncertainty
which a market involves, and let L be the family of information frames that describe a
fixed statistical knowledge of S. Set A = R+. The market comprises individual 1 and
2 whose behaviors can be described by ω-FAEU preferences %1 and %2, respectively.
Denote by (u1, V 1, P,ω1) and (u2, V 2, P,ω2) the representations.
To simplify the argument, assume the followings.
(A1) Let e = (er, es, et) be the state-contingent total endowments, where er < es <
et. Thus, aggregate market uncertainty exists.
(A2) P is a probability measure on P(S). Namely, if L = {{r}, {s}, {t}} is released,
the knowledge would be interpreted as a common probabilistic belief.
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(A3) u1 is strictly increasing strictly concave and differentiable, while u2 is the
identity function. That is, %1 is strictly risk averse, while %2 is risk neutral.
(A4) For all L ∈ L \ {L}, ω1L > ω2L.
Now, let xi = (xir, xis, xit) be the ex-ante allocation for individual i, and consider the
allocation problem (x1, x2) in the spirit of Rigotti et al. (2008).
Suppose the statistical knowledge is released in information frame L. Under as-
sumptions (A1)-(A3), it is well-known that, an interior feasible allocation (x1, x2) is
Pareto-optimal if and only if x1r = x1s = x1t . Thus, under L, any interior Pareto-optimal
allocation would lead individual 2 to burden the entire market uncertainty. However,
under (A4), if the statistical knowledge is released in frame L = {{s}, {r, t}}, then
any interior Pareto-optimal allocation would require individual 1 to share the market
uncertainty to some extent. (See Appendix 3.D.2 for detail.)
In economic problems that involve uncertainty and information, decision models
are often considered models of beliefs. In other words, the variation of information is
reflected by that of (the set of) beliefs in the models. However, FAEU allows one to
consider not only the variation of knowledge about uncertainty (e.g., Ellsberg’s urns
with different contents) but also that of frames in which each knowledge is revealed
(e.g., for a fixed urn, announcing the quantities of different combinations of colors),
hence enlarging the scope of analysis and observations for those economic problems.
As for a typical instance of such applications, one can consider, as in the above
example, a market framework comprising an information sender and receivers, wherein
the sender can design a suitable information frame in order to lead the receivers’ de-
cision to achieve some desirable goals, such as implementing an equilibrium with par-
ticular properties. Incorporating the previous ambiguity-related discussion, leading
individuals’ decisions by selecting a suitable information frame to release the knowl-
edge of uncertainty can be viewed as doing so via a design of ambiguity. This approach
is similar in nature to the one adopted by di Tillio et al. (2017).
3.A. Preliminary Observations
3.A.1. Axioms and Null-Additive Capacities
Some preliminary claims will be stated explicitly.
Claim 3.1. The following statements hold.
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(a) SCoR implies Certainty, CoR and Coarseness Aversion, and Coarseness Aver-
sion implies Certainty.
(b) SCoI implies CoI.
Proof. (a) First, assume SCoR. Let L = {S}. Then, for every L ∈ L, (L,L) ∈ L .
By construction, HL = HC . Thus, by SCoR, for every L ∈ L and any c, c′ ∈ HC ,
c %L c′ if and only if c %L c′. Certainty is implied. For all (L, L̃) ∈ L , c ∈ HC and
D ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅}, we have CLD[c] ⊂ HL. Thus, CoR holds. Coarseness Aversion is in
an analogy as HC ⊆ HL for all L ∈ L.
Now, assume Coarseness Aversion. Let L = {{s} | s ∈ S}, and fix an L ∈ L \ L
arbitrarily. Then, (L,L) ∈ L . By Coarseness Aversion, for all c, c′ ∈ HC , c %L c′
implies c %L c′, and c L c′ implies c L c′. Thus, c %L c′ if and only if c %L c′.
(b) Set E = E ′ in SCoI. Then, for any (L, L̃) ∈ L , E ∈ L̃, c ∈ HC and any
f, g ∈ CL̃E[c], f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g. Thus, CoI is satisfied. Q.E.D.
The following claims state some properties of null-additive capacities and the cor-
responding Choquet integrals. These properties will be frequently applied to the sub-
sequent proofs. Let X be a nonempty finite set.
Claim 3.2. Let Σ be a σ-algebra of X and v : Σ → [0, 1] be a null-additive capacity.
Suppose β ∈ R++ is a parameter that satisfies 1/β ≥ maxB∈Σ: v(X\B)>0 v(B). Define
a set function m : Σ → [0, 1] by: m(B) = βv(B) if v(X \ B) > 0, and m(B) = 1
otherwise. Then, m is a null-additive capacity on Σ.
Proof. Let v, β and m be as above. First, we show that m is a capacity on Σ.
Let B,D ∈ Σ be such that B ⊂ D. Since v is a capacity, it holds that v(B) ≤ v(D),
and v(X \D) > 0 implies v(X \ B) > 0. Thus, one of the following cases holds. (a1)
v(X \ D) > 0. Then, by definition, m(D) = βv(D) and m(B) = βv(B). Given
that β > 0, we have m(B) ≤ m(D). (a2) v(X \ D) = 0 and v(X \ B) > 0. Then,
it follows that m(D) = 1 and m(B) = βv(B). By assumption, we have v(B) ≤
maxB̃∈Σ:v(X\B̃) v(B̃) ≤ 1/β, which yields m(B) ≤ 1 = m(D). (a3) v(X \ D) = 0 and
v(X \B) = 0. Then, it holds that m(B) = m(D) = 1.
As a result, for all B,D ∈ Σ, B ⊂ D implies m(B) ≤ m(D). Clearly, m(∅) = 0
and m(X) = 1 as m(∅) = βv(∅) and v(X \X) = 0. Hence, m is a capacity on Σ.
Now, we show the null-additivity.
Let D0 ∈ Σ be such that m(D0) = 0. Given that β > 0, by assumption, we have
v(D0) = 0. Let B ∈ Σ be a subset such that B ∩D0 = ∅, and let D = B ∪D0. Since v
is null-additive and v(D0) = 0, it thus follows that v(D) = v(B), and that v(X \B) > 0
if and only if v(X \D) > 0. (b1) v(X \B) > 0. Then, by assumption, m(D) = βv(D)
and m(B) = βv(B). Thus, we have m(D) = m(B). (b2) v(X \ B) = 0. Then, it
follows that m(D) = m(B) = 1.
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Hence, for any disjoint B,D0 ∈ Σ, m(D0) = 0 implies m(B ∪D0) = m(B).
Therefore, m is a null-additive capacity on Σ. Q.E.D.
Claim 3.3. Let L be a partition of X, and denote by Y the set of all bounded
Σ(L)-measurable R-valued functions on X. Let v : Σ(L) → [0, 1] and v′ : Σ(L) →
[0, 1] be capacities. Then, the following statements are equivalent: (i) For all y ∈ Y ,∫
X y dv ≥
∫
X y dv
′; (ii) For all B ∈ Σ(L), v(B) ≥ v′(B).
Proof. Let E denote a typical cell in L.
Define a set Y ⊂ Y by
Y = {y ∈ Y | ∀E ∈ L,∀x ∈ E,∀x′ ∈ X \ E, y(x) 6= y(x′)}.
Given an y ∈ Y , define a set Y [y] ⊂ Y by
Y [y] = {y ∈ Y | ∀x, x′ ∈ X, [y(x) ≥ y(x′)⇒ y(x) ≥ y(x′)]}.
Then, it follows that Y = ⋃y∈Y Y [y].
Let τ : L → {1, . . . , |L|} be a bijection. Given v and τ , define a function vτ :
L → [0, 1] by vτ (E) = v(
⋃ {Ê ∈ L | τ(Ê) ≥ τ(E)}). Similarly, given v′ and τ , define
v′τ : L→ [0, 1] by v′τ (E) = v′(
⋃ {Ê ∈ L | τ(Ê) ≥ τ(E)}).
Given τ and y ∈ Y , let dyτ : L→ R be the function such that: (i) dyτ (E) = y(x) for
x ∈ E if τ(E) = 1; and (ii) for every E ∈ L with τ(E) > 1, dyτ (E) = y(x) − y(x̂) for
x ∈ E and x̂ ∈ Ê, where τ(Ê) = τ(E)− 1.
For every y ∈ Y , let τy be the above mentioned bijection such that for any E, Ê ∈ L,
x ∈ E and x̂ ∈ Ê, τy(E) ≥ τy(Ê) implies y(x)) ≥ y(x̂). Clearly, for every y ∈ Y , such
τy uniquely exists, and yields a permutation of L. Given y ∈ Y and the permutation
(Eτy(E))|L|τy(E)=1 induced by τy, for every y ∈ Y [y], let d
y
τy
∈ R|L|−1+ be the vector given
by dyτy = (d
y
τy
(E2) · · · dyτy(E
|L|)). Analogously, let vτy ,v′τy ∈ R
|L|−1
+ be those induced by
vτy and v′τy , respectively. Given y ∈ Y , let C[y] = {d
y
τy
| y ∈ Y [y]}, and denote by
C∗[y] the dual cone of C[y].






















Therefore, statement (i) holds if and only if for any y ∈ Y , vτy − v′τy ∈ C
∗[y]. Denote
the latter statement by (i0).
For a fixed y ∈ Y , (a) functions in Y [y] are pairwise comonotonic, and (b) for any
y ∈ Y , if y and y are comonotonic, then y ∈ Y [y]. In addition, by the properties of
Choquet integral, for every positive affine transformation a, it holds that
∫
X a ◦ y dv =
a(
∫
X y dv), where a ◦ y denotes the pointwise affine transformation. Thus, it yields
C[y] = R|L|−1+ , meaning that C[y] is self-dual. Note that, for every E ∈ L and y ∈ Y ,
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v′τy(E) = vτy(E) = 1 whenever τy(E) = 1. Therefore, (i0) holds if and only if for any
E ∈ L and y ∈ Y , vτy(E) ≥ v′τy(E).
By construction, for every B ∈ Σ(L), there exist an y ∈ Y and an E ∈ L such that
B = ⋃ {Ê ∈ L | τy(Ê) ≥ τy(E)}. As a result, (i0) holds if and only if for all B ∈ Σ(L),
v(B) ≥ v′(B). Q.E.D.
Claim 3.4. Let L be a partition of X. Let v : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] and v̂ : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] be
a null-additive capacity and a capacity on Σ(L), respectively. Given v, define ∆(L) =
{B ∈ L | v(B) > 0}. Let y : X → R be an arbitrary Σ(L)-measurable function. Then,
the following statements hold.
(a)
∫
X y dv =
∫⋃
∆(L) y dv.
(b) Suppose that for any D ∈ Σ(L), v(D) = 0 if and only if v̂(D) = 0, and that
there is a β ∈ R++ such that for any B ∈ Σ(L), v(B) = 1 when v̂(X \B) = 0
and v(B) = βv̂(B) otherwise. Then,
∫⋃
∆(L)



















(c) Let v, v̂ and β be as in (b). If v̂ is null-additive, then
∫⋃
∆(L)
y dv = β
∫⋃
∆(L)





Proof. Note that y is constant on every E ∈ L. Let yE = y(x) for x ∈ E.
Let p(y) = (E1, . . . , E|L|) be a permutation of L such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|−1},
yEi+1 ≥ yEi . Fix this p(y).
(a) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|}, let yi = yEi , and for any i ∈ {1, . . . , |L| − 1}, let
vi = v(⋃|L|j=iEj) − v(⋃|L|j=i+1Ej), and let v|L| = v(E|L|). Denote by k the set of indices
such that Ek ∈ ∆(L) for any k ∈ k, and let j = {1, . . . , |L|} \ k. Then, by null-




















(b) By the null-additivity of v, we have v(⋃∆(L)) = 1, and for any D ⊂ ∆(L), it
holds that v(X \ (⋃D)) > 0, which is by assumption equivalent to v̂(X \ (⋃D)) > 0.
Thus, by assumption, for any D ⊂ ∆(L), v(⋃D) = βv̂(⋃D).
Let p̂(y) = (E1, . . . , Em) be the permutation of∆(L) induced by p(y). Let y1 = yE1 ,
and for any i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let yi = yEi − yEi−1 , vi = v(
⋃m
j=iE
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Then, for any i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, vi = βv̂i. Therefore, it follows that∫⋃
∆(L)
y dv = y1 +
m∑
i=2
yivi = y1 + β
(




= y1 + β
∫⋃
∆(L)
(y − y11X) dv̂.
Clearly, y1 = minx∈⋃∆(L) y(x). Hence, the statement follows.
(c) Let v, v̂ and β ∈ R++ be as in (b), and suppose that v̂ is null-additive.
Let y = minx∈⋃∆(L) y(x). Then, by (b), it holds that∫⋃
∆(L)







By assumption, for any D ∈ Σ(L), v(D) > 0 if and only if v̂(D) > 0. Thus, it
follows that ∆(L) = {B ∈ L | v̂(B) > 0}. Consequently, by the null-additivity of v̂,
we have v̂(⋃∆L) = 1. As a result, the above equation yields∫⋃
∆(L)










y dv̂ + (1− β)y.
The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
3.A.2. An Auxiliary Lemma
The following auxiliary result states that we have the standard CEU representation
with respect to null-additive capacities for the acts that are Σ(L)-measurable under
each given information frame.
Lemma 3.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(I) {%L}L∈L satisfies the uniform axioms and Certainty.
(II) There exists an affine function u : Π(A) → R, and for every L ∈ L, there is
a unique null-additive capacity VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] such that for all L ∈ L and
f, g ∈ HL,







Moreover, u is unique up to p.l.t.
3.A.2.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
Claim 3.5. For every L ∈ L, the following statements hold.
(a) Under statement (II), Monotonicity-(I) implies Monotonicity-(II) on HL.
(b) CRI-(I) implies CRI-(II) on HL.
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Proof. Fix an L ∈ L and f, g ∈ HL arbitrarily. Assume statement (II).
(a) Assume Monotocinity-(I), and suppose that g L f . Define G,N ⊆ L by
G =
{
Ê ∈ L | ∀t ∈ Ê, g(t) L f(t)
}
;
N = {E0 ∈ L | VL(E0) = 0} .
Then, Monotonicity-(I) implies G 6= ∅ as f, g ∈ HL and g L f . Also, by the null-
additivity of VL, we have N ⊂ L. Suppose that G \N 6= ∅, and fix an Ê ∈ G \N . Set















where uc = u(c(s)) on S, and ûf = u(f(t)), ûg = u(g(t)) for t ∈ Ê. By statement (II),
this inequality is equivalent to [fÊc] ≺L [gÊc]. As a result, f ≺L g implies the existence
of an Ê ∈ L that satisfies [fÊc] ≺L [gÊc]. Thus, under Claim 3.1, Monotonicity-(II)
follows. Therefore, it now suffices to show G \N 6= ∅.
Suppose G \ N = ∅. Then, N ⊂ L yields G ⊂ L. For g, fix a permutation
p(g) = (Eg,(1), . . . , Eg,(|L|)) of L such that u(g(s)) ≥ u(g(t)) for each s ∈ Eg,(i+1) and
t ∈ Eg,(i), and let q(g) = (ug,(1), . . . , ug,(|L|)) be the implied ≥-increasing sequence of






g,(j)) for i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|−1},






VL is null-additive, Eg,(i) ∈ G implies vg,(i) = 0 as G ⊆ N . Hence, given p(g) and q(g),
if define a ≥-increasing sequence q̃(g) = (ũg,(1), . . . , ũg,(|N |)) by
ũg,(i) =
 u
g,(i), Eg,(i) 6∈ G






Eg,(j) 6∈ G, ∃j ≤ i, Eg,(j) 6∈ G
1, ∀j ≤ i, Eg,(j) ∈ G
,
then it follows that ∑|L|i=1 ug,(i)vg,(i) = ∑|L|i=1 ũg,(i)vg,(i). As a result, we have ∫S u(g)dVL =∫
S u(g̃)dVL, where g̃ ∈ HL denotes the act that yields q̃(g) under p(g). Similarly, let
p(f), q(f) and (vf,(i))i=1,...,|L| be the f -counterparts of p(g), q(g) and (vg,(i))i=1,...,|L|.
Given p(f) and q(f), define a sequence q̃(f) = (ũf,(1), . . . , ũf,(|N |)) by
ũf,(i) =
 u
f,(i), Ef,(i) 6∈ G






Ef,(j) 6∈ G, ∃j ≥ i, Ef,(j) 6∈ G
|L|, ∀j ≥ i, Ef,(j) ∈ G
,




f,(i)vf,(i) = ∑|L|i=1 ũf,(i)vf,(i) = ∫S u(f̃)dVL. Moreover, since u(f(s)) ≥ u(g(s)) on
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every E ∈ L \ G, the definitions of q̃(f) and q̃(g) imply that u(f̃(s)) ≥ u(g̃(s)) on




S u(g̃)dVL, meaning that∫
S u(f)dVL ≥
∫
S u(g)dVL. By statement (II), the last inequality is equivalent to f %L g,
which contradicts to g L f . As a result, G \N 6= ∅.
(b) On HL, (b) is trivial. Q.E.D.
Necessity. Order, Monotonicity-(I), CRI-(I) and Certainty hold as direct conse-
quences of Choquet integral. Hence, Claim 3.5 completes the necessity. Q.E.D.
Now, assume statement (I).
Claim 3.6. Suppose that, for a fixed L ∈ L, there exist a u : Π(A) → R and a
capacity V : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] such that I : HL → R given by I(f) =
∫
S u(f)dV represents
%L on HL. Then, V is null-additive.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L. Let N = {E ∈ L | V (E) = 0}.




u(h)dV = V (E)uE(h) + (1− V (E))uc,
where uhE = u(h(s)) on E and uc = u(c(s)) on S.
First, we show that N 6= L. Suppose N = L. Then, for all E ∈ L and f, g ∈ HL,
we have [fEc] ∼L [gEc], where c = fL if gL %L fL, and c = gL otherwise. Thus, by
Monotonicity-(II), for all f, g ∈ HL, f ∼L g, meaning that HC , as well as Π(A), is
%L-indifferent. Under Monotonicity-(I), this in turn implies that H is %L-indifferent,
which contradicts to Nondegeneracy. As a result, N ⊂ L.
Moreover, for any Ê ∈ N , c ∈ HC and h ∈ CLE[c]∩HL, we have I(h) = (1−V (Ê))uc.
Thus, for all Ê ∈ N and c ∈ HC , CLE[c] ∩HL is %L-indifferent
Fix an Ê ∈ N . Let HL(Ê) be the set given by
HL(Ê) =
h ∈ HL
∣∣∣∣ [∀E ∈ L, ∀t ∈ E, ∀s ∈ S \ E, ¬(h(t) ∼L h(s))]∧ [∃s ∈ S \ Ê, ∀t ∈ Ê, h(s) L h(t)]
 .
For a fixed h ∈ HL(Ê), define a set DÊ(h) ⊂ HL by
DÊ(h) =
[cÊh]
∣∣∣∣ c ∈ HC ∧ [∀t ∈ Ê, c(t) L h(t)] ∧[∀s ∈ S \ Ê,∀t ∈ Ê, h(s) %L c(t)⇔ h(s) %L h(t)]
 .
Then, we have h ∈ DÊ(h). Moreover, for any ĥ ∈ DÊ(h), it holds that: (d1) for every
E ∈ L, [ĥEhL] ∈ CLE[hL]∩HL; (d2) for every E ∈ L \ {Ê}, [ĥEhL] = [hEhL]; and (d3)
ĥ and h are comonotonic. Since CL
Ê
[hL]∩HL is %L-indifferent, thus for any ĥ ∈ DÊ(h),
(d1) and (d2) jointly imply that [ĥEhL] ∼L [hEhL] holds for every E ∈ L. Hence, by
Monotonicity-(II), ĥ ∼L h, meaning that DÊ(h) is also %L-indifferent.
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As in the proof of Claim 3.5, define p(h) = (Eh,(1), . . . , Eh,(|L|)), (vh,(i))i and q(h) =
{uh,(1), . . . , uh,(|L|)} with respect to u and V . By (d3), for every ĥ ∈ DÊ(h), p(ĥ)
uniquely exists. Hence, for any ĥ ∈ DÊ(h), we have p(ĥ) = p(h) and (vĥ,(i))i = (vh,(i))i.
Let j be the index such that Ê = Eh,(j) in p(h). Then, by the definition of DÊ(h), for
every ĥ ∈ DÊ(h), uĥ,(i) 6= uh,(i) if and only if i = j. Recall that DÊ(h) is %L-indifferent.
Thus, for any ĥ ∈ DÊ(h), it follows that














⇐⇒ uh,(j)vh,(j) = uĥ,(j)vh,(j).
Since uh,(j) 6= uĥ,(j), the last equality yields vh,(j) = 0. That is, V (B ∪ Ê) = V (B),
where B = ⋃|L|i=j+1Eh,(i).
As a result, for a given h ∈ HL(Ê), DÊ(h) leads to a unique Bh ∈ Σ(L) that
satisfies Bh ∩ Ê = ∅ and V (Bh ∪ Ê) = V (Bh). Note that, for every h ∈ HL(Ê), the
definition of DÊ(h) does not impose any restriction on h. Thus, there exists a mapping
σ : HL(Ê) → Σ(L) such that V (Ê ∪ σ(h)) = V (σ(h)) for any h ∈ HL(Ê). Then, it
holds that {B ∈ Σ(L) | B ∩ Ê = ∅} = {σ(h) | h ∈ HL(Ê)}. Therefore, the proof is
complete as Ê ∈ N is fixed arbitrarily. Q.E.D.
Sufficiency. Fix an arbitrary L̂ ∈ L. Then, %L̂⊂ HL̂ × HL̂ satisfies Order,
Continuity, Monotonicity-(I) and Comonotonic Independence. Hence, by Schmeidler’s
theorem (Schmeidler (1989, .pp 578-579)), there exist an affine function uL̂ : Π(A)→ R
and a unique capacity VL̂ : Σ(L̂)→ [0, 1] such that for any f, g ∈ HL̂,







where uL̂ is unique up to p.l.t. As a result, the above equivalence holds for every L ∈ L
since L̂ is assumed to be arbitrary.
By Certainty, (HC , %L) and (HC , %L̂) are order isomorphic for any L ∈ L. Notice
that Π(A) is a mixture space with respect to the lottery mixture. As a result, for any
L ∈ L, a bounded continuous and strictly increasing function ϕL : R → R exists such
that uL̂ = ϕL ◦ uL. Set u = uL̂. Since u and uL are unique up to p.l.t. with satisfying
mixture linearity, ϕL is thus linear for any L ∈ L. Hence, for every L ∈ L, the previous
equivalence is satisfied by u.
Finally, Claim 3.6 implies that VL is null-additive for every L ∈ L. Q.E.D.
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3.A.3. Utility Acts
Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L. Then, by Lemma 3.1, there exists a uL : Π(A) → R that
represents the induced %L on Π(A) (hence, on HC), and uL is unique up to p.l.t.9
Hence, wlog, suppose that uL(f(s)) ∈ X on S for every f ∈ H, where X ⊂ R is a
closed convex set satisfying [−1, 1] ⊆ X.
For each f ∈ H, define a function ψf : S → X by ψf (s) = (uL ◦ f)(s), and
typically write ψ whenever the choice of f ∈ H does not concern the argument. Let
Ψ = {uL ◦ f | f ∈ H} be the set of all such functions. Let <L⊂ Ψ× Ψ be the binary
relation such that for every ψf , ψg ∈ Ψ,
ψf <L ψg ⇐⇒ f %L g.
Then, ≥ and <L coincide on X. Denote by ΨL and ΨC the set of Σ(L)-measurable
functions and that of constant functions, respectively.
Let ψL be the Ψ-counterparts (with respect to <L) of the one defined on H. Then,
for every ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, it holds that ψL(s) = mins∈S ψ(s) on S. For every D ∈P(S), let
MLD[ψx] be the set of all functions such that ψ = [ψDψx] with [ψDψx](s) ≥ x for all













Claim 3.7. For any L ∈ L, D ∈ P(S) and any ψz ∈ ΨC, MLD and MLD[ψz] are
closed under the mixture (henceforth, convex).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary D ∈P(S). Suppose that ψ, ψ′ ∈ MLD with ψ = [ψDψx]
and ψ′ = [ψ′Dψy], where ψx(s) = x and ψy(s) = y on S. Then, for any α ∈ [0, 1],
we have αψ+ (1−α)ψ′ = [(αψ + (1− α)ψ′)D(αψx + (1− α)ψy)]. Since ψ(s) ≥ x and
ψ′(s) ≥ y for any s ∈ D, it follows that (αψ + (1 − α)ψ′)(s) ≥ (αx + (1 − α)y) for
any s ∈ D, which implies (αψ + (1− α)ψ′) ∈MLD. For any ψz ∈ ΨC , the convexity of
MLD[ψz] can be shown by letting ψx = ψy = ψz in the above proof. Q.E.D.
3.B. Proofs for Section 3.3 and Section 3.4
The proofs are based on all the preliminary observations given in Appendix 3.A.
9In the proof of Lemma 3.1, the existence of uL : Π(A)→ R does not require Certainty.
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3.B.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1
The sufficiency part will be concluded by the following series of claims.
Lemma 3.2. Given an E ∈ L, let LE = {{s} | s ∈ E} ∪ {S \ E}. Then, for every
E ∈ L, there exists a capacity µEL : Σ(LE) → [0, 1] such that for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ MLE,











Moreover, for every E ∈ L, µEL is unique in the sense that if there is another capacity
µ : Σ(LE)→ [0, 1] being such, then µEL (B) = µ(B) for every B ∈P(E).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary E ∈ L. Notice that any ψ ∈ MLE is Σ(LE)-measurable,
and by Claim 3.7,MLE is convex. Then, the restriction of <L onMLE satisfies Order,
Continuity, Monotonicity-(I), Comonotonic Independence, and Nondegeneracy. Thus,
by Schmeidler (1989, the prood of Theorem, .p 579), there exists a unique functional
JE :MLE → R such that for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ MLE, ψ <L ψ′ if and only if JE(ψ) ≥ JE(ψ′),
and satisfies:
(a) ∀ψx ∈ ΨC , JE(ψx) = x;
(b) for any pairwise comonotonic ψ, ψ′, ψ′′ ∈ MLE and α ∈ (0, 1), JE(ψ) > JE(ψ′)
implies JE(αψ + (1− α)ψ′′) > JE(αψ′ + (1− α)ψ′′);
(c) ∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, [∀s ∈ S, ψ(s) ≥ ψ′(s)] =⇒ JE(ψ) ≥ JE(ψ′).
Moreover, for any ψ ∈ MLE, we have ψ(s) ∈ X on S with [−1, 1] ⊆ X, and any
ψ ∈MLE satisfies the following conditions:
(i) t ∈ S \ E =⇒ ψ(t) = mins∈S ψ(s);
(ii) ∀x ∈ X, {s | ψ(s) > x} ∈ (P(E) ∪ {S}) ⊂ Σ(LE).
Define a monotone set function νE : P(E) ∪ {S} → [0, 1] by νE(B) = JE(1B) for
every B ∈ P(E) ∪ {S}, where 1B is the indicator function of B. Then, by Schmei-
dler’s corollary (Schmeidler (1986, .p 258)), νE is the unique monotone set function on









Fix an arbitrary ψ ∈ MLE, and suppose that ψ(t) = mins∈S ψ(s) for some t ∈ E,
wlog. Let (x(i), . . . x(K)) be the permutation of {ψ(s) | s ∈ S} such that x(i) < x(i+1)
for i ∈ {1, . . . K − 1}, and let νE(i) denote the quantity of νE({s ∈ S | ψ(s) ≥ x(i)}).
10Under (a), (b) and (c), Schmeidler’s corollary does not imply that νE is a capacity on Σ(LE).
To see this, let BE = {(S \ E) ∪ B | B ⊂ E}. Then, {BE , {S},P(E)} forms a partition of Σ(LE).
Note that 1B 6∈ MLE for every B ∈ BE as 1B violates (i) when B ∈ BE . Nonetheless, by condition (i)
and ΨC ⊂MLE , Schmeidler’s corollary does imply the suggested representation.
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Since νE is the unique monotone set function that satisfies the above equation, thus if
there is a capacity µ : Σ(LE)→ [0, 1] which satisfies this equation, then µ(B) = νE(B)
holds for every B ∈ (P(E) ∪ {S}). Hence, the claimed uniqueness follows.
Now, it suffices to show that there is an extension, µEL : Σ(LE) → [0, 1], of νE
that forms a capacity on Σ(LE). This is shown by an example as follows. For every
B ∈ Σ(LE), let D(B) = (P(E) ∪ {S}) ∩P(B). Given νE, fix a real number ν ∈
[0, 1− νE(E)] and define a set function µEL : Σ(LE)→ [0, 1] by
µEL (B) =

ν B = S \ E
max
D∈D(B)
νE(D) B 6= S \ E
.
Then, since νE is monotone with respect to the set inclusion, it follows that: (c1)
µEL (∅) = 0 and µEL (S) = 1, (c2) for any B ∈ Σ(LE) and D ∈ P(B) µEL (B) ≥ µEL (D),
and (c3) for any B ∈P(E), µEL (B) = νE(B). Hence, µEL is a capacity on Σ(LE). The
proof is complete as E ∈ L is assumed to be arbitrary. Q.E.D.
Let VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] be the capacity obtained in Lemma 3.1. Denote by I(ψ) the
functional derived in the proposition. That is, I(ψ) =
∫
S ψdVL for every ψ ∈ ΨL. Let
N(L) be the set of all VL-null cells in L. Formally,
N(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) = 0} .
Then, by null-additivity, N(L) 6= L.
Claim 3.8. For every E ∈ L, µEL (E) = VL(E).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary E ∈ L. By construction, ΨL∩MLE 6= ∅. Clearly,MLE∩ΨL
is convex, hence being simply connected. Since JE : MLE → R and I : ΨL → R
represents the same preference <L on MLE ∩ ΨL, there is a continuous and strictly
increasing function ϕE : JE(MLE ∩ ΨL) → R such that for every ψ ∈ MLE ∩ ΨL,
ϕE (JE(ψ)) = I(ψ). Note that ΨC ⊂ (ΨL ∩MLE). Thus, we have ϕE(x) = x for every
x ∈ X. As a result, for every [ψyEψz] ∈ ΨL ∩MLE, it follows that
JE([ψyEψz]) = µEL (E)y + (1− µEL (E))z
= VL(E)y + (1− VL(E))z = I([ψyEψz]),
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where y = ψy(s) and z = ψz(s) on S. Set x = y− z. Since ψz and ψy are arbitrary, the
equality implies that µEL (E)x = VL(E)x for every x ∈ R+. Therefore, for every E ∈ L,
µEL (E) = VL(E) as E is assumed to be arbitrary. Q.E.D.
Claim 3.9. Given a ψ ∈ Ψ and a ψL ∈ ΨL, let ψz ∈ ΨC be the constant function
such that ψz(s) = z = min {mins∈S ψ(s), mins∈S ψL(s)} on S.
(a) Suppose z = mins∈S ψ(s). Then, [ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz] for every E ∈ L if and







(b) Suppose N(L) = ∅. Then, [ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz] for every E ∈ L only if
z = mins∈S ψ(s).
Proof. Fix a ψ ∈ Ψ and a ψL ∈ ΨL arbitrarily. Let x = mins∈S ψ(s) on S.
By construction, it holds that [ψEψz] ∈ MLE and [ψLEψz] ∈ MLE ∩ ΨL for every
E ∈ L. Hence, by Lemma 3.2, [ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz] for every E ∈ L if and only if

















ψdµEL = µEL (E)ψEL ,
where ψEL = ψL(t) for t ∈ E. Under Claim 3.8, it yields that ∀E ∈ L,
[ψEψz] ∼L [ψLEψz]
 ⇐⇒





(a) Set ψz = ψL. Then, for every E ∈ L, [ψLEψx] ∈ MLE ∩ ΨL. Thus, the above
equivalences also hold for x and ψL. Fix an arbitrary E ∈ L. Then, [ψEψL] ∼L




L = VL(E)ψEL . By Claim 3.8, when E ∈ N(L), this
equality becomes trivial as µEL (E) = VL(E) = 0. Yet, since µEL (E) = VL(E) > 0 when






/VL(E). As a result, for every









(b) Suppose N(L) = ∅. It suffices to show mins∈S ψL(s) = z implies z = x. Assume
mins∈S ψL(s) = z. Then, since ψL ∈ ΨL, there is an Ê ∈ L such that [ψLÊψz] = ψz.




L = VL(Ê)z. Under Claim 3.8,




ψ(s)VL(Ê) ≥ VL(Ê)x ≥ VL(Ê)z,





L = VL(Ê)z yields that mins∈Ê ψ(s) = mins∈S ψ(s) = x = z. Q.E.D.
3.B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3.3 AND SECTION 3.4 108
Claim 3.10. Suppose that a mapping QL : Ψ → ΨL exists such that, for every
ψ ∈ Ψ, (i) mins∈S QL(ψ)(s) ≥ mins∈S ψ(s) on S; and (ii) [ψEψL] ∼L [QL(ψ)EψL]






Proof. By (i), it holds that QL(ψ)L <L ψL for every ψ ∈ Ψ. Hence, under
Monotonicity-(II), condition (ii) implies that ψ ∼L QL(ψ). Therefore, by transitiv-
ity, for every ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, ψ <L ψ′ if and only if QL(ψ) <L QL(ψ′). Note that
QL(ψ), QL(ψ′) ∈ ΨL. Thus, by Lemma 3.1, ψ %L ψ′ if and only if I(QL(ψ)) ≥
I(QL(ψ′)), where for any ψL ∈ ΨL, I(ψ) =
∫
S ψLdVL.
Recall that VL is null-additive, and that L \ N(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) > 0}. As a
result, by Claim 3.4-(a), for any ψL ∈ ΨL, I(ψL) =
∫⋃
(L\N(L)) ψLdVL. Q.E.D.
Sufficiency. Let ∆(L) = L \N(L).
Let QL : Ψ → ΨL be a mapping such that mins∈S QL(ψ)(s) ≥ mins∈S ψ(s) on S.
Then, by Claim 3.9-(a), QL satisfies condition (ii) in Claim 3.10 if and only if for any






/VL(E). Therefore, a mapping













xÊ + mins∈S ψ(s)
)
1Ê,
where xÊ ∈ R+ for each Ê ∈ N(L).














Therefore, by Claim 3.10, for any ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ,
ψ <L ψ














Let BL = (
⋃
E∈L P(E)) ∪Σ(L), and define a set function v : BL → [0, 1] by
v(B) =

VL(B), B ∈ Σ(L);
µEL (B), ∃E ∈ ∆(L), B ⊆ E;
0, otherwise.
Note that (⋃E∈L P(E)) ∩ Σ(L) = L, and by Claim 3.8, VL(E) = µEL (E) for every
E ∈ L. Thus, v is well-defined. Since VL and each µEL : Σ(LE) → [0, 1] are monotone
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with respect to the set inclusion, Claim 3.8 implies that v is also monotone. By null-
additivity, VL(
⋃
∆(L)) = VL(S) = 1, meaning that v(
⋃
∆(L)) = 1. Hence, v is the
unique monotone set function on BL such that v(
⋃











 dv, ∀ψ ∈ Ψ.
Given that v(⋃∆(L)) = 1, any monotone extension vL : P(S) → [0, 1] of v
satisfies equivalence in Eq (3.2) with respect to the above equation, and any such vL
forms a capacity on P(S). Hence, the existence of capacity vL on P(S) follows. The
uniqueness of v proves the second statement in (II).
Finally, the null-additivity of VL implies ∆(L) 6= ∅. Q.E.D.
Necessity. Order, Continuity and Monotonicity-(I) are trivial.
CRI-(I) is implied by Lemma 3.1, while Lemma 3.2 concludes CRI-(II).
Monotonicity-(II) follows the equivalences in Claim 3.9 and Claim 3.10. Q.E.D.
3.B.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2
First, we show the sufficiency part. The proof will follow all the notations and
claims given in Appendix 3.A and Appendix 3.B.1.
Under Certainty, Lemma 3.1 implies that {uL}L∈L can be fixed by a u : Π(A)→ R,
meaning that {ψ 7→ ψL}L∈L is not subject to L ∈ L. Accordingly, for every L, L̃ ∈ L,
it holds thatMLE =ML̃E whenever E ∈ L∩ L̃. Thus, in what follows, we simply write
ψ andME, respectively.
Let L = {S} and L = {{s} | s ∈ S}. Let V̂ : P(S) → [0, 1] denote the null-
additive capacity obtained in Corollary 3.1.1-(II). Denote by V : P(S) → [0, 1] the
unique capacity obtained in Corollary 3.1.1-(I), and letN(S) be the set of V -null events.
Formally, N(S) = {B ∈ P(S) | V (B) = 0}. Given an L ∈ L, let VL : Σ(L) → [0, 1]
be the null-additive capacity obtained in Lemma 3.1. Then, V̂ = VL in particular.
Claim 3.11. Under Certainty and CoI, the following statements hold.
(a) For every L ∈ L and any E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) implies E 6∈ N(S).
(b) For any L ∈ L and every E ∈ ∆(L), there exists a ϑEL ∈ R++ such that for
every B ∈P(E), µEL (B) = ϑELV (B).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L.
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(a) Fix an E ∈ L and a ψx ∈ ΨC , where x = ψx(s) on S. Consider ψ, ψ′ ∈ME[ψx].
Then, by Lemma 3.2,
ψ <L ψ







Since µEL is monotone and JL(ψ) ≥ x holds for any ψ ∈ ME[ψx], thus ME[ψx] is
not <L-indifferent if and only if µEL (E) > 0. Hence, by Claim 3.8, for any ψx ∈ ΨC ,
ME[ψx] is not <L-indifferent if and only if E ∈ ∆(L).
Suppose that E ∈ ∆(L). Then, for any ψx ∈ ΨC , there exist ψ, ψ′ ∈ ME[ψx]
such that ψ L ψ′. Thus, by CoI, ψ L ψ′ holds for every such ψ, ψ′ ∈ ME[ψx],
meaning that ME[ψx] is not <L-indifferent for any ψx ∈ ΨC . By Corollary 3.1.1-(I),
this statement is equivalent to V (E) > 0. As a result, E ∈ ∆(L) implies E 6∈ N(S).
(b) Fix an E ∈ ∆(L) and a ψz ∈ ΨC arbitrarily. Then, by CoI, for any ψ, ψ′ ∈
ME[ψz] \ {ψz}, ψ <L ψ′ if and only if ψ <L ψ′. By Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.1.1-(I),














E ψdV + (1− V (E))z. Thus,












By (a), E ∈ ∆(L) implies E 6∈ N(S), meaning that V (E) > 0 and µEL (E) > 0.
Let [ψyEψz] ∈ ME[ψz] ∩ ΨL, and suppose ψy(s) = y > z on S. Clearly, it holds
that
∫
E [ψyEψz]dµEL = µEL (E)y and
∫
E [ψyEψz]dV = V (E)y. Set ϑEL = µEL (E)/V (E).
Then, since V (E) > 0 and µEL (E) > 0, we have ϑEL > 0. Therefore, by CoI, for every




L = µEL (E)y =
ϑELV (E)y = ϑEL (
∫






holds for any ψ ∈ ME \ ΨC . As a result, this equality yields that µEL (B) = ϑELV (B)
for every B ∈P(E). Q.E.D.
Sufficiency. By Claim 3.9 and Claim 3.10, the equivalence obtained in Eq (3.2)
holds for every L. Given QL and QL in Eq (3.2), define a functional Q : Ψ×L → R and
a mapping Q : Ψ × L → Ψ respectively by Q(ψ,L) = QL(ψ) and Q(ψ,L) = QL(ψ).
Then, for all L ∈ L and ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ, ψ <L ψ′ if and only if Q(ψ,L) ≥ Q(ψ′, L).
Probing further, by Claim 3.11-(a), for any L ∈ L, ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) >
0} ⊆ {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}. By Claim 3.8 and Claim 3.11-(b), for every L ∈ L and
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For every L ∈ L, VL is null-additive on Σ(L), and Q(ψ,L) ∈ ΨL for any ψ ∈ Ψ.











V (E) . (3.3)
Q.E.D.
Necessity. Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits a representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L).
(Uniform Axioms) Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L. Since ∆(L) ⊆ {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0},
we have V (E) > 0 whenever VL(E) > 0. Let BL = (
⋃
E∈L P(E)) ∪Σ(L) and define a
monotone set function vL : BL → [0, 1] by
vL(B) =

VL(B), B ∈ Σ(L);
V (B)VL(E)
V (E) , B ∈P(E), E ∈ ∆(L);
0, otherwise,
∀B ∈ BL.












By the uniqueness of VL, vL is the unique monotone set function on BL with satisfying
the above equation. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, uniform axioms hold.
(CoI) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary.
For any Ẽ ∈ L̃ and any c ∈ HC , CL̃Ẽ[c] is not %L̃-indifferent if and only if Ẽ ∈ ∆(L̃).
Fix an Ẽ ∈ ∆(L̃) and a c ∈ HC arbitrarily. Let E ∈ L be the unique cell such that
Ẽ ⊆ E. Recall that ∆(L) ⊆ {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0} and ∆(L̃) ⊆ {E ∈ L̃ | V (E) > 0}.
Thus, by the monotonicity of V , Ẽ ∈ ∆(L̃) implies E ∈ ∆(L). In turn, we have
V (E) > 0 and V (Ẽ) > 0. Consequently, for any h ∈ CL̃
Ẽ
[c], it holds that






U(h, L) = ϑ
(∫
Ẽ









where ϑ̃ = VL̃(Ẽ)/V (Ẽ) > 0, ϑ = VL(E)/V (E) > 0, β = (V (Ẽ)VL(E))/V (E) and
uc = u(c(s)) on S.
Therefore, for any f, g ∈ CL̃
Ẽ
[c], U(f, L̃) ≥ U(g, L̃) if and only if
∫
Ẽ u(f)dV ≥∫




Ẽ u(g)dV . As a result,
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3.B.3. Proof of Theorem 3.3
First, we show the necessity part.
Claim 3.12. Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ,ω).
For every L ∈ L, define a set function VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] by: VL(B) = ωLV̂ (B) if V̂ (S\
B) > 0, and VL(B) = 1 otherwise. Then, {%L}L∈L admits the FAEU representation
(u, V, {VL}L∈L).
Proof. Let {%L}L∈L and {VL}L∈L be as assumed.
By definition, for every L ∈ L \ L, 1/ωL ≥ 1, and V̂ is null-additive. These yield
1/ωL ≥ 1 ≥ maxB∈Σ(L):V̂ (S\B)>0 V̂ (B), meaning that for all L ∈ L \ {L}, VL and V̂
satisfy the assumptions of Claim 3.2. Therefore, for every L ∈ L, VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] is
a null-additive capacity.
Given the defined family {VL}L∈L, for every L ∈ L, let ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) >
0}. Then, it follows trivially that Ω(L) = ∆(L) holds for all L ∈ L.
Hence, for all L ∈ L, V̂ and VL satisfy the assumptions of Claim 3.4-(b). Therefore,












Given that the tuple (u, V, V̂ ,ω) is unique, for every L ∈ L, VL : Σ(L) → [0, 1]
defined above is the unique null-additive capacity that satisfies Eq (3.4).
As a result, {%L}L∈L admits the FAEU (u, V, {VL}L∈L). Q.E.D.
Necessity. Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits a representation (u, V, V̂ ,ω). Then, by
Claim 3.12, {%L}L∈L admits FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L), where {VL}L∈L is
induced by V̂ and ω as in the claim. Thus, Theorem 3.2 proves the uniform axioms,
Certainty and CoI.
(Coarseness Aversion) Given Certainty, we only need to consider L \ {L}.
Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be such that L 6= L and L̃ 6= L.
By the definition in Claim 3.12, VL and VL̃ are null-additive. Thus, by Claim 3.4-




S u(f)dVL, and so does for VL̃
and L̃. Moreover, under the definition in Claim 3.12, ωL̃ ≥ ωL implies that for every
B ∈ Σ(L), VL̃(B) ≥ VL(B). Thus, by Claim 3.3, for all h ∈ HL, it holds that∫
S u(h)dVL̃ ≥
∫
S u(h)dVL. That is, for all h ∈ HL, Uω(h, L̃) ≥ Uω(h, L).
Since Uω(c, L) = Uω(c, L̃) holds for all (L, L̃) ∈ L and c ∈ HC , the above inequality
is equivalent to Coarseness Aversion.
(CoR) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary, and let {VL}L∈L be the aforementioned family.
3.B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3.3 AND SECTION 3.4 113
Recall that VL : Σ(L) → [0, 1] is null-additive, and that Ω(L) = ∆(L) ⊆ {E ∈
L | V (E) > 0}. Thus by Eq (3.4) and Claim 3.4-(a), for any h ∈ HL, Uω(h, L) =∫
S u(h)dVL and Uω(h, L̃) =
∫
S u(h)dVL̃. Note that ωL, ωL̃ ∈ R++. Hence, by the
definition given in Claim 3.12, for any D ∈ Σ(L), V̂ (S \ D) > 0 implies VL(D) =
βVL̃(D), where β = ωL/ωL̃ > 0.
Suppose that there exist D,D′ ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅}, a c ∈ HC , an f ∈ CLD[c] ∩ HL and











where uc = u(c(s)) on S. Note that both sides of the above inequalities are non-
negative as f ∈ CLD[c] ∩HL and g ∈ CLD′ [c] ∩HL. Suppose that VL(B) = βVL̃(B) holds
for every B ∈ ((P(D)∪P(D′))∩Σ(L)). Then, it follows that
∫
D (u(f)− uc1S)dVL =
β
∫
D (u(f)− uc1S)dVL̃ and
∫
D′ (u(g)− uc1S)dVL = β
∫
D′ (u(g)− uc1S)dVL̃. Given that
β > 0, the above pair of inequalities is self-contradictory. Therefore, there exists a
B ∈ ((P(D) ∪ P(D′)) ∩ Σ(L)) such that VL(B) 6= βVL̃(B). Fix this B. Then,
by the definition given in Claim 3.12, we have V̂ (S \ B) = 0. Suppose that, wlog,
B ∈ (P(D)∩Σ(L)). Then, the monotonicity of V̂ implies V̂ (S \D) = 0, meaning that⋃
Ω(L) ⊆ D. Hence, for any h ∈ CLS\D[c], it yields that Uω(h, L) = uc as h(s) = c(s)
on ⋃Ω(L). That is, CLS\D[c] is %L-indifferent.
As a result, for any D,D′ ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅} and any c ∈ HC , if there exist f ∈
CLD[c] ∩ HL and g ∈ CLD′ [c] ∩ HL such that f %L g and f ≺L̃ g, then either CLS\D[c] or
CLS\D′ [c] is %L-indifferent. CoR holds. Q.E.D.
The sufficiency part will follow all the notations and claims given in Appendix 3.A.
Suppose {%L}L∈L satisfies the given axioms. By Claim 3.1-(b), Certainty is implied.
Thus, by Theorem 3.2, {%L}L∈L admits an FAEU (u, V, {VL}L∈L). Fix this tuple, and
let V̂ denote the null-additive capacity VL.
Claim 3.13. Under Certainty and CoR, the following statements hold.
(a) For any L ∈ L and any B ∈ Σ(L), VL(B) > 0 if and only if V̂ (B) > 0.
(b) For any L ∈ L, an ωL ∈ R++ exists such that, for every B ∈ Σ(L), V̂ (S\B) >
0 implies VL(B) = ωLV̂ (B).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L.
(a) Fix a B ∈ Σ(L). For any ψz ∈ ΨC and any ψ ∈ME[ψz] ∩ΨL, we have∫
S
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where z = ψz(s) on S. Thus, by Lemma 3.1, VL(B) = 0 if and only ifME[ψz] ∩ΨL is
<L-indifferent for any ψz ∈ ΨC .
Suppose that VL(B) = 0. Then, ME[ψz] ∩ ΨL is <L-indifferent for any ψz ∈ ΨC ,
and by null-additivity, VL(S \B) = 1. Under Nondegeneracy, this in turn implies that
MS\B[ψz] is not <L-indifferent. Thus, by CoR, <L=<L on MB[ψz] ∩ ΨL, meaning
that MB[ψz] ∩ ΨL is also <L-indifferent. Since Σ(L) ⊆ Σ(L) implies ΨL ⊆ ΨL, by
Lemma 3.1,MB[ψz]∩ΨL is <L-indifferent if and only if V̂ (B) = 0. Hence, VL(B) = 0
implies V̂ (B) = 0.
Suppose that VL(B) > 0, and that there is a ψz ∈ ΨC such thatMS\B[ψz] is <L-
indifferent. Similarly, we have VL(S \B) = 0, and hence VL(B) = 1 by null-additivity.
Under Nondegeneracy, the latter implies that MB[ψz] is not <L-indifferent for every
ψz ∈ ΨC . Thus, by CoR, for any ψz ∈ ΨC , <L=<L on MS\B[ψz] ∩ ΨL, meaning
that V̂ (S \ B) = 0. By null-additivity, it yields that V̂ (B) = 1. Now, assume that
VL(B) > 0, and thatMS\B[ψz] is not <L-indifferent for any ψz ∈ ΨC . Then, by CoR,
<L=<L onMB[ψz] ∩ΨL, meaning thatMB[ψz] ∩ΨL is not <L-indifferent. Thus, by
Lemma 3.1, V̂ (B) > 0. Therefore, VL(B) > 0 implies V̂ (B) > 0.
As a result, for any B ∈ Σ(L), VL(B) > 0 if and only if V̂ (B) > 0.
(b) Let B = {B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S, ∅} | V̂ (S \ B) > 0}. Fix an arbitrary B ∈ B. By
(a), we have VL(S \ B) > 0, which implies that MS\B[ψz] is not <L-indifferent for
any ψz ∈ ΨC . Thus, by CoR, for any ψz ∈ ΨC , <L=<L onMB[ψz] ∩ ΨL. Note that
(MB[ψz] ∩ ΨL) ⊆ ΨL = Ψ, and that, by Claim 3.7, MB[ψz] ∩ ΨL is convex. Thus,
by Lemma 3.1, IL(ψ) =
∫
S ψdVL and Î(ψ) =
∫
S ψdV̂ represent the same preference
on MB[ψz] ∩ ΨL. Therefore, for any ψz ∈ ΨC , there exists a continuous and strictly








where Î(MB[ψz] ∩ΨL) denotes the range of Î onMB[ψz] ∩ΨL.
Recall that, for any ψ ∈ ψ and every s ∈ S, ψ(s) ∈ X ⊂ R, and that [−1, 1] ⊆ X.
Let 0 denote the constant function that assigns 0 to every s ∈ S. Then, for every
D ∈ Σ(L) ∩P(B) and any x ∈ Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL), we have x1D ∈ MB[0] ∩ ΨL. Thus,
by Eq (3.5) and comonotonic additivity, ϕB,0 : Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL) → R+ satisfies: (d1)
ϕB,0(0) = 0; (d2) for any α ∈ (0, 1) and any x, y ∈ Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL), αϕB,0(x) + (1 −
α)ϕB,0(y) = ϕB,0(αx + (1 − α)y); and (d3) for every D ∈ Σ(L) ∩P(B), VL(D) =
ϕB,0(V̂ (D)).
To see that (d2) is satisfied, let ψ, ψ′ ∈ MB[0] ∩ ΨL be arbitrary comonotonic
functions. Due to Claim 3.7, for any α ∈ (0, 1), we have (αψ+(1−α)ψ′) ∈MB[0]∩ΨL.
In addition, by comonotonic additivity, IL(αψ + (1− α)ψ′) = αIL(ψ) + (1− α)IL(ψ′)
and Î(αψ + (1− α)ψ′) = αÎ(ψ) + (1 − α)Î(ψ′). Thus, under Eq (3.5), it follows that
αϕB,0(Î(ψ))+(1−α)ϕB,0(Î(ψ′)) = ϕB,0(Î(αψ+(1−α)ψ′)) = ϕB,0(αÎ(ψ)+(1−α)Î(ψ′)).
Since ψ and ψ′ are arbitrary, so are Î(ψ) and Î(ψ′) in Î(MB[0]∩ΨL). Thus, (d2) holds.
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By (d1) and (d2), ϕB,0 is linear on Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL) and there exists a ωBL ∈ R++
such that ϕB,0(x) = ωBLx, where the strict positiveness is implied by (a).
Let B,B′ ∈ B be arbitrary, and suppose that Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL) ⊆ Î(MB′ [0] ∩ ΨL).
By CoR, for any ψ ∈ MB[0] ∩ ΨL and ψ′ ∈ MB′ [0] ∩ ΨL, ψ ∼L ψ′ if and only
if ψ ∼L ψ′. Thus, by Eq (3.5), for any x ∈ Î(MB[0] ∩ ΨL), it holds that ωBLx =
ϕB,0(x) = ϕB′,0(x) = ωB
′
L x, which yields ωBL = ωB
′
L . As a result, by (d3), a unique
ωL ∈ R++ exists such that, for any B ∈ B, VL(B) = ωLV̂ (B). Q.E.D.
Claim 3.14. Under Coarseness Aversion, (a) for any (L, L̃) ∈ L such that L 6= L
and L̃ 6= L, ωL ≤ ωL̃; and (b) for all L ∈ L \ {L}, ωL ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. (a) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary, and suppose L 6= L and L̃ 6= L.
Let IL and IL̃ denote the functionals on ΨL given by IL(ψ) =
∫
S ψdVL and IL̃(ψ) =∫
S ψdVL̃, respectively. By Lemma 3.1, IL represents <L on ΨL, and IL̃ represents <L̃
on ΨL. Thus, by Coarseness Aversion, for all ψ ∈ ΨL, we have IL(ψ) ≤ IL̃(ψ).
Therefore, by Claim 3.3, for all B ∈ Σ(L), VL(B) ≤ VL̃(B). Recall that VL, VL̃
and V̂ are null-additive. Thus, by Claim 3.13-(b) implies that for all B ∈ Σ(L),
VL(B) = ωLV̂ (B) and VL̃ = ωL̃V̂ (B) whenever V̂ (S \ B) > 0, where ωL, ωL̃ ∈ R++.
Under null-additivity, Claim 3.13-(b) also implies that VL(B) = VL̃(B) = V̂ (B) = 1
whenever V̂ (S \ B) = 0. As a result, VL(B) ≤ VL̃(B) holds for all B ∈ Σ(L) if and
only if ωL ≤ ωL̃.
(b) Given VL = V̂ , Claim 3.13-(b) implies that ωL = 1. Thus, (b) is a direct
consequence of (a) since for all L ∈ L \ {L}, (L,L) ∈ L . Q.E.D.
Sufficiency. Let Q and Q be the functional and mapping given in Eq (3.3).
Under the uniform axioms, Certainty and CoI, Q represents {<L}L∈L on Ψ with
respect to V and {VL}L∈L fixed above.
For every L ∈ L, let Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V̂ (E) > 0}. Then, Claim 3.13-(a) implies
that Ω(L) = ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) > 0}. Thus, by null-additivity and Claim 3.11-
(a), Ω(L) 6= ∅ and Ω(L) ⊆ {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.
Under Claim 3.13-(a)(b), for any L ∈ L, VL and V̂ satisfy the assumptions in
Claim 3.4-(c). In particular, the assumptions are vacuous for L. As a result, by


















Claim 3.14 concludes the rest of the proof. Q.E.D.
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3.B.3.1. Proof of Corollary 3.3.1
Sufficiency. By Claim 3.1, SCoR implies Coarseness Aversion and CoR. Thus,
by Theorem 3.3, {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ,ω).
Hence, it suffices to show ωL = 1 for every L ∈ L \ {L}.
Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L \ {L}. Then, we have HC ⊆ HL ⊂ HL = H, and by SCoR,
%L=%L on HL×HL. Thus, for any h ∈ HL and any c ∈ HC , U(h, L) = U(c, L) if and
only if U(h, L) = U(c, L). Let uc = u(c(s)) on S. Then, we have U(c, L) = U(c, L) = uc,
which implies U(h, L) = U(h, L).
Note that, (i) for any h ∈ HL, U(h, L)(s) = u(h(s))1⋃Ω(L) and U(h, L)(s) =
u(h(s))1⋃Ω(L) on S; (ii) Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V̂ (E) > 0} and Ω(L) = {{s} | V̂ ({s}) > 0};
(iii) V̂ : P(S) → [0, 1] is null-additive; and (iv) ωL = 1. By (i), (ii) and (iii), for any
h ∈ HL, it holds that
∫⋃
Ω(L) U(h, L)dV̂ =
∫⋃
Ω(L) U(h, L)dV̂ =
∫⋃
Ω(L) u(h)dV̂ =∫
S u(h)dV̂ . Thus, under (iv), for any h ∈ HL, we have
U(h, L) = ωL
∫⋃
Ω(L)




















Ω(L) u(h)dV̂ ≥ mins∈⋃Ω(L) u(h(s)). Since the above equality holds for any
h ∈ HL, it thus follows that ωL = 1.
The proof is complete as L ∈ L \ {L} is assumed to be arbitrary. Q.E.D.
Necessity. Assume statement (II).
By Theorem 3.3, the uniform axioms and CoI are satisfied.
(SCoR) Since V̂ : P(S) → [0, 1] is null-additive, by Claim 3.4-(a), for any L ∈ L




S u(h)dV̂ . This implies that USCoR(h, L) =
USCoR(h, L). Fix a (L, L̃) ∈ L . Then, we have HL ⊂ HL̃. Thus, it follows that
USCoR(h, L) = USCoR(h, L̃) = USCoR(h, L). As a result, for any (L, L̃) ∈ L and any
f, g ∈ HL, f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g. Q.E.D.
3.B.4. Proof of Theorem 3.4
Suppose {%L}L∈L satisfies the axioms. By Claim 3.1-(b), CoI is also satisfied. By
Theorem 3.2, {%L}L∈L admits an FAEU (u, V, {VL}L∈L). Fix this tuple. Let V̂ denote
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the null-additive capacity VL. For every L ∈ L and E ∈ L, let ϑEL , ωL ∈ R++ be the
numbers respectively obtained in Claim 3.11-(b) and Claim 3.13-(b).
Claim 3.15. Under Certainty, CoR and SCoI, the following statements hold.
(a) For any L ∈ L and E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) if and only if V (E) > 0.
(b) For any L ∈ L, there exists a unique ϑL ∈ R++ such that for any E ∈ L,
VL(E) = ϑLV (E).
(c) For any B ∈P(S), V̂ (B) = ϑLV (B) whenever V (S \B) > 0.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L \ {L}. Then, (L,L) ∈ L .
(a) By Claim 3.11-(a), for any E ∈ L, E ∈ ∆(L) implies V (E) > 0. Hence, it
suffices to show the opposite direction. Let E ∈ L, and suppose that E 6∈ ∆(L). Then,
by Lemma 3.2, ME[ψz] is <L-indifferent for any ψz ∈ ΨC . Thus, SCoI implies that
ME[ψz] is also <L-indifferent for all ψz ∈ ΨC . By Nondegeneracy and Corollary 3.1.1-
(I), it follows that V (E) = 0. As a result, V (E) > 0 implies E ∈ ∆(L).
(b) Let E,E ′ ∈ L. Fix an arbitrary ψx ∈ ΨC , and suppose that ψ ∈ME[ψx]\{ψx}
and ψ′ ∈ME′ [ψx] \ {ψx} satisfy ψ ∼L ψ′. Then, SCoI implies ψ ∼L ψ′.













ψdV + (1− V (E))x =
∫
E′




ψdV − V (E)x =
∫
E′
ψ′dV − V (E ′)x,
where x = ψx(s) on S. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2, JE and JE′ represents <L on
ME andME′ respectively. By definition, ΨC =ME∩ME′ , and JE(ψz) = JE′(ψz) = z
for every ψz ∈ ΨC , where z = ψz(s) on S. Thus, by transitivity, ψ ∼L ψ′ if and only if
JE(ψ) = JE′(ψ′). Similarly, JE(ψ) = JE′(ψ′) yields∫
E








Since (a) implies that there is no E ∈ L satisfying V (E) > 0 and E 6∈ ∆(L), thus
Claim 3.11-(b) holds for any E ∈ L. As a result, under Claim 3.11-(b), the above









ψdV − V (E)x
)
.
Hence, ϑEL = ϑE
′
L as E,E ′, ψx, ψ and ψ′ are chosen arbitrarily.
Let ϑL = ϑEL for an E ∈ L. Then, ϑL is the unique number satisfies the claim.
(c) By (a) and Claim 3.13-(a), it holds that for any B ∈ P(S), V̂ (B) > 0 if and
only if V (B) > 0. By (b), there is a unique ϑL ∈ R++ such that VL(E) = ϑLV (E)
holds for any E ∈ L. Thus, by Claim 3.13-(b), for any E ∈ L, if V (S \ E) > 0, then
VL(E) = ωLV̂ (E) = ϑLV (E). Fix such an E ∈ L, and let L̃ ∈ L be a partition such that
E ∈ (L∩ L̃). Similarly, for every such L̃, we have VL̃(E) = ωL̃V̂ (E) = ϑL̃V (E). Given
that ωL, ωL̃, ϑL, ϑL̃ ∈ R++, we have V̂ (E) = (ϑL/ωL)V (E) = (ϑL̃/ωL̃)V (E), which
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implies (ϑL/ωL) = (ϑL̃/ωL̃). Thus, for any L, L̃ ∈ L, L ∩ L̃ 6= ∅ implies (ϑL/ωL) =
(ϑL̃/ωL̃).
As a result, for any L ∈ L \ {L}, (ϑL/ωL) = (ϑL/ωL).
To see this is satisfied, let (L1, . . . , Ln) be an n-sequence of partitions such that:
(i) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, (Li, Li+1) ∈ L with |Li+1| − |Li| = 1; and (ii) L1 = L
and Ln = L. Then, for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, Li ∩ Li+1 6= ∅. Thus, it holds that
(ϑLi/ωLi) = (ϑLi+1/ωLi+1). As a result, for any i ∈ {2, . . . , n−1}, (ϑLi/ωLi) = (ϑL/ωL).
Clearly, L is a partial order over L, and the partially ordered set (L,L ) forms a lattice.
Thus, L is the union of all such n-sequences, due to which, the aforementioned equality
holds for every L ∈ L \ {L}.
By Claim 3.13-(b), ωL = 1. Then, for any L ∈ L \ {L}, (ϑL/ωL) = ϑL. As a result,
for any B ∈P(S), V̂ (B) = ϑLV (B) whenever V (S \B) > 0. Q.E.D.
Sufficiency. Let Q and Q be as in Eq (3.3). By Theorem 3.2, Q represents
{<L}L∈L on Ψ with respect to V and {VL}L∈L fixed above.
By Claim 3.15-(c), for any B ∈P(S), V̂ (B) > 0 if and only if V (B) > 0. For every
L ∈ L, let Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V̂ (E) > 0}. Then, by Claim 3.13-(a) and Claim 3.15-(a),
it follows that Ω(L) = ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) > 0}.
For all L ∈ L\{L}, set ϑL = ωLϑL. Given the above observation, by Claim 3.13-(b)
and Claim 3.15-(c), the following statement is satisfied:
(P ) : ∀L ∈ L,∀B ∈ Σ(L), V (S \B) > 0 =⇒ VL(B) = ϑLV (B).
Thus, for every L ∈ L \ {L}, the defined ϑL coincides with the one obtained in
Claim 3.15-(b). In particular, by Claim 3.11-(b) and Claim 3.15-(b), ϑL = 1 and
VL(B) = ϑLV (B) holds for all B ∈ Σ(L). Hence, for any L ∈ L, null-additive capacity
VL and V satisfy the assumptions of Claim 3.4-(b) with respect to ϑL.




{Q(ψ,L)− qL(ψ)1S} dV + qL(ψ),
where qL(ψ) = mins∈⋃Ω(L) Q(ψ,L)(s).
Finally, property (P) proves statement (2) in Definition 3.4. Q.E.D.
Necessity. Suppose {%L}L∈L admits an S-FAEU representation (u, V,ϑ). Let US
be the functional.
For all L ∈ L, let VL be the null-additive capacity defined as in Definition 3.4-(2).
Then, for every L ∈ L, Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) > 0}. Thus, by Claim 3.4, for all
L ∈ L and h ∈ H, it holds that US(h, L) =
∫⋃
Ω(L) U(h, L)dVL. Therefore, {%L}L∈L
admits the FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L). As a result, Theorem 3.2 proves he
uniform axioms and Certainty.
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(CoR) Given Certainty, we only need to consider partitions in L \ {L}.
Let (L, L̃) ∈ L be arbitrary such that L 6= L and L̃ 6= L, and let VL and VL̃
be the null-additive capacities defined above. Then, by Claim 3.4-(a), for all f ∈
HL, US(h, L) =
∫
S u(h)dVL and US(h, L̃) =
∫
S u(h)dVL̃. Set β = ϑL/ϑL̃. Then, by
Definition 3.4-(2), for all B ∈ Σ(L), VL̃(S \D) > 0 implies VL(D) = βVL̃(D).
The rest part is exactly same as that in the necessity of CoR for Theorem 3.3.
(SCoI) Let (L, L̃) ∈ L , E,E ′ ∈ L̃, and c ∈ HC be arbitrary. Given these, fix an
f ∈ CL̃E[c] and a g ∈ CL̃E′ [c] arbitrarily. Denote by D and D′ the cells in L that satisfy
E ⊆ D and E ′ ⊆ D′. Let uc = u(c(s)) on S.
Suppose that E,E ′ 6∈ Ω(L̃). Then, since Ω(L̃) = {E ∈ L̃ | V (E) > 0}, it thus holds
that U(f, L̃) = U(g, L̃) = [(u◦c)(⋃Ω(L̃))0] and U(f, L) = U(g, L) = [(u◦c)(⋃Ω(L))0].
As a result, we have US(f, L̃) = US(g, L̃) = US(f, L) = US(g, L) = uc, meaning that
f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g.
Suppose that, wlog, E ∈ Ω(L̃). Let m̃(f) = mins∈⋃Ω(L̃) U(f, L̃) and m(f) =
mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(f, L). Given that E ∈ Ω(L̃), exactly one of the following cases holds.
Case 1) Ω(L̃) = {E}. Then, by the monotonicity of V , Ω(L) = {D}. Then,
it follows immediately that US(h, L̃) = m̃(f) and US(h, L) = m(f), where m̃(f) =
(1/V (E))
∫
E u(f)dV and m(f) = (1/V (D))(
∫
E u(f)dV + (V (D) − V (E))uc). Since
f ∈ CL̃E[c], it thus holds that
∫
E u(f)dV ≥ V (E)uc. Hence, we have US(f, L̃) ≥ uc and
US(f, L) ≥ uc. Moreover, E ′ 6∈ Ω(L̃) implies that US(g, L̃) = US(g, L) = uc. As a
result, we have US(f, L̃) ≥ US(g, L̃) and US(f, L) ≥ US(g, L).
Case 2) E ′ 6∈ Ω(L̃), Ω(L) = {D} and Ω(L̃) is not singleton. Then, it still holds that
US(g, L̃) = US(g, L) = uc. As in Case 1, Ω(L) = {D} implies that US(f, L) = m(f) =
(1/V (D))(
∫
E u(f)dV + (V (D) − V (E))uc). Similarly, we have US(f, L) ≥ US(g, L).
Since Ω(L̃) is not singleton and f ∈ CL̃E[c], thus m̃(f) = uc, meaning that
US(f, L̃) = ϑL̃
∫
E
{u(f)− uc1S} dV + uc ≥ uc.
Therefore, it follows that US(f, L̃) ≥ US(g, L̃) and US(f, L) ≥ US(g, L).
Case 3) E ′ 6∈ Ω(L) and neither Ω(L) nor Ω(L̃) is singleton. Then, as in Case 2,
US(g, L̃) = US(g, L) = uc. Moreover, that Ω(L) and Ω(L̃) are not singleton implies
m̃(f) = m(f) = uc. Thus, it yields that
US(f, L̃) = ϑL̃
∫
E
{u(f)− uc1S} dV + uc ≥ uc;
US(f, L) = ϑL
∫
E
{u(f)− uc1S} dV + uc ≥ uc.
As a result, we have f %L g and f %L̃ g.
Case 4) E,E ′ ∈ Ω(L̃). Then, the above equations hold for both f and g. Thus, it
follows that
f %L g ⇐⇒
∫
E




⇐⇒ f %L̃ g.
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As a result, it holds in all cases that f %L g if and only if f %L̃ g. Since
(L, L̃), E, E ′, c, f and g are arbitrary, SCoI is thus satisfied. Q.E.D.
3.B.4.1. Proof of Corollary 3.4.1
The proof will be conducted by showing both (I) and (II) are equivalent to (III).
First, the following claim shows the equivalence between (II) and (III).
Claim 3.16. Let V : P(S) → [0, 1] be a capacity and ϑ ∈ R++ be a number
such that defining a set function V̂ : P(S) → [0, 1] by V̂ (B) = 1 if V (S \ B) = 0,
and V̂ (B) = ϑV (B) otherwise, yields a null-additive capacity. Then, for any affine
function u on Π(A), (u, V, ϑ) is an S-FAEU representation if and only if (u, V, V̂ ) is
an ω-FAEU representation.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary u, and let V , ϑ and V̂ be as assumed.
Then, V , ϑ and V̂ satisfies the assumptions of Claim 3.4-(b). Therefore, for any
L ∈ L and h ∈ H, it follows that∫⋃
Ω(L)







where uhL = mins∈⋃Ω(L) U(h, L) and U is the mapping given in Definition 3.2. Q.E.D.
Now, we show the equivalence between (I) and (III). Assume statement (I). Then,
by Claim 3.1, {%L}L∈L satisfies all the axioms previously postulated. Due to this, the
sufficiency parts will be based on all the notations and claims made previously.
By Theorem 3.2, {%L}L∈L admits an FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L). Fix this
tuple, and let V̂ = VL. By Claim 3.15-(c), for any B ∈ P(S), V̂ (B) > 0 if and only
if V (B). Let Ω(L) = {E ∈ L | V̂ (E) > 0} and ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | VL(E) > 0}. Then,
Claim 3.13-(a) and Claim 3.15-(a) jointly imply that Ω(L) = ∆(L) = {E ∈ L | V (E) >
0}. For every L ∈ L, let ωL, ϑL ∈ R++ be as in Claim 3.11-(b) and Claim 3.15-(b).
Then, under Corollary 3.3.1, the following claim concludes the sufficiency of (III).
Claim 3.17. Under SCoR and SCoI, there exists a ϑ ∈ R++ such that for all L ∈ L
and any B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S}, VL(B) = ϑV (B).
Proof. As shown in Corollary 3.3.1, SCoR implies that ωL = 1 holds for all
L ∈ L\ {L}. Hence, for any L ∈ L, VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] is the restriction of V̂ on Σ(L).
Let L, L̃ ∈ L be such that L ∩ L̃ 6= ∅. Then, by Claim 3.15-(b) and the above
statement, for any E ∈ L ∩ L̃, it holds that V̂ (E) = ϑLV (E) = ϑL̃V (E). Since
ϑL, ϑL̃ ∈ R++, we have ϑL = ϑL̃. Thus, for any L, L̃ ∈ L, ϑL = ϑL̃ whenever L∩ L̃ 6= ∅.
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As shown in the proof of Claim 3.15-(c), this implies that ϑL = ϑL holds for any
L ∈ L \ {L}.
Under Claim 3.15-(c), it now suffices to show that V̂ (B) = ϑLV (B) also holds
for B ∈ P(S) \ {S} that satisfies V (S \ B) = 0. Let B ∈ P(S) \ {S} be such
that V (S \ B) = 0. Then, there exists an L̂ ∈ L \ {L} such that B ∈ L̂, and by
Claim 3.15-(b), we have V̂ (B) = ϑL̂V (B). Thus, ϑL̂ = ϑL implies V̂ (B) = ϑLV (B).
Therefore, in conjunction with Claim 3.15-(c), it holds for every B ∈ P(S) \ {S}
that V̂ (B) = ϑLV (B). Note that B has to be a proper subset of S because no L ∈
L \ {L} includes S as a cell. Let ϑ = ϑL. Then, for all L ∈ L \ {L} and B ∈ Σ(L) \ S,
VL(B) = ϑV (B). Q.E.D.
Necessity of (III). Assume statement (III). The uniform axioms and SCoR are
implied by Corollary 3.3.1, while under Claim 3.16, SCoI follows. Q.E.D.
3.C. Proofs for Section 3.5
3.C.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Suppose {%L}L∈L admits an FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L).
Fix an arbitrary (L,D) ∈ R, and let E ∈ L be the cell such that D ⊆ E. Then,





























+ (1− β) min
s∈S
u(h),
where β = (V (D)VL(E))/V (E). By the monotonicity of V and VL, we have β ∈ (0, 1).
Define VD : P(D) → [0, 1] by VD(B) = V (B)/V (D) for every B ∈ P(D). Then,
VD forms a capacity on P(D) as V is a capacity on P(S). Thus, for any f ∈ CD, it
follows that





+ (1− β) min
s∈S
u(h).
For every h ∈ H, let ID be the functional given by ID(h) =
∫
D u(h)dVD.
Let f, g ∈ CD be such that f ∼L g, and given an α ∈ (0, 1), let lα = αf + (1− α)g.
Simply let uf = mins∈S u(f) (resp., ug and ul
α). By Claim 3.7, CD is convex, meaning
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that lα ∈ CD for all α ∈ (0, 1). Thus, for all α ∈ (0, 1), it yields that
U(lα, L) = βID(lα) + (1− β)ul
α
= βID(lα) + (1− β)
(
αuf + (1− α)ug
)
.
The second line is implied by the definition of CD. That is, for any h ∈ CD and





β (ID(g)− ID(f)). Hence, we have
U(lα, L)− U(f, L) = β
(
ID(lα)− αID(f)− (1− α)ID(g)
)
.
Since β > 0, by definition, %L reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CD
if and only if for any f, g ∈ CD and α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼L g implies ID(lα) ≥ αID(f) +
(1−α)ID(g) (resp., ≤). Therefore, by Schmeidler’s proposition (Schmeidler (1989, .pp
582-583)), %L⊂ CD × CD reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) if and only if VD
is convex (resp., concave) on P(D).
Since V and VD differ only in positive multiplication on P(D) with respect to a
constant multiplier 1/V (D), thus the convexity (resp., concavity) of V and VD are
equivalent on P(D). As a result, %L⊂ CD × CD reveals uncertainty aversion (resp.,
loving) if and only if V is convex (resp., concave) on P(D).
Suppose that V is convex (resp., concave) on P(D). Then, for every D̃ ⊆ D, V is
convex (resp., concave) on P(D̃). Let (L̃, D̃) ∈ R be arbitrary such that D̃ ⊆ D. Let
Ẽ ∈ L̃ be the cell that satisfies D̃ ⊆ Ẽ. Then, for every f ∈ CD̃, it follows that





+ (1− β̃) min
s∈S
u(f),
where β̃ = (V (D̃)VL̃(Ẽ))/V (Ẽ) > 0, and VD̃(B) = V (B)/V (Ẽ) for every B ∈P(D̃).
By assumption, VD̃ is also convex (resp., concave) on P(D̃). Thus, as shown in
the proof for %L on CD, %L̃⊂ CD̃ × CD̃ reveals uncertainty aversion (resp., loving).
The proof is complete as (L,D), (L̃, D̃) ∈ R are assumed to be arbitrary. Q.E.D.
3.C.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2
Statement (I). Suppose {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ,ω).
For every L ∈ L, let VL be the capacity such that for all D ∈ Σ(L) \ {S}, VL(D) =
ωLV̂ (D). Let (L,B) ∈ R be arbitrary.
By Claim 3.12, for all h ∈ CB ∩ HL, Uω(h, L) =
∫
B u(h)dVL + (1 − VL(B))u(h),
where h is the constant act such that for all t ∈ S \B, h(s) = h(t). Let IB denote the
functional IB(·) =
∫
B u(·)dVL. Let f, g ∈ CB ∩ HL be arbitrary such that f ∼L g. As
in the previous proof, given an α ∈ (0, 1), let lα = αf + (1 − α)g. By construction,
for all α ∈ (0, 1), lα ∈ CB ∩ HL. Thus, it follows that Uω(lα, L)− Uω(f, L) = IB(lα)−





, where uf = u(f). Notice that ulα = αuf + (1− α)ug.
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Thus, ulα − uf = (1− α)(ug − uf ). Moreover, f ∼L g implies (1− VL(B))(ug − uf ) =
IB(f)− IB(f). Hence, it yields that
Uω(lα, L)− Uω(f, L) = IB(lα)−
(
αIB(f) + (1− α)IB(g)
)
.
Given this, by definition, %L exhibits uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩HL if
and only if for all f, g ∈ CB ∩HL and α ∈ (0, 1), IB(lα) ≥ αIB(f) + (1−α)IB(g) (resp.,
≤). Therefore, the first statement is equivalent to that VL is convex (resp., concave)
on P(B) ∩ Σ(L). Recall that VL(D) = ωLV̂ (D) holds for all D ∈ Σ(L) \ {S}. As a
result, %L exhibits uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩ HL if and only if V̂ is
convex (resp., concave) on P(B) ∩Σ(L).
Suppose %L exhibits uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩ HL. Then, as
shown above, V̂ is convex (resp., concave) on P(B) ∩ Σ(L). Let (L̃, B̃) ∈ R be
arbitrary such that B̃ ⊆ B and there is a K ⊆ (L ∩ L̃) satisfying B̃ = ⋃K. Then,
it holds that P(B̃) ∩ Σ(L̃) = P(B̃) ∩ Σ(L) ⊆ (P(B) ∩ Σ(L)). Thus, V̂ is convex
(resp., concave) on P(B̃)∩Σ(L̃), and so is VL̃. Therefore, as shown above, %L̃ exhibits
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB̃ ∩HL̃. Q.E.D.
Statement (II). Suppose {%L}L∈L admits an S-FAEU representation (u, V,ϑ).
Let (L,D) ∈ R be arbitrary, and suppose that %L reveals uncertainty aversion
(resp., loving) on CD. Then, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1, V is convex
(resp., concave) on P(D). Let (L̂, B) ∈ R be arbitrary such that B ⊆ D. Then, V is
convex (resp., concave) on P(B). Given V and ϑL̂, define a capacity VL̂ : Σ(L̂)→ [0, 1]
as in Definition 3.4-(2). Then, since V is convex (resp., concave) on P(B), VL̂ is convex
(resp., concave) on P(B)∩Σ(L̂). In addition, by Claim 3.4-(b), for all h ∈ CB∩HL̂, it
holds that US(h, L̂) =
∫
S u(h)dVL̂. Therefore, as shown in the proof of (I), %L̂ reveals
uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on CB ∩HL̂. Q.E.D.
3.C.3. Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits an ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ), and
that %L and %L̃ reveal uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) on F .
(I) When ΣF ⊆ Σ(L), the statement is a consequence of SCoR.
(II) Suppose that Σ(L) ⊆ ΣF ⊆ Σ(L̃). Then, by (I), the statement holds for any
L̂ ∈ L that satisfies ΣF ⊆ Σ(L̂). The remaining part is a special case of (III) in which
ΣF and Σ(L̃) coincide.
(III) Suppose thatΣ(L̃) ⊆ ΣF . Then,HL̃ ⊆ F . Since functional IL̃(h) =
∫
S u(h)dV̂
represents %L̃ on HL̃, by Schmeidler’s proposition, %L̃⊂ F × F revealing uncertainty
aversion (resp., loving) implies that V̂ is convex (resp., concave) on Σ(L̃). Moreover,
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Σ(L) ⊆ ΣF implies that CE ⊂ F holds for every E ∈ L. By assumption, %L reveals un-
certainty aversion (resp., loving) on each CE. As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1,
%L⊂ F×F revealing uncertainty aversion (resp., loving) implies that V is convex (resp.,
concave) on S (L), where S (L) is the semi-ring of S given by S (L) = ⋃E∈L P(E).
Fix an arbitrary L̂ ∈ L such that (L, L̂), (L̂, L̃) ∈ L . Then, it holds that S (L̂) ⊆
S (L). Thus, V and V̂ are convex (resp., concave) on S (L̂) and Σ(L̂), respectively.
Let U be the functional given in Corollary 3.3.1. Then, U(h, L̂) =
∫
S U(h, L̂)dV̂
represents <L̂ on F . Let f, g ∈ F be arbitrary such that f ∼L̂ g. Recall that V is
convex (resp., concave) on S (L̂) = ⋃E∈L̂ P(E), and V̂ is convex (resp., concave) on
Σ(L̂). Thus, for any α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that∫
S










U(f, L̂)dV̂ + (1− α)
∫
S
U(g, L̂)dV̂ (resp., ≤).
As a result, for any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), f ∼L̂ g implies αf+(1−α)g %L̂ f (resp.,
-L̂). Hence, for any L̂ ∈ L that satisfies (L, L̂), (L̂, L̃) ∈ L , %L̂ reveals uncertainty
aversion (resp., loving) on F . Q.E.D.
3.C.4. Proof of Proposition 3.4
3.C.4.1. Preliminaries for The Proof
We introduce some notations and claims which are essential for the proof.
Suppose that {%L}L∈L admits an FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L).
Let L ∈ L be arbitrary, and let |L| = m.
Fix an f ∈ H. Given %L, let pL(f) = (Ei)mi=1 be a permutation of L such that:
(A1) for every i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, (
∫
Ei u(f)dV )/V (Ei) ≥ (
∫
Ei−1 u(f)dV )/V (Ei−1).
Fix this pL(f), and equip L with a lexicographic index (((i, r))|E
i|
r=1)mi=1 such that:
(A2) for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ⋃|Ei|r=1 {s}(i,r) = Ei; and
(A3) for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and r ∈ {2, . . . , |Ei|}, u(f(t)) ≤ u(f(t′)) for t ∈
{s}(i,r−1) and t′ ∈ {s}(i,r).
Let oL(f) denote a typical indexed partition that satisfies (A1)-(A3), i.e.,
oL(f) =
{
{s}(1,1), . . . , {s}(k,|Ek|), {s}(k+1,1), . . . , {s}(m,|Em|)
}
.
Denote by OL(f) the set of all indexed partitions over L induced by f and %L in the
way satisfying (A1)-(A3).
Given f ∈ H and oL(f) ∈ OL(f), let vL(f) = (v1L, . . . , vmL ) be the m-sequence such






i), and vmL = VL(Em).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let vL,i(f) = (vL,(i,1), . . . , vL,(i,|Ei|)) be the |Ei|-sequence given
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by vL,(i,r) = (V (⋃|Ei|j=r {s}(i,j))−V (⋃|Ei|j=r+1 {s}(i,j)))/V (Ei) for each r ∈ {1, . . . , |Ei|−1},
and vL,(i,|Ei|) = V ({s}(i,|Ei|))/V (Ei). Define a function voL(f) : L→ [0, 1] by
voL(f)({s}(i,r)) = vL,(i,r)viL.
Finally, given an f ∈ H, define a function uf : L→ R by uf ({s}) = u(f(s)).
Slightly abuse the notation and consider voL(f) and uf also to be vectors in n-
dimensional Euclidean space. That is, suppose also that uf ,voL(f) ∈ Rn.
Let H be the set of acts given by
H = {h ∈ H | ∀s, t ∈ S, [s 6= t =⇒ u(h(s)) 6= u(h(t))]}.
Then, for any h ∈ H, the followings hold: (i) for every L ∈ L, h 6∈ HL unless L = L;
and (ii) For L, oL(h) uniquely exists. Thus, whenever L and h ∈ H are considered, we
simply write vh instead of vo
L
(h).
Given L ∈ L, h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h), define F [h | oL(h)] and C[h | oL(h)] by
F [h | oL(h)] =
f ∈ H
∣∣∣∣ [∀s, t ∈ S, u(h(s)) ≥ u(h(t))⇒ u(f(s)) ≥ u(f(t))]∧ [oL(h) ∈ OL(f)]
 ;
C[h | oL(h)] =
{
uf | f ∈ F [h | oL(h)]
}
.
Claim 3.18. Suppose {%L}L∈L admit an FAEU representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L).
Then, for every L ∈ L, the following statements hold.
(a) For any h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h), C[h | oL(h)] is a convex cone.
(b) %L is as uncertainty averse as %L if and only if for any h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈
OL(h), vh − voL(h) = 0.
Proof. Let L ∈ L be arbitrary.
(a) Fix h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h) arbitrarily.
Clearly, (HC ∪ {h}) ⊂ F [h | oL(h)]. Hence, {0} ⊂ C[h | oL(h)]. Let f ∈ F [h | oL(h)]
be such that h 6= f . Let g be an act such that for every s ∈ S, u(g(s)) = αu(h(s)) +
βu(h(f)), where α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.
Given that oL is the unique for h, it thus yields the unique index system that
satisfies (A1)-(A3) for h and f simultaneously. Hence, by the definition of F [h | oL(h)],
for all s, t ∈ S, u(h(s)) ≥ u(h(t)) implies u(g(s)) ≥ u(g(t)). This implies that f , g and
h are pairwise comonotonic on each Ei ∈ L. Hence, by (A1) and comonotonicity, for
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This implies oL(h) ∈ OL(g).
Therefore, we have g ∈ F [h | oL(h)], meaning that ug ∈ C[h | oL(h)]. As a result,
C[h | oL(h)] is a convex cone in Rn.
(b) Clearly, for any c ∈ HC , U(c, L) = U(c, L). Thus, %L is as uncertainty averse
as %L if and only if for any h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h), and for any f ∈ F [h | oL(h)],
U(f, L) = U(f, L).








The second equality follows the definition of F [h | oL(f)]. That is, function voL(·) solely
depend on the indices given by oL(·), rather than the specific act by which the indexed
partition oL(·) is induced. Thus, given that oL(h) ∈ OL(f) for all f ∈ F [h | oL(h)], the
second equality holds.
Therefore, for any f ∈ F [h | oL(h)], it follows that












Consequently, the followings are equivalent:
(i) %L is as uncertainty averse as %′L̃.
(ii) ∀h ∈ H, ∀oL(h) ∈ OL(h),∀u ∈ C[h | oL(h)], u · (vh − voL(h)) = 0.
By (a), for any h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h), C[h | oL(h)] is a convex cone such that
{0} ⊂ C[h | oL(h)]. This implies that vh − voL(h) lies in both the dual and polar
cone of C[h | oL(h)]. Therefore, statement (ii) holds if and only if for all h ∈ H and
oL(h) ∈ OL(h), vh − voL(h) = 0. Q.E.D.
3.C.4.2. Proof of The Proposition
Let {%L}L∈L be an arbitrary FAEU preference, and let (u, V, {VL}L∈L) denote the
representation. Fix this tuple. The proof will be concluded by showing both (I) and
(III) are equivalent to (II).
(II) ⇔ (III). Let u and V be as fixed, and let P and ϑ be as in (II).
By Claim 3.16, {%L}L∈L admits the ω-FAEU representation (u, V, P ) if and only if
it admits the S-FAEU representation (u, V, ϑ).11
11For the fixed tuple (u, V, {VL}L∈L), recall that we assumed, for all L ∈ L, (S,Σ(L)) does not have
any nonempty VL-null event. By the definition of FAEU, this implies that (S,P(S)) does not have
any nonempty V -null event. Hence, given that {%L}L∈L admits the representation (u, V, {VL}L∈L),
if {%L}L∈L precisely admits the representation (u, V, P ) as in (II), then (S,P(S)) does not have
any nonempty P -null or V -null event. Therefore, the following statements are equivalent: (i) for
all B ∈ P(S) \ {S}, P (B) = ϑV (B); and (ii) for all B ∈ P(S), P (B) = 1 if V (S \ B) = 0, and
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Therefore, by Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.4.1, {%L} satisfies all the axioms given
previously, in which Richness is trivial. Notice that P is a probability measure on
P(S). Thus, for all L ∈ L, %L satisfies independence on HL. Q.E.D.
(I) ⇔ (II). Let {%L}L∈L and (u, V, {VL}L∈L) be as fixed, and let V̂ denote VL.
Invoke the notations given in Appendix 3.C.4.1.
Define the following properties of {%L}L∈L and (u, V, {VL}L∈L):
(P1) For every L ∈ L \ {L}, %L is as uncertainty averse as %L.
(P2) For any L ∈ L \ {L}, h ∈ H and oL(h) ∈ OL(h), vh − voL(h) = 0.
Then, by definition, {%L}L∈L satisfies statement (I) if and only if it satisfies (P1). In
addition, by Claim 3.18-(b), {%L}L∈L satisfies (P1) if and only if it satisfies (P2). As
a result, statement (I) is equivalent to (P2).
Now, assume (P2).
For a fixed L ∈ L \ {L}, let f ∈ H be an act that satisfies the following condition:
∃oL(f) ∈ OL(f),∃s0 ∈ S, {s ∈ S | u(f(s)) ≥ u(f(s0))} ∈ Σ(L).
Then, for this f and oL(f), vh − voL(f) = 0 yields that VL(Df ) = V̂ (Df ), where
Df = {s ∈ S | u(f(s)) ≥ u(f(s0))}. Note that L ∈ L \ {L} and such f ∈ H are
arbitrary. Thus, for all L ∈ L \ {L} and D ∈ Σ(L), VL(D) = V̂ (D). As a result,
{%L}L∈L admits the ω-FAEU representation (u, V, V̂ ), where V̂ = VL.
Therefore, by (P2), for any nonempty E ⊂ S, any s∗ ∈ E, D ⊂ E, and any
B,B ⊂ S, if s∗ 6∈ D, s∗ 6∈ B, E ∩B = ∅ and D ⊆ B, then it holds that
V ({s∗} ∪D)− V (D)
V (E)
(
V̂ (E ∪B)− V̂ (B)
)
= V̂ ({s∗} ∪B)− V̂ (B). (3.7)
Note that E 6= S since L 6= L in (P2), and S is not a cell for any L ∈ L \ {L}.





For a given s ∈ S, let ϑs denote this ratio. Then, ϑsV (E) = V̂ (E) holds for any E ⊂ S
such that s ∈ E. Thus, for any s, s′ ∈ S, it follows that ϑs = ϑs′ . As a result, there is
a unique ϑ ∈ R++ such that for every B ∈P(S) \ {S}, ϑV (B) = V̂ (B).
Set D = B = ∅. Then, for any s ∈ S and any E,D ⊂ S that satisfy s ∈ E and





V̂ ({s} ∪D)− V̂ (D)
V̂ (E)
,
where the first equality follows the previous equation. Hence, for any s ∈ S and D ⊆ S,
we have V̂ ({s}) = V̂ ({s} ∪D)− V̂ (D) whenever s 6∈ D. By iteration, for any disjoint
P (B) = ϑV (B) otherwise. This is because, under the non-nullity, B = S is the unique event such
that V (S \B) = 0. As a result, P , V and ϑ satisfy the assumption of Claim 3.16.
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B,D ⊂ S, it follows that V̂ (B) = V̂ (B ∪ D) − V̂ (D). Thus, V̂ : P(S) → [0, 1] is
additive. That is, V̂ is the probability measure P in (II).
As a result, (P2) implies statement (II).
Conversely, assume (II).
For every L ∈ L, let PL be the restriction of P on Σ(L). Then, V and {PL}L∈L
satisfy: (i) for every L ∈ L \ {L}, PL is a probability measure; (ii) for every B ∈
P(S) \ {S}, P (B) = ϑV (B); and (iii) for any disjoint B,D ⊂ S, B ∪D 6= S implies
V (B ∪D)− V (D) = V (B). Note that (iii) is implied by (i) and (ii).
Let U be the functional that represents {%L}L∈L, and let L ∈ L\{L} be arbitrary.





where for every (i, r), s(i,r) denotes the unique state in {s}(i,r).
Moreover, by the definition of voL(f), for any {s}(k,j) ∈ L, it follows that
voL(f)({s}(k,j)) =









where D = ⋃|Ek|r=j+1 {s}(k,r) and B = ⋃ni=k+1Ei. The second line is implied by (i) and
(iii), while the last line follows (ii).







u(f)dP = U(f, L).
As a result, statement (II) implies (I). The proof is complete. Q.E.D.
3.C.5. Proof of Proposition 3.5
Fix an arbitrary L ∈ L \ {L}.
Statement (I). Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be FAEU preferences.
Denote by (u, V, {VL}L∈L) and (u′, V ′, {V ′L}L∈L) the representations, where u = u′
and V = V ′. Let U , U , U ′ and U ′ be the associated functionals and mappings.
Then, u = u′ and V = V ′ jointly imply that U(·, L) = U ′(·, L) on H. Thus, for any
f ∈ H \ HC , there exists an h ∈ HL \ HC such that f ∼L h and f ∼′L h. In addition,
u = u′ implies that U(c, L) = U ′(c, L) holds for all c ∈ HC . Therefore, by definition,
%L is more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if for all h ∈ HL, U(h, L) ≤ U ′(h, L).
As a result, Claim 3.3 concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
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Statement (II). Let {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L be as assumed in (II).
Let Uω and Uω ′ be the corresponding functionals. Then, as shown in (I), %L is
more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if for all h ∈ HL, Uω ′(h, L) ≥ Uω(h, L).
Given V̂ and ωL, define a set function VL : Σ(L)→ [0, 1] as in Claim 3.12. Similarly,
define V ′L using V̂ ′ and ω′L. Then, by the claim, for all h ∈ HL, Uω =
∫
S u(h) dVL and
Uω ′(h, L) =
∫
S u(h) dV ′L. Therefore, by Claim 3.3, Uω ′(h, L) ≥ Uω(h, L) holds for all
h ∈ HL if and only if for all B ∈ Σ(L), V ′L(B) ≥ VL(B).
By the definition given in Claim 3.12, the latter statement is equivalent to that for
all B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S}, ω′LV̂ ′(B) ≥ ωLV̂ (B). Consequently, (II) holds.
Now, assume that V̂ = V̂ ′. Then, for all B ∈ Σ(L) \ {S}, ω′LV̂ ′(B) ≥ ωLV̂ (B) if
and only if ω′L ≥ ωL. Q.E.D.
Statement (III). Suppose {%L}L∈L and {%′L}L∈L are S-FAEU preferences.
Let US and US ′ be the corresponding functionals. Given u = u′ and V = V ′, as
shown in (I), %L is more uncertainty averse than %′L if and only if for all h ∈ HL,
US(h, L) ≤ US ′(h, L).
For all h ∈ HL, it holds that













where the integral part is non-negative. Therefore, US(h, L) ≤ US ′(h, L) holds for all
h ∈ HL if and only if ϑL ≤ ϑ′L. Q.E.D.
3.D. Details for Section 3.6
3.D.1. Details of Section 3.6.1
Reflection Example. Let UL be as in Theorem 3.1, and denote by UL the func-
tional. Given vL, assume vL({B}) = vL({Y }) and vL({R,B}) = vL({Y,G}). Given
the tuple (uL, vL), let u0 = uL($0), u1 = uL($x), u2 = uL($2x), v = vL({Y,G}) and
p = vL({Y })/v. Then, assumption (i), (ii) and (iii) imply the followings:
(A1) u0 < u1 < u2;
(A2) u1 > (1− p)u0 + pu2; and
(A3) 2vp 6= p.
By the definitions of UL and UL, vL({R,B}) = vL({Y,G}) and vL({B}) = vL({Y })
jointly imply that UL(f1) ≥ UL(f2) if and only if UL(f3) ≤ UL(f4).
Thus, consider only f1 and f2. Then, it holds that UL(f1) = ((1−p)u1+pu2)1{R,B}+
((1−p)u0 +pu1)1{Y,G}, and that UL(f2) = u11{R,B}+ ((1−p)u0 +pu2)1{Y,G}. By (A1),
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we have (1− p)u1 + pu2 > (1− p)u0 + pu1. Thus, under (A2), it follows that
UL(f1) = (1− v)
(




(1− p)u1 + pu2
)
;
UL(f2) = (1− v)
(
(1− p)u0 + pu2
)
+ vu1.
Therefore, it yields that UL(f1) − UL(f2) = (2vp − p)(u2 − u1). As a result, by (A1)
and (A3), UL(f1) 6= UL(f2), and 2vp > p if and only if UL(f1) > UL(f2).
Slightly-Bent Coin. Let UL be as in Theorem 3.1, and denote by UL the func-
tional. Given uL, let u− = uL(− $x), u0 = uL($ 0), and u+ = uL(+ $x). In addition,
given vL, define vH = vL({HR,HB}), vT = vL({TR, TB}), phr = vL({HR})/vH , and
ptb = vL({TB})/vT . Then, assumption (i), (ii) and (iii) imply the followings:
(A1) u− < u0 < u+;
(A2) (1− ptb)u− + ptbu+ < u0; and
(A3) vHphr 6= (1− vH)ptb, where ptb > 0 and phr > 0.
By the definition of UL, it holds that
UL(h1) = ((1− phr)u0 + phru+)1{HR,HB} + ((1− ptb)u− + ptbu0)1{TR,TB};
UL(h2) = u01{HR,HB} + ((1− ptb)u− + ptbu+)1{TR,TB}.
Given ptb > 0, (A1) implies that (1− phr)u0 + phru+ > (1− ptb)u− + ptbu0. On the
other hand, for h2, (A2) yields u0 > (1− ptb)u− + ptbu+. Thus, it follows that
UL(h1) = vH
(




(1− ptb)u− + ptbu0
)
;
UL(h2) = vHu0 + (1− vH)
(
(1− ptb)u− + ptbu+
)
.
As a result, we have UL(h1) − UL(h2) = (vHphr − (1 − vH)ptb)(u+ − u0). By (A1),
u+ − u0 > 0. Therefore, (A3) implies that UL(h1) 6= UL(h2). In particular, if vHphr >
(1− vH)ptb (resp., <), then UL(h1) > UL(h2) (resp., <).
3.D.2. Details of Section 3.6.2
Suppose fixed statistical knowledge is released in the form of L = {{r}, {s, t}}.
Let x = (x1, x2) be an interior feasible allocation such that x1r = x1s = x1t = x. We
show that x cannot be Pareto-optimal under L (i.e., for %1L and %2L).
Given the representation tuples, let p = P ({s, t}), and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, let
vit = V i({t})/V i({s, t}). By construction, x2 = (er − x, es − x, et − x). By (A1), we
have x2r < x2s < x2t . Thus, for x, it follows that Uω 1(x1) = u1(x), and that
Uω 2(x2) = (1− ω2L)x2r + ω2L
(
(1− p)x2r + (1− v2t )px2s + v2t px2t
)
= (1− ω2Lp)x2r + ω2L
(
(1− v2t )px2s + v2t px2t
)
.
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Set β = ω2Lp/(1− ω2Lp). By construction, we have β > 0. Let δ > 0 be an arbitrary
real number such that δ < min {(1 + β)(es − er), x/β}. Let x̂ = (x̂1, x̂2) denote the
allocation given by x̂1 = (x− βδ, x+ δ, x+ δ) and x̂2 = (x2r + βδ, x2s − δ, x2t − δ).
For x̂2, δ < (1 + β)(es − er) implies x̂2r < x̂2s < x̂2t . Thus, it follows immediately
that Uω 2(x̂2) = Uω 2(x2). Moreover, for x̂1, we have
Uω 1(x̂1) = (1− ω1L)u1(x− βδ) + ω1L
(
(1− p)u1(x) + pu1(x+ δ)
)
= (1− ω1Lp)u1(x− βδ) + ω1Lpu1(x+ δ).
Set α = ω1Lp. Then, it yields that









By (A3), we have u1(x − βδ) − u1(x) > −βδu1′(x) and u1(x + δ) − u1(x) > δu1′(x).
Thus, Uω 1(x̂1) − Uω 1(x1) > (α − β + αβ)δu1′(x). By construction, α − β + αβ =
(ω1L − ω2L)p/(1− ω2Lp). Hence, (A4) implies that α − β + αβ > 0. Therefore, under
(A1)-(A4), Uω 1(x̂1)− Uω 1(x1) > (α− β + αβ)δu1′(x) > 0.
As a result, x is not Pareto-optimal.
Bibliography
Aguiar, V. H., M. J. Boccardi, and M. Dean (2016): “Satisficing and stochastic
choice,” Journal of Economic Theory, 166, 445–482.
Ahn, D. S. (2008): “Ambiguity Without a State Space,” Review of Economic Studies,
75, 3–28.
Ahn, D. S. and H. Ergin (2010): “Framing Contingencies,” Econometrica, 78, 655–
695.
Anscombe, F. J. and R. J. Aumann (1963): “A Definition of Subjective Probabil-
ity,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34, 199–205.
Baillon, A., O. L’Haridon, and L. Placido (2011): “Ambiguity Models and the
Machina Paradoxes,” American Economic Review, 101, 1547–1560.
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer (2012): “Salience Theory of Choice
Under Risk,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1243–1285.
Caplin, A., M. Dean, and J. Leahy (2019): “Rational Inattention, Optimal Con-
sideration Sets, and Stochastic Choice,” The Review of Economic Studies, 86, 1061–
1094.
Caplin, A., M. Dean, and D. Martin (2011): “Search and Satisficing,” American
Economic Review, 101, 2899–2922.
Chambers, C. P. and F. Echenique (2016): Revealed Preference Theory, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chambers, C. P., F. Echenique, and E. Shmaya (2014): “The Axiomatic Struc-
ture of Empirical Content,” American Economic Review, 104, 2303–2319.
——— (2017): “General revealed preference theory,” Theoretical Economics, 12, 493–
511.
Dekel, E., B. L. Lipman, and A. Rustichini (2001): “Representing Preferences
with a Unique Subjective State Space,” Econometrica, 69, 891–934.
di Tillio, A., N. Kos, and M. Messner (2017): “The Design of Ambiguous
Mechanisms,” Review of Economic Studies, 84, 237–276.
Dillenberger, D., J. S. Lleras, P. Sadowski, and N. Takeoka (2014): “A
theory of subjective learning,” Journal of Economic Theory, 153, 287–312.
Ellsberg, D. (1961): “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 75, 643.




Epstein, L. G., M. Marinacci, and K. Seo (2007): “Coarse contingencies and
ambiguity,” Theoretical Economics, 2, 355–394.
Epstein, L. G. and J. Zhang (2001): “Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively
Unambiguous Events,” Econometrica, 69, 265–306.
Erdem, T., M. P. Keane, and B. Sun (2008): “A Dynamic Model of Brand
Choice When Price and Advertising Signal Product Quality,” Marketing Science,
27, 1111–1125.
Fishburn, P. C. (1970): Utility Theory for Decision Making, New York: Wiley.
Gajdos, T., T. Hayashi, J.-M. Tallon, and J.-C. Vergnaud (2008): “Attitude
toward imprecise information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 140, 27–65.
Gajdos, T., J.-M. Tallon, and J.-C. Vergnaud (2004): “Decision making with
imprecise probabilistic information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 647–
681.
Ghirardato, P. (2001): “Coping with ignorance: unforeseen contingencies and non-
additive uncertainty,” Economic Theory, 17, 247–276.
Ghirardato, P., F. Maccheroni, and M. Marinacci (2004): “Differentiating
ambiguity and ambiguity attitude,” Journal of Economic Theory, 118, 133–173.
Ghirardato, P. and M. Marinacci (2001): “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation
of Utility and Beliefs,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 26, 864–890.
——— (2002): “Ambiguity made precise: A comparative foundation,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 102, 251–289.
Gilboa, I., F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, and D. Schmeidler (2010): “Ob-
jective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model,” Econometrica, 78,
755–770.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1989): “Maxmin expected utility with non-unique
prior,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141–153.
——— (1993): “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 33–49.
——— (2003): “Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach,” Econometrica, 71,
1–26.
Hayashi, T. (2012): “Imprecise information and subjective belief,” International
Journal of Economic Theory, 8, 101–114.
Jamison, D. T. and L. J. Lau (1973): “Semiorders and the Theory of Choice,”
Econometrica, 41, 901.
Kahneman, D. (2003): “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics,” American Economic Review, 93, 1449–1475.
——— (2011): Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Karni, E. and M.-L. Vierø (2013): ““Reverse Bayesianism”: A Choice-Based The-
ory of Growing Awareness,” American Economic Review, 103, 2790–2810.
——— (2017): “Awareness of unawareness: A theory of decision making in the face of
ignorance,” Journal of Economic Theory, 168, 301–328.
134
Klibanoff, P., M. Marinacci, and S. Mukerji (2005): “A Smooth Model of
Decision Making under Ambiguity,” Econometrica, 73, 1849–1892.
Koray, S. and K. Yildiz (2018): “Implementation via rights structures,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 176, 479–502.
Kőszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2006): “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 1133–1165.
——— (2007): “Reference-dependent risk attitudes,” American Economic Review, 97,
1047–1073.
L’Haridon, O. and L. Placido (2010): “Betting on Machina’s reflection example:
an experiment on ambiguity,” Theory and Decision, 69, 375–393.
Li, H. (2018): “Uncertainty Attitude and Variable Information Structures,” Working
Paper.
Lleras, J. S., Y. Masatlioglu, D. Nakajima, and E. Y. Ozbay (2017): “When
more is less: Limited consideration,” Journal of Economic Theory, 170, 70–85.
los Santos, B. D., A. Hortaçsu, and M. R. Wildenbeest (2012): “Testing
Models of Consumer Search Using Data on Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior,”
American Economic Review, 102, 2955–2980.
Luce, R. D. (1956): “Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination,” Economet-
rica, 24, 178.
——— (1959): Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: John
Wiley and sons.
Machina, M. J. (2009): “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Rank-Dependence Axioms,”
American Economic Review, 99, 385–392.
——— (2014): “Ambiguity Aversion with Three or More Outcomes,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 104, 3814–3840.
Machina, M. J. and D. Schmeidler (1992): “A More Robust Definition of Sub-
jective Probability,” Econometrica, 60, 745.
Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti (2007): “Sequentially Rationalizable Choice,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 97, 1824–1839.
——— (2012a): “Categorize then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1141–1165.
——— (2012b): “Choice by lexicographic semiorders,” Theoretical Economics, 7, 1–23.
——— (2014): “Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets,” Econometrica, 82, 1153–
1176.
Manzini, P., M. Mariotti, and C. J. Tyson (2011): “Manipulation of Choice
Behavior,” SSRN Electronic Journal.
——— (2013): “Two-stage threshold representations,” Theoretical Economics, 8, 875–
882.
Masatlioglu, Y. and D. Nakajima (2013): “Choice by iterative search,” Theoret-
ical Economics, 8, 701–728.
135
Masatlioglu, Y., D. Nakajima, and E. Y. Ozbay (2012): “Revealed Attention,”
American Economic Review, 102, 2183–2205.
Matějka, F. and A. McKay (2015): “Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices:
A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model,” American Economic Review,
105, 272–298.
Mehta, N., S. Rajiv, and K. Srinivasan (2003): “Price Uncertainty and Con-
sumer Search: A Structural Model of Consideration Set Formation,” Marketing Sci-
ence, 22, 58–84.
Milgrom, P. and J. H. Roberts (1986): “Price and Advertising Signals of Product
Quality,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 796–821.
Nehring, K. (1999): “Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence,”
Mathematical Social Sciences, 38, 197–213.
——— (2000): “A Theory of Rational Choice under Ignorance,” Theory and Decision,
48, 205–240.
——— (2009): “Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under
ambiguity,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 1054–1091.
Nickerson, R. S. (1998): “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises,” Review of General Psychology, 2, 175–220.
Olszewski, W. (2007): “Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries,” Review of Economic
Studies, 74, 567–595.
Richter, M. K. (1966): “Revealed Preference Theory,” Econometrica, 34, 635–645.
Rigotti, L., C. Shannon, and T. Strzalecki (2008): “Subjective Beliefs and ex
ante Trade,” Econometrica, 76, 1167–1190.
Rottenstreich, Y. and A. Tversky (1997): “Unpacking, repacking, and anchor-
ing: Advances in support theory.” Psychological Review, 104, 406–415.
Rubinstein, A. and Y. Salant (2006): “A Model of Choice from Lists,” Theoretical
Economics, 1, 3–17.
——— (2012): “Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioural Data Sets,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 79, 375–387.
Salant, Y. and A. Rubinstein (2008): “( A , f ): Choice with Frames,” Review of
Economic Studies, 75, 1287–1296.
Savage, L. J. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.
Schmeidler, D. (1986): “Integral representation without additivity,” Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society, 97, 255–255.
——— (1989): “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity,”
Econometrica, 57, 571.
Schmidbauer, E. and A. Stock (2018): “Quality signaling via strikethrough
prices,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 35, 524–532.
Sen, A. K. (1971): “Choice Functions and Revealed Preference,” The Review of
Economic Studies, 38, 307.
136
Seo, K. (2009): “Ambiguity and Second-Order Belief,” Econometrica, 77, 1575–1605.
Simon, H. A. (1955): “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 69, 99.
Taylor, S. E. and S. C. Thompson (1982): “Stalking the elusive "vividness" effect.”
Psychological Review, 89, 155–181.
Thaler, R. H., C. R. Sunstein, and J. P. Balz (2010): “Choice Architecture,”
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974): “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases.” Science, 185, 1124–31.
——— (1991): “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 1039–1061.
Tversky, A. and D. J. Koehler (1994): “Support theory: A nonextensional rep-
resentation of subjective probability.” Psychological Review, 101, 547–567.
Wathieu, L. and M. Bertini (2007): “Price as a Stimulus to Think: The Case for
Willful Overpricing,” Marketing Science, 26, 118–129.
Zhang, J. (2002): “Subjective ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected
utility,” Economic Theory, 20, 159–181.
